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Abstract 
The world is experiencing increasing water scarcity and with such scarcity comes a greater 
likelihood of violence. Worldwide countries have had to investigate scarcities and resultant 
challenges such as violence. Low-income countries which suffer from lack of good 
governance and possess an array of ethnic groupings within their borders are the most 
vulnerable to water scarcity-related violence. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
relationship between water scarcity and conflict through the case study of Darfur. Darfur 
highlights how low-income countries lack the means to address grievances which arise 
between different ethnic groups around issues with water sources. This thesis takes an 
important stance on water scarcity in that it does not agree that water scarcity alone is enough 
to cause major incidences of violence, it is rather the mixture of ethnic tensions, water 
scarcity and bad governance which is toxic and results in violence. This is often forgotten by 
fear-ridden media articles and politicians which believe the globe is doomed to dehydration 
and war. Water scarcity and conflict are complex phenomena and thus require comprehension 
of the theoretical principles which created them. Traditional International Relations theories 
are therefore analysed in order to provide insight into why scarcities are occurring and how 
they have indirectly contributed to scarcities. Liberalism and realism have ensured that the 
world views nature as something to be used and profited from. This has proven to be 
unstainable and notes an area where International Relations needs to improve. Newer 
environmentally-minded theories have emerged and have fought to alter the current world 
order where natural resources are pillaged and lives are at risk. Such theories would include 
Green Theories. Green Theories are multifaceted and normatively show an alternate outcome 
when applied to the Darfur crisis. The purpose of the theoretical component of this thesis is to 
highlight that newer more environmentally-minded theories are needed in International 
Relations, and currently demand further study.    
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Opsomming 
Waterskaarste neem wêreldwyd toe, wat lei tot die potensiaal vir die toename van geweld. 
Geweld is een van die tendense verwant aan die wêreldwye toename in die skaarste-tendens. 
Lae-inkomste lande   met swak regerings wat bestaan uit ‘n uiteenlopende verskeidenheid 
etniese groepe binne hul grense, staan die sterkste kans om onder hierdie waterskaarste-
geweld deur te loop. Die doel van hierdie tesis is om die verhouding te ondersoek tussen 
waterskaarste en konflik deur gebruik te maak van die Darfur-gevallestudie. Darfur werp lig 
op die wyse waarop lae-inkomste lande nie oor die nodige middele beskik om hierdie griewe 
aan te spreek nie – griewe wat ontstaan tussen verskillende etniese groepe rondom kwessies 
verwant aan toegang tot en die beskikbaarheid van waterbronne.  Hierdie tesis neem ‘n 
belangrike standpunt in oor waterskaarste deurdat dit nie akkoord gaan daarmee dat dit alleen 
waterskaarste is wat vir meeste van die grootste gevalle van geweld verantwoordelik is nie. 
Hierdie tesis neem standpunt in dat die geweld eerder toegeskryf kan word aan ‘n kombinasie 
van etniese spanning, waterskaarste asook swak regering – ‘n toksiese kombinasie wat in 
geweld ontaard. Hierdie kombinasie word meesal deur die vreesbevange media-artikels en 
politici agterweë gelaat – politici wat glo die wêreld is gedoem tot dehidrasie en oorlog. 
Waterskaarste en konflik is ingewikkelde verskynsels. Dit verg begrip van die teoretiese 
beginsels wat daartoe aanleiding gegee het.  Tradisionele Internasionale Betrekkingsteorieë 
word vervolgens ontleed om insig te lewer oor die redes waarom skaarste plaasvind, en hoe 
dit indirek tot die skaarstes bydra. Liberalisme en realisme het meegebring daartoe dat die 
wêreldwye opvattings oor die natuur lei tot houdings van die natuur as bloot ‘n kommoditieit 
vir geldgewin. Hierdie wêreldbeskouing is duidelik nie meer volhoubaar nie, en bied ‘n 
leemte in die gebied van Internasionale Betrekkinge waar dit drasties kan verbeter. Nuwe 
omgewingsgesinde teorieë het nou ontwikkel wat die bestaande idees aanvat en is besig om 
die hedendaagse tendense te verander - tendense wat die natuurlike hulpbronne plunder en 
lewens in gevaar stel. Sulke teorieë sluit in Groen Teorieë. Groen Teorieë is veelsydig en dui 
normatief op ‘n alternatiewe uitkomste waar dit op die Darfur-krisis toegepas word. Die doel 
van die toeretiese gedeelte van hierdie tesis is om die kollig te werp op nuwe en meer 
omgewingsgerigte teorieë wat nodig is om Internasionale Betrekkinge op datum te bring, en 
wat tans dingende, verdere studie verg. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
 
“THE OCEANS COULD BE DEAD BY THE YEAR 2048” – The Inertia, 12 November 
2014 
“FOUR BILLION PEOPLE FACE SEVERE WATER SCARCITY” – The Guardian, 12 
February 2016 
“WORLD FACING FIRST MASS EXTINCTION SINCE THE DINOSAURS AS 
WILDLIFE POPULATIONS PLUNGE BY 67 PER CENT IN 50 YEARS” – Independent, 
27 October 2016 
These are just a few of the consistent headlines of newspapers, online blogs and television 
specials that serve as warning signs to people globally. It is not, however, only the media that 
warn of such a future; in October 2016 a special issue of the Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs edited by Burgess, Owen and Sinha outlined International Relations’ 
propensity to turn to securitization when water scarcity is prevalent.  
If nothing drastic is done, the world will die. There is no future for our children. So why are 
the people who have the power to make changes not doing anything? Why is the world still 
consumed by matters of so-called “high politics”1 without seeing that our collective existence 
is being threatened by our desires to gorge ourselves on things that harm the Earth?   
Every day people are made aware of the fact that our environment is facing devastation 
(Marten, Brooks & Suutari, 2005: 10). From these reports one can see that natural ecosystems 
from the oceans to the rainforests are close to “tipping points”; once they have tipped the 
damage will be irreversible and catastrophic for the human population (Marten et al., 2005: 
10). Scientists claim that the evidence of climate change is irrefutable and it therefore 
demands immediate attention in order to reverse the process.  
Climate change, and how it has challenged past populations, can and does have a destabilising 
effect on nations and states. These challenges can precipitate disruption in the geopolitical, 
social and economic realms (Mazo, 2010: 9). According to Speth and Haas (2006: 1), there is 
                                                 
1
 “High politics” refers to important issues that have to do with inter-state relations, such as war, diplomatic 
cooperation and peace. It refers specifically to problems that affect state sovereignty and autonomy. The state is 
the main unit of concern and analysis in “high politics” (Dikshit, 1999: 8).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 2 
 
more economic activity and there are more people on the Earth than ever before. This has a 
major impact on the environment and will have drastic consequences if not addressed. The 
environment is at present increasingly vulnerable and susceptible to any changes to natural 
resources within its ecosystems. This is exacerbated by the increasing numbers of human 
beings, who have a tendency to consume products at a more rapid rate than ever before (Speth 
& Haas, 2006: 1).  
The consequences of this increase in population size, and the concomitant consumerism, are 
felt throughout the ecosystem. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) estimates that more than 
10 000 species become extinct every year and, according to scientists, the “rapid loss of 
species we are seeing today is estimated by experts to be between 1,000 and 10,000 times 
higher than the natural extinction rate” (WWF, 2014a). The main causes of these losses are 
habitat degradation, over-exploitation in fishing and hunting, as well as habitat loss; all of 
these features can be attributed to people’s need to survive or prosper in an ever increasing 
globalised world (WWF, 2014b). Fishing towns and islands that once had over-abundant 
stocks of fish have experienced a 95 per cent drop in their stocks over the last 50 years 
(Marten et al., 2005: 10).  
This over-exploitation has been studied by Garret Hardin, who contends that there is a 
fundamental problem with commonly owned resources (Hardin, 1968: 1246; Hasnas, 2009: 
96). In “The Tragedy of the Commons” Hardin states that: 1) commonly owned resources will 
be over-exploited; 2) the tragedy of the commons
2
 cannot be resolved “by appealing to the 
consciences of those exploiting the resource”; and 3) that the only real solution to such a 
tragedy would be the privatisation of the resource (Hardin, 1968: 1246; Hasnas, 2009: 96; 
Goodin, 1992: 7). Much of this framework can be applied to the many areas where 
environmental degradation is resulting in high levels of scarcity and loss of ecosystems 
(Goodin, 1992: 7).  
Animals and the larger natural ecosystems are not, however, the only areas that are 
experiencing great turmoil and, even though humans are the perpetrators of the destruction, 
they are also at the receiving end of it. Natural resources that have long been used as sources 
of survival for humans are now scarcer (Bouguerra, 2006: 49). The scarcity of drinkable water 
                                                 
2
 The “tragedy of the commons” refers to a “commons”, which is a natural resource that is shared by many 
people. Hardin states that when such commons are shared, no one person has a claim over the resource but rather 
has the right to use their fair share of the resource for survival or profits. The “tragedy” occurs when, through the 
lack of regulation, people begin to take more than their share and the resource become over-exploited. The 
common resource is rapidly depleted, leaving everyone with nothing (Reader, 1988: 51; Ponce, 2005). 
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causes the most concern for the human race. Carrington (2016) recently reported in The 
Guardian that at least four billion people experience water scarcity for at least one month a 
year. Water has always been a finite resource; however, there is more than enough water for 
the world’s population and ecosystems. The problem becomes apparent in the 
mismanagement and distribution of water. If it were not for some countries having more 
water sources than others and using this as political leverage, then there would be enough 
water to “meet the needs of a population ten times larger than today’s” (Bouguerra, 2006: 49).  
Water is the source of all life, for humans and the natural world. When people hear the words 
“water scarcity”, images of droughts and deserts come to mind. Sandra Postel, however, 
argues that water scarcity is in reality the consequence of the increasing consumption of 
water. From the 1950s until the early 1990s the global consumption of water tripled. In the 
1990s the response to this increasing demand involved engineers constructing more than 
38 000 dams and waterways that would help deal with floods and provide more water for 
agriculture, irrigation and drinking. This, however, is not a sustainable way to deal with this 
ever-increasing demand for water. Dams and lakes are shrinking, while water tables all 
around the world are declining. This has drastic implications for both the ecosystem and the 
human population (Postel, 1992: 2332).  
Lack of water can cause socio-political conflict. Animosity is particularly rife between the 
“haves” and the “have nots”. Societies that have an abundance of water sources are capable of 
dictating high prices for the water that they sell to their water-deprived neighbours. This can 
lead to conflicts. On a smaller, but equally important, level there is conflict among rural 
farmers and city dwellers. Competition over the scarce sources of water are increasingly 
present between farmers and urban populations. This almost trivial competition can, however, 
lead to armed conflicts and wars (Postel, 1992: 2332).  
The effects of water scarcity are the most detrimental in developing states. Africa is regarded 
as one of the most vulnerable continents when it comes to resource scarcity and conflict. 
There are two reasons for this: 1) Africa contains states that have the highest population 
growth rates in the world; and 2) “Africa has over the last few decades probably witnessed 
more destructive and violent intermediate-level conflicts than any other continent” (Derman, 
Odgaard & Sjaastad 2007: 2).  The fact that Africa still experiences the highest rates of 
poverty and famine in the world also contributes to this condition. An important aspect of this 
evaluation is the reality that African states, populations and economies rely solely on 
agriculture for their livelihoods. “Africa has experienced more intra-national violence than 
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any other continent over the last four decades and conflicts … over natural resources appear 
to be growing as these resources become scarcer and more difficult to access” (Derman et al., 
2007: 1). Many conflicts may be interpreted as being driven by reasons that have nothing to 
do with resource scarcity specifically; however, many of these conflicts are perpetuated by 
such scarcity (Derman et al., 2007: 1).  
Conflict in developing states has been understood by influential scholars (Homer-Dixon, 
1991, 1995, 1996; Hardin, 1968; Taylor, 2004, 2011; Maxwell & Reuveny, 2000) as having 
innate links with resource scarcity and that most of Africa’s armed conflicts can be explained 
within this framework (Derman et al., 2007: 2).  Africa is also unique in that it contains 
thousands of different ethnic groups that add fuel to any competition over scarce resources. 
Most African rural people are pastoralists who require water to hydrate their cattle and crops. 
This leads to competition when water is scarce. Conflict often arises between the different 
ethnic groups over who has the right to that specific water source. This type of conflict can 
easily and rapidly escalate into bloody armed conflicts that involve one group taking over 
control of the source and the other fighting for its survival (Derman et al., 2007: 215).  
The links between water scarcity and conflict have been studied by an array of scholars 
(Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1995, 1996; Hardin, 1968; Munn, 2002; Postel, 1992 & Taylor, 2004, 
2011). The main conclusion of such studies highlights the extent to which there is a link 
between conflict and water scarcity; however, these links are complex and multi-faceted. 
Homer-Dixon (1991: 77) states that, “unfortunately, the environment-security theme 
encompasses an almost unmanageable array of sub-issues”. When water sources start to dry 
up, this affects states’ and regions’ ability to sustain themselves, which in turn results in the 
impoverishment of people, which in its turn causes ethnic and class cleavages to manifest 
violently. Water scarcity and general environmental degradation pose the threat of new forms 
of violence occurring in both the global North and South (Homer-Dixon, 1991: 78).  
Although the issue of water scarcity concerns all countries, it affects the poorer ones more 
seriously. This makes the situation dire for African countries. A good indication that water 
scarcity is affecting a country can be seen in four areas: economic decline; reduced 
agricultural production; disruption of legitimate social relations; and population displacement. 
In the case of the Sudan and Darfur regions specifically, all of these areas were affected and 
directly led to the years of war that ensued. The effects of water scarcity mean that several 
forms of conflict (insurgencies, ethnic violence, civil strife) occur which all work to 
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destabilize the security of states and regions (Homer-Dixon, 1991: 78). Ignoring them only 
means that the security threat to the state intensifies.  
As Homer-Dixon (1991: 81) points out, the literature on “specific connections” between 
water scarcity and “acute conflict are surprisingly thin”. This is because there are usually 
other factors that contribute immensely to the conflict, such as clashing religious beliefs. The 
different lifestyles of pastoralists and nomads often become central to conflict over water 
scarcity. In the case of Darfur land scarcity and ethnic misunderstandings contributed to the 
conflict. These are complex issues that often overshadow the underlying issue of water 
scarcity causing conflict. The stance in this thesis, however, remains that water scarcity is the 
catalyst to many conflicts, which have many intervening causes as well.  
An analysis of the many elements of water scarcity reveals that such scarcity has many links 
with armed conflicts in an ethnically divided Africa (Homer-Dixon, 2010: 3). The topic of 
“water wars” has garnered much attention from academics in the past (Barnaby, 2009; Gleik, 
1993; Irani, 1991; Pearce, 2006; Turton, 2000, 2001), with grand claims being made that most 
conflicts in Africa can be understood within the water scarcity framework (Munn, 2002: 146). 
Today, however, academics have taken a more moderate stance on the power of water to 
cause wars and armed conflicts (Homer-Dixon and Percival, 1998; McMichael, 1993; 
Tignino, 2005). The combination of water scarcity and ethnic divisions and how these 
elements aggravate each other is a crucial aspect of this thesis. As a specific illustration of this 
purported relationship, this thesis aims to study both ethnic tensions and water scarcity 
through a case study on the armed conflict in the Darfur province in Sudan.  
The Conflict in Darfur 
Several publications on the conflict in Darfur attribute the outbreak of violence to water 
scarcity and ethnic tensions. Resources were unfairly distributed based on different 
populations’ ethnic background and/or religious beliefs. Suliman (2011: 7) states that it was 
“changing resource dynamics, expanding poverty, lack of infrastructure, and political 
corruption which all underlie the conflict, which can only be superficially defined across 
ethnic lines”. This study will focus on such resource dynamics and ethnic lines and their 
contribution to the conflict. 
The United Nations calls the conflict in Darfur “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” 
(Morris, 2004). Since February 2003 Darfur has been in a protracted state of armed conflict 
(Ray, 2009: 213). Competition over scarce water between Arab pastoralists and black African 
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farmers is believed to have been the trigger of the violence (Schlein, 2011). This was 
exacerbated by the drought that the region had been experiencing since the 1970s 
(Gebrewold, 2013: 160). The drought forced many nomadic “tribes” to relocate to the south; 
this created further depletion of water in the south, which angered those who had lived there 
their whole lives (Gebrewold, 2013: 160). At recent peace summits and meetings delegates all 
agreed that access to water will be the key to peace in Darfur. Mohamed Yonis, Deputy Joint 
Special Representative of the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur, stated that 
“water is one of the main root causes of this conflict … there is a need to address this issue 
and we do believe that water will serve as an instrument for peace” (Schlein, 2011).  
Darfur is a vast and sparse western region in Sudan that has a strong tradition of opposition to 
central rule. It was one of the last regions to be commandeered by a European power after the 
Berlin Conference and remained independent until after the First World War, when the British 
took control. Darfur was resistant to central rule even after Sudan became independent from 
British rule in 1956. This resistance was manifested in violent skirmishes that lasted until the 
1970s between the government and rebels from Darfur. In the 21
st
 century Darfur has been 
economically marginalised compared to the rest of Sudan because of its secessionist 
characteristics (Nothold, 2009: 212; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2013: 65).  
In 2003 the war between North Sudan and the South began to dissipate as peace talks began 
to make progress; rebel groups in Darfur saw this and were angered that their needs were not 
being taken into account and that they were excluded (Nothold, 2009: 212; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
& Mhlanga, 2013: 65). The conflict in Darfur consisted of two insurgent groups fighting 
government forces over their marginalisation and consequent impoverishment. These groups 
were the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM). In 2003 it was these groups that “launched a joint attack on government targets, 
thereby igniting the current war” (Nothold, 2009: 212; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2013: 
65).  
The two groups were successful in the beginning through their attacks on government air 
bases, which destroyed government helicopters. The government, failing to quell the attacks, 
turned to the Sudanese Military Intelligence; this led to civilians and innocent people being 
killed in a myriad of air strikes and bombings. This was not the only form of violence that the 
Khartoum government used and financially supported; they involved Arab “Janjaweed” 
(devils on horseback) (Nothold, 2009: 212; Mazzei, 2009: 216). The Janjaweed militias rode 
into African homesteads and villages and violently assaulted the inhabitants. Janjaweed 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 7 
 
attacks were characterised by the systematic rape of women and children, the enslavement of 
young men, destruction of property and the “organised denial of food, medical and other relief 
supplies so as to promote deaths by ‘natural’ causes” (Nothold, 2009: 212; Mazzei, 2009: 
216).  
The Khartoum government clearly favoured the Arabic communities in Darfur and made sure 
that they were well supplied with water. This caused competition and frustration to emerge 
between the two ethnic groups. The Janjaweed attacks alone were responsible for the deaths 
of 180 000 African Darfurians. The attacks caused 200 000 people to seek safety in refugee 
camps in neighbouring countries (Mazzei, 2009: 216). Today the conflict has subsided (as a 
as a result of many agreements) but not in a way that will ensure the end of competition over 
water sources forever. Environmental depletion is increasing at a rapid rate; this means that if 
the competition over fair water distribution in Darfur is not resolved, then violent conflict will 
continue to mar the country. 
Research Problem 
With global environmental scarcities only becoming more and more prominent, the study of 
their consequences have become critically important (Cramer, 2000: 25). Climate-related 
scarcities are purported to influence conflict, especially in low-income countries. The 
relationship between water scarcity and conflict is supposedly not direct; instead it 
exacerbates existing societal weaknesses and proxy elements such as ethnic tension (Jacoby & 
Sasley, 2002: 107). Some believe that water stress may influence ethnic and other tensions 
that have existed since the partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1884 (Ndulo, 
2003: 315-317). Supposedly, these tensions can manifest in the form of armed conflicts, 
especially in the absence of good governance to quell competition or resolve the challenges 
associated with water scarcity. In the case of the Darfur region in Sudan, some argue that a 
toxic mix of water scarcity and ethnic tensions have led to a protracted armed conflict. In 
International Relations scholarship, there remains the interesting challenge that the issue of 
water scarcity straddles the lines between what constitutes “low politics” and “high politics”. 
Scholarship appears to be divided whether it is this tension between issues related to ethnic 
insecurities (high politics), on the one hand, or the structural violence of neoliberal 
environmental objectification globally (low politics), on the other hand, which are the primary 
culprits in fanning water insecurity, exacerbating physical violence and military conflict.  
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Research Questions 
Primary research question 
How credible is the IR scholarship which has framed the purported link between violent 
conflict and water insecurity, and is there any heuristic utility in the concomitant 
securitisation of water in particular?  
Sub-questions 
1) Do Green Theories within IR provide an analytically useful alternative/addition to the 
conservative theories of realism and liberalism, specifically with regards to environmental 
issues?  
2) Is there evidence that water scarcity in particular can be associated with armed conflicts in 
diverse ethnic communities in Africa, specifically in the Sudanese province of Darfur?  
3) Would environmental issues be addressed more efficiently if they were considered in 
terms of “high politics”? 
Objectives of Research 
The objective of this research is to describe and explain how climate change, and specifically 
water scarcity, may have major ramifications for the stability of low-income states. It 
provides the case study of Darfur and the armed conflict, which can be seen as a cautionary 
tale for the rest of Africa and the world. Is it the current dominant IR theories such as 
liberalism and realism which have been responsible for ignoring the real threat of 
environmental degradation? Could it be that such theories have led to the speeding up of 
resource depletion for the sake of economic gains? This research studies the descriptive nature 
of Green Theories which might be able provide an alternative perspective to that of realism 
and liberalism. Green Theories may also provide greater insight into how to deal more 
effectively with environmental issues. It is important to note that these issues are not Africa-
specific and can be experienced in the developed world as well. Climate change issues have 
long been side-lined by “high politics” and security threats; therefore, this research aims to 
frame environmental issues not as “high politics” threats, but as threats that increase the more 
the environment gets abused.  
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Theory 
The uses of political theories are prevalent throughout this thesis. It is therefore important to 
discuss the utility of theories. According to Mukherjee and Ramaswamy (2011: 7) theories 
can “be used to either defend or question the status quo, it takes into cognizance the facts and 
details, it explains and describes politics in abstract and general terms that allow space for 
critical imagination”. The main focus of political theories is to explain and describe real life 
events, political institutions and power relations (Goodwin, 2007: 4). When applied to this 
thesis, the use of Green Theories come into play because environmental issues need to be 
explained and described. The principles of Green Theories are descriptive and normative, 
however, this thesis remains centred on the descriptive nature of such theories.  
Throughout this thesis Green Theories are used in order to highlight their different approaches 
to environmental issues when compared to those of liberalism and realism. The contrasting 
descriptive nature of Green Theories highlights how realism and liberalism have only 
exacerbated environmental issues through their basic assumptions and global dominance. 
Liberal and realist theories have done little to explain or fully advocate for the environment, 
even if it appears that they want to (Laferriere & Stoett, 2006: 6-7; Weber, 2006: 104; De-
Shalit, 2006: 387). Liberalism and realism both understand the world through studying 
progress and humankind’s ability to control natural resources. When examining the key 
principles of both realism and liberalism, one can see that although they both support 
sustainability, they both negate it simultaneously (Laferriere & Stoett, 2006: 6). 
Realism’s main tenet that war is the norm and that national security is the priority which 
ensures that nature is exploited in the “service of a military-industrial elite” (Laferriere & 
Stoett, 2006: 6). Realism cannot fully advocate for the protection of nature because it is a 
theory that is (perhaps) unintentionally based on power politics, which demands an “ideology 
of biocontrol” (Laferriere & Stoett, 2006: 6). This biocontrol is amplified when it is believed 
that the entire international realm is always ready to go to war (Laferriere & Stoett, 2006: 7). 
When states do go to war, many of them disable their enemies through bombing dams and 
major water pipelines (Selden & So, 2004: 157). This is just one of the outcomes of realist 
beliefs that directly damage the environment and those that need it for their survival.  
Liberalism, although more optimistic about the human condition, also does not truly advocate 
for issues that will preserve our ecosystem (Weber, 2006: 104). Liberalism’s goal of peace 
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poses a threat to the environment and scarce resources, because it hides behind this façade 
while it openly advocates for the pillaging of natural resources in the pursuit of economic 
dominance. Liberalism’s strong ties with capitalism show exactly how damaging liberalism is 
to the environment. Capitalism is a system of economic distribution and expansion; it is 
characterised by its “constant drive for expansion in search of increased productivity and 
profit” (Cahn, 1995: 1). This characteristic leads to the overuse of limited environmental 
resources. Globalisation has caused a relaxing of national borders, which has in turn come 
with a relaxing of transnational corporations’ environmental responsibilities and 
accountability (Laferriere & Stoett, 2006: 7). 
Realist and liberal theories try to incorporate the plight of the environment into their policies. 
However, their basic assumptions and goals tell us that they will not put the environment 
before the protection of the state and economic profits. This is ironic, because if the 
environment suffers, then the protection of the state and economic gains will suffer. 
Liberalism and realism are “caught in a problematic ecological web, imposed by [their] own 
values and assumptions about human and non-human nature (and expressed in the 
commodifying language of nature as resources)” (Laferriere & Stoett, 2006: 7).  
This is not true of Green Theories. The ideological tenets are descriptive and provide new 
understandings of international processes which serve the environment better than those of the 
realist and liberal theories (Laferriere & Stoett, 2006: 7; Weber, 2006: 104). Green Theories 
claim that political order is best achieved through a holistic approach (Laferriere & Stoett, 
2006: 8). A holistic approach is defined by belief that all parts are connected to a larger whole 
and therefore the wellbeing of the whole is determined by the wellbeing of all the parts. The 
holistic approach takes into account the state of the environment and the long-term effects of 
exploiting it. This alone does not ensure the protection of the environment or resources; 
however, it does highlight the “ecological superstructure of (international) politics” 
(Laferriere & Stoett, 2006: 8).  
IR Green Theory Perspective 
Green Theories are not yet acknowledged as fully-fledged theories of International Relations, 
but rather as sub-fields of the wider theory of International Relations (Eckersley, 2004: 248). 
Green Theory was recognised as a sub-field only in the 1970s, after the issue of trans-
boundary ecological crises became more prominent (Eckersley, 2004: 248).  The body of 
theories themselves is based on the broad insights of ecology. Ecology is a sector of science 
that studies the relationship between organisms and their environments. Green Theories came 
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to prominence as the relationship between human beings and their environment became 
unstable because of the damage that is being inflicted on the environment (Wake & Malpas, 
2013: 154). Green Theories advocate for the closing of the gap that has occurred between 
“society and the environment” (Barry, 2007: 17). This ‘gap’ refers to the process whereby 
humans have distanced themselves from the natural world and no longer see themselves as 
being intrinsically linked to that world. It is important to note that Green Theory is a broad 
church; there are many different Green Theories and they will be addressed in later chapters. 
The recurrent theme that is prominent in Green Theories is the need for a change in societies’ 
instrumental relationship with nature and natural resources. The instrumental relationship 
highlights how human beings have begun to view the natural world as an instrument that can 
help them and their countries/companies accumulate wealth. Green theorists take a normative 
stance on many issues, especially with their belief that the relationship between society and 
nature should be a more intrinsic one where society realizes that through abusing the 
environment they are indirectly abusing themselves (Dobson & Lucardie, 2002: 191). 
Green Theory came to fruition in the 1970s, after the impact of social movements such as 
women’s rights, gay rights and the civil rights movement inspired academics to take the 
environmental movement seriously.  These movements caused many green parties to emerge 
in European politics, which were based on the four pillars of green politics: social justice, 
ecological responsibility, grassroots democracy and non-violence. Green Theories are among 
the recent international discourses that directly challenge neoliberal globalisation. Much like 
socialism and liberalism, Green Theories have a strong normative stance on justice, 
democracy, rights, the environment and the state. They also have a political economic branch 
which concerns itself with understanding the relationship between the environment, the 
economy and the state (Eckersley, 2004: 250).  
Instead of looking to realist or liberal theories only to explain water scarcity and conflict, the 
principles of Green theories are also investigated in this thesis. This is to ensure that an 
alternative perspective to that of realism and liberalism on the topic of environmental issues is 
given.  Relative to the literature of IR theories, that on Green Theories is not as abundant; 
however, the main principles are provided so as to give the reader a glimpse of what is to be 
expected in following chapters. Green issues have been recognized since the 1960s; however, 
the world has only seen the political implications of such issues recently (Weber, 2006: 104). 
Green Theories acknowledge that humans are, or rather should be, self-governing and 
autonomous agents. This can be applied to a main theme in green political theory when it 
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comes to theory of agency. The green belief in agency is that every person should have the 
autonomy to shape his or her social and personal circumstances. Green theorists believe that 
the current ecological crisis, coupled with the economic crisis can only be overcome by the 
self-determination of those affected. The use of the vague term ‘self-determination’ calls for 
Green theorists to clarify what they mean by self-determination (Goodin, 1992: 124-126).  
Non-violence is one of Green Theories’ central principles that guide the actions of people 
who follow green principles. Green Theories emerged out of opposition to violence and the 
nuclear arms race; therefore one can see that non-violence has remained important in these 
theories. Non-violence does not mean that greens believe that a state or individual should not 
be active in protecting themselves; they believe non-violent alternatives are abundant and can 
be used instead of violence (Goodin, 1992: 131). Many of the Green Theories’ values and 
beliefs have been adopted by liberal parties or realist-leaning elites; however, to adopt such 
theories piecemeal does not approach issues with the environment holistically (Goodin, 1992: 
124). Many scholars believe that such a patchwork approach to issues facing the environment 
and humankind’s existence will not be comprehensive enough to “save” the Earth (Goodin, 
1992: 126; Laferriere & Stoett, 2006: 6).  
When issues specifically around water scarcity reach crisis levels, IR tends to want to 
securitize them. This has many far-reaching consequences which are discussed at length in 
Chapter 3; however, in order to contextualise the concept of Securitization Theory, a brief 
synopsis is presented below.  
The securitization
3
 of water has become a popular topic among scholars and politicians. 
Securitization Theory was developed by the Copenhagen School and provides a competent, 
sophisticated research departure for general security studies (Williams, 2003: 528). The 
securitization discourse highlights how environmental issues are urgent and “interrelated to 
human security and well-being” (Fischhendler, 2015: 246). In 2003 a report was sent to the 
US Department of Defence which claimed that “climate change would challenge US national 
security in ways that should be considered immediate” (Fischhendler, 2015: 246). This points 
to the desire to make environmental issues part of a “high politics” agenda. If water can be 
‘securitized’ then high-ranking security departments could take it as a serious threat.  
                                                 
3
 To ‘securitize’ an issue it means that “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency 
measures” (Bourne, 2013: 53). 
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The resource that is ‘chosen’ the most to securitize is that of transboundary water. Many 
transboundary river basins in Africa have demanded the attention of national security. States 
that share a water source become environmentally, economically and politically 
interdependent. These interdependencies are what place water on the “national security” 
agendas. The act of ‘securitizing’ water, and linking conflict with water, have demanded a 
conceptual shift from traditional notions of security “as primarily lack of, or safety from, 
military threats to a concept that has been linked to a chain of ‘natural’ processes (such as 
water scarcity) and their impact on physical security and welfare” (Fischhendler, 2015: 247).  
Many environmentally minded people and politicians like to see water scarcity being raised to 
the level of “high politics” through securitization; however, this does not always ensure 
peace. Raising the profile of water scarcity to security guarantees raised awareness, faster-
acting resolutions and funds, but it also guarantees that great measures will be taken to 
prevent the threat. Fischhendler (2015: 248) states that, “once an issue is securitized, 
exceptional measures to prevent an existential threat are often legitimized as well, including 
the waging of war”. The act of ‘securitizing’ is an act that bends the rules of “normal politics” 
because it places issues beyond public debate and allows for decisions to be made on the basis 
of anxiety and impulse (Williams, 2003: 518).   
In the case of Darfur, this discourse does not relate to the “transboundary” nature of water 
securitization. However, one could interpret the secessionary desires of Darfur as being 
enough to warrant the transboundary discourse. Darfur has a history with wanting to secede 
from the rest of Sudan; this means that to Darfurians the water they were fighting over did 
have a symbolic transboundary nature. What is missing from the securitization discourse, 
however, is the fact that it does not take into account civil issues around water scarcity, such 
as is the case in Darfur.  
Research Design and Methodology 
This study is based on qualitative research. This means that the data and information on the 
selected topic will be gathered and analysed through an explorative, descriptive and 
explanatory method (Burnham, Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008: 40). All such data are 
based on secondary sources, which can be accessed through Stellenbosch University’s online 
databases and library. Two features of qualitative research are applicable to this thesis. Firstly, 
the research explicitly attends to and accounts for real-world contextual conditions. Secondly, 
the qualitative nature of the research ensures that insights from existing and new concepts aid 
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in explaining social behaviour and thinking (Yin, 2015: 9). In order to highlight such elements 
deductive reasoning
4
 is used in order to gain insight into the conflict in Darfur and the 
descriptive nature of Green Theories.  
The research design of this thesis takes the form of a case study. Yin (2008: 2) states that a 
case study design is helpful because many topics within the social sciences possess elements 
which are extensive and complex and often pertain to real-life events. The choice to use the 
case study design was taken because this thesis demands a detailed understanding of a real-
life phenomenon, which also encompasses several important contextual conditions (Yin, 
2009: 18; Yin & Davis, 2007).  
The specific case study which is used is the case of the conflict in Darfur, which started in 
2003. This case study was chosen because it highlights an African country which has a 
colonial history and is considered a low-income country (Holt & Daly, 2014; World Bank, 
2016). The case study design also allows for the context of extreme ethnic tensions, water 
scarcity and conflict to be studied in-depth (Homer-Dixon, 1991: 8). It is essential to study 
such phenomena here because they are relevant to answering the research questions.  
According to Yin, “doing case study research would be the preferred method … in situations 
when 1) the main research questions are ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions; 2) a researcher has little or 
no control over behavioural events; and 3) the focus of the study is a contemporary (as 
opposed to entirely historical) phenomenon” (2013: 13). This study applies Green Theories to 
a single case study. Hofstee (2006: 123) states that there are many risks in using case study 
research, including generalisations, subjectivity and regression away from the study’s focus. 
Hofstee (2006: 123) states that in order to balance out the risks one must combine the case 
study method with other techniques. The analysis and use of secondary sources has 
advantages and disadvantages. The advantages include: saving time and money, the use of 
advanced frameworks that already exist and the fact that the researcher does not have to reach 
populations that are vulnerable in order to re-interview them. Some of the disadvantages 
include the fact that the data may be incomplete, partial, biased or obsolete (Gray, 2013: 533).  
                                                 
4“The process of inferring conclusions from known information based on formal logic rules where conclusions 
are necessarily derived from the given information and there is no need to validate them by experiments” (Seel, 
2011: 911).   
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Structure of the Thesis 
The remaining chapters of this thesis are partitioned into four sections; below is a breakdown 
of each chapter.  
Chapter 2 is on the topic of water scarcity and conflict. It examines the links between water 
scarcity and conflict to see if this link is warranted or over-emphasized. 
Chapter 3 is on the topic of Green Theories and Securitization Theory. The spectrum of Green 
Theories is present in this chapter. It aims to show how Green Theories provide an alternative 
to the conservative theories of realism and liberalism on environmental issues. This chapter 
also includes an account of Securitization Theory and shows that while there is great heuristic 
utility in securitizing water, there are also great consequences. 
Chapter 4 provides the case study on Darfur. The case study dissects the conflict and applies 
the theories, ideas and opinions from previous chapters to the conflict.  
Chapter 5 provides the reader with the conclusions of the study.  
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 16 
 
Chapter 2: The Relationship between 
Water Scarcity and Conflict 
Introduction 
The relationship between water scarcity and conflict forms the foundation of this thesis. It is 
this relationship which determines how other elements of the thesis are linked. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine how credible the IR scholarship which framed the purported link 
between water insecurity and violent conflict is. Only once such examination has been 
provided can the descriptive attributes of Green Theories, Securitization Theory and the case 
study of Darfur be applied to the link.  
The world over there has been a creation of a “disastrous” outlook when it comes to water. A 
“crisis state of mind” is constructed around water. The UN has stated that the 21st century is 
“the century of water” (Berry, 2008: 15). Vice-President of the World Bank, Ismail 
Serageldin, said that “the wars of the next century will be over water” (de Villiers, 2000: 13).  
The vital nature of water and its relationship with possible conflict is highlighted well by 
Ward (2003: 4-5): 
There are alternatives to energy. But there are no alternatives for water apart from 
recycling and desalination. And desalination is not an easy option in continental-size 
countries. Well, I’ve got water, so maybe my supply is all right, but what about the 
guy who has no water, what happens to him? Who is to be responsible? Will he say, 
‘well, it’s OK my friend Verghese has water. I shall sacrifice myself for him?’ I don’t 
see him saying that. Why should he?  
This is a crisis, as the poorest countries are not able to stop scarcity from occurring, and 
consequently they cannot stop violence. How can they when their people are sick and 
impoverished? The world knows this and that is why nearly every sector – engineering, 
industry, social sciences and others – is writing about this problem and trying to come up with 
viable solutions (Berry, 2008: 15).  
One can still question whether this crisis-filled and fearful discourse is really necessary. Is the 
world really heading toward a water-less tomorrow? Many will say yes without any 
hesitation. Many others are more wary of such a panic-fuelled discourse. Academics have 
many theories (cornucopianism, resource curse etc.) that back them up, claiming that the 
water crisis is not as bad as everyone is making it out to be. Each narrative is increasingly 
important as together they mould “public sensibilities, shape power relations in ways that may 
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be less than transparent” (Berry, 2008: 18). This chapter analyses these opposing positions 
and provides a thorough study of both the fearful discourse and the perspective that water 
scarcity is not as bad as it is made out to be. Choosing one perspective over the other is not 
the point. The point is to show that not all academics believe we are doomed to dehydration.  
Although dehydration is a good enough reason to take up arms and fight for water, it is not 
the only reason. This highlights the point that the relationship between water scarcity and 
conflict is increasingly complex and requires a thorough reading if one wants to know the 
“full story”. Water scarcity is becoming a more and more prominent issue throughout the 
world. The Middle East, Africa and North America have all recently experienced severe 
droughts. As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is low-income countries that are the most vulnerable 
to scarcity-related conflicts. Technologies and wealth that are required to ease droughts are 
non-existent in poor, African countries.  
The history of countries also has a role to play in their propensity to take up arms when 
resources become scarce. Ethnic groups were either split up or lumped together at the Berlin 
Conference in the 19
th
 century (Hodge, 2008: 83). This ensured that African states would 
battle to create a unified national identity. The great diversity that emerged with all the 
different ethnicities and religions created countries that were consistently at odds among 
themselves and their neighbours. Combined with the poverty and disease that affect African 
people every day, it is a reality that another element such as environmental problems will 
drive Africa even further backwards. Environmental changes could cause wars, diplomatic 
disagreements, terrorism and trade disputes. This will hinder African development even 
further. If the relationship between water scarcity and conflict is not studied in depth, then 
solutions will be harder to find and all the while African people continue to suffer. 
Homer-Dixon (1991) and the Toronto Group studied the relationship between water scarcity 
and conflict at great length. Their work will be prominent through much of this chapter. The 
Toronto Group came up with many frameworks that help in studying the relationship between 
water scarcity and conflict. They formulated theories around what types of conflicts occur 
because of certain types of scarcities. They also highlighted how state capacity often 
influences society to take up arms. Environmental security and how it defines threats to peace 
will be outlined by noted academics, as will the topic of “water wars”. Many believe water 
wars and scarcity-related conflicts are one and the same thing; this chapter will highlight how 
they are different. These are just a few of the variables that will be examined in this chapter.  
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As seen in Chapter 1, the issue at stake is the link between water insecurity and violent 
conflict which is in question. This chapter does not intend to answer the question of whether 
the links between water scarcity and conflict are substantive, but rather to show what 
prominent academics think of such links and whether such links are credible within IR. 
Studying the links between water scarcity and conflict is not easy as there are an increasing 
number of elements to each case of scarcity-related conflict. Some of these elements are 
studied in this chapter. This chapter, however, provides different perspectives on the 
relationship between water scarcity and conflict. It also highlights how violence is not the 
only or inevitable outcome when scarcity increases; sometimes cooperation is possible. With 
cooperation, however, come consequences that could affect the state. 
The question posed in Chapter 1 on how credible the IR scholarship which has framed the 
purported link between violent conflict and water insecurity is highlights the aim of this 
chapter. What do the experts have to say about the purported links, are these credible 
opinions? It is a review that inspects the many different ideas about the purported relationship 
between water scarcity and conflict. There are many sub-issues that make up such a 
relationship; this makes it impossible to answer explicitly the primary research question of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, this chapter also provides a broad overview of the topic.  
Is there evidence that water scarcity in particular can be associated with armed conflicts in 
diverse ethnic communities in Africa, specifically in the Sudanese province of Darfur? 
Chapter 1 raises this question, but it is not answered fully in this chapter; however, the 
different types of conflicts that occur as a  result of scarcity are indicated, which help when 
applied to the case study on Darfur. This chapter aims to give a better understanding of the 
diverse range of academic opinions on whether the purported links between water scarcity and 
conflict are credible.  
This introduction has put the issues that surround water scarcity into a global context. It has 
introduced the premise that fears about a waterless future are warranted. The remainder of the 
chapter is divided into five sections in order to unpack the research questions.  
The first section consists of a review of the relationship between climate change and conflict. 
This section is important because it highlights how climate change is causing great economic, 
political and social shifts. These shifts have major impacts on conflicts that arise; sometimes 
they are the direct cause and at other times they are the indirect causes of conflicts. Gleditsch 
and Theisen’s (2007) “Pathway to Conflict” is provided in order to explain such a 
relationship. 
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In order to narrow the research focus, the next section examines the relationship between 
water scarcity and conflict. It displays an array of academics’ views and beliefs about the 
purported relationship between water scarcity and conflict. This section discusses topics such 
as: 
 Neo-Malthusians 
 Cornucopians 
 Political ecology 
 The liberal argument and 
 Types of scarcity, ecological marginalisation and resource capture. 
These topics aid a fuller comprehension of the complex relationship between water scarcity 
and conflict. 
Following an account of the relationship between water scarcity and conflict is a discussion 
on environmental security. This is a key section as it highlights that resource scarcity is a 
catalyst in human behaviour that generates violence. This section looks at the broader 
underpinnings of environmental security and assesses what it conveys about the purported 
relationship between scarcity and conflict. 
Water wars and the water discourse in Africa is then discussed. This section analyses the 
characteristics of so-called “water wars” and provides a clear distinction between water 
scarcity and actual water wars. One can conclude from this section that water wars are not 
nearly as prominent as some politicians claim they are.  
The last section is on the topic of cooperation and the reshaping of state sovereignty. As is 
highlighted throughout this chapter, conflict is not the only result to issue from water scarcity. 
Many believe that cooperation is more likely. This section studies cooperation and the 
theoretical strand it emerged from, and provides the consequences for state sovereignty when 
cooperation occurs. 
The Relationship between Climate Change and Conflict 
Climate change refers to a process whereby there is a shift in meteorological conditions which 
lasts for at least five years. These shifts may only involve a change in rainfall or temperature; 
however, they usually accompany a general shift in conditions to either dryer or wetter 
climates (Burroughs, 2001: 2; Lawson, 2015: 219). Climate change can also refer to the 
warming of the planet; the atmosphere and oceans are warmer than they have ever been, 
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which has resulted in glaciers melting and sea levels rising (IPCC, 2014: 1261). It has been 
scientifically proven that the increase of greenhouse gases produces anthrogenic emissions 
and is what has caused this warming (IPCC, 2014: 1260). Greenhouse gases can be both 
naturally occurring and human-made. With the increase of anthropogenic emissions through 
activities such as deforestation and the burning of fossil fuels, land use changes, livestock 
production and industrial processes, the Earth is rapidly losing its ability to absorb gases 
(IPCC, 2014: 1260; Lawson, 2016: 219). It is this inability to absorb gases that causes the 
global rise in temperatures (IPCC, 2014: 1260). Climate change can be caused by natural 
internal changes; however, it is more persistent when it is caused by things such as the 
burning of fossil fuels and deforestation (IPCC, 2014: 1255). The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) defines climate change as “a change of climate 
which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the 
global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over 
comparable time periods” (IPCC, 2014: 1255). This marks an important distinction between 
climate change as result of natural climate variability and as caused by human activity which 
alters atmospheric composition (IPCC, 2014: 1255).  
It is expected that climate change and global warming will cause significant changes to our 
environment. Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen (2010: 76) state that there are three 
consequences of this fact that have security consequences.
5
 The first is that scarcities of fresh 
water will increase. It is the increasing unpredictability of access to water that is the greatest 
challenge to human life and livelihoods. Every region will experience the consequences of 
climate change differently. Europe will experience higher temperatures and Africa will 
experience altering precipitation patterns, droughts and general reduction in annual rainfall 
(Buhaug et al., 2010: 76). This will ensure that the gap between the low-income countries and 
the high-income countries will grow even wider.  
The second consequence is the rising sea levels; this will cause population displacement and 
threaten peace in many coastal areas (Buhaug et al., 2010: 77). This is a predictable and 
incremental change; however, it has significant implications when combined with water 
scarcity and the refugee crisis in Africa. Coastal areas will experience catastrophic storms and 
soil erosion that will force many to become environmental refugees. Competition between 
                                                 
5
 Security consequences would entail wars, civil wars, terrorism and skirmishes. Any event that threatens the 
state is considered a threat to security (Lonergan, 2012: 251).  
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these refugees and the natives of the places where they decide to settle raises the likelihood of 
conflict; this is illustrated well by Gleditsch et al. (2007) and their “pathways to conflict”. 
Figure 2.1: Pathways to Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to note that these “pathways to conflict” can be applied to all three 
consequences of climate change and global warming.  
The third consequence is natural disasters. There are two types of natural disasters: they can 
either be hydrometeorologic (caused by climate) or geologic (caused by the earth) (Buhaug et 
al., 2010: 77). Recently the number of hydrometeorologic disasters has increased 
exponentially, meaning that there are more disasters than there have ever been in the past. 
This increase can be accredited to global warming. The global nature of such disasters means 
that they take more victims than geological disasters do. The worst of these disasters are 
floods, which are often followed by years of drought (Buhaug et al., 2010: 77). 
These three consequences all have major implications for the issue of water scarcity and 
conflict. They highlight that human survival is intrinsically linked to the environment’s 
wellbeing. When one area, region or country experiences a disaster, it will affect many other 
areas of the environment as well as human living conditions. In other words, when one area of 
the environment is under distress, the entire world feels either direct or indirect implications. 
The implications often involve people turning to conflict. This will be discussed further 
below. 
 
Pathways to Conflict 
Direct Effect     
Environmental Stress  Migration from Region A  Conflict in Region B 
Indirect Effect 
Environmental stress  Conflict in Region A  Migration from Region A  Conflict in 
Region B 
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The Relationship between Water Scarcity and Conflict 
Water scarcity is described as the point where the average use of water by humans negatively 
affects the quantity and quality of water to such a level that all sectors, most importantly the 
environment, cannot be sustained (Krchnak, 2014). Schulte adds to this definition by claiming 
that water scarcity is the volumetric lack of water supplies, which is measured through 
looking at the ratio of human consumption in relation to the available water supply in a 
specific area/region (Schulte, 2014). The physical measurements of water scarcity come from 
studies conducted by the World Health Organisation (1995), which stated that 25-30 litres of 
water per person per day is the minimum amount before people are classified as water 
deprived. It is important to point out here that inadequate access to water should not be 
confused with actual water scarcity (Mukheibir, 2010: 1027). Access to water and the 
distribution of water are core elements to water security; however, they do not always go 
hand-in-hand with water scarcity. For many low-income countries, issues with access to water 
and distribution does stem from water scarcity, but this is not always the case (Mukheibir, 
2010: 1027). Mukheibir (2010: 1027) adds to Homer-Dixon and Percival’s (1998: 280) 
definitions of water scarcity. They believe that water scarcity can be experienced as a result of 
“policy-induced consequences of mismanagement”. What they mean by this is that those who 
battle to gain access to water are economically, geographically, socially and institutionally 
situated on the margins. Without policies to aid the marginalised, they tend to experience 
structural scarcity of water (Mukheibir, 2010: 1027).  
Maxwell and Reuveny (2000: 301), Sandra Postel (1992: 2332), Johan Galtung (1982: 99) 
and Sverre Lodgaard (1992: 119) all claim that as natural resources become increasingly 
scarce, there is more and more proof that such scarcity is a primary element in politically-
driven conflict, especially in African countries. There are other academics, including Homer-
Dixon and Percival (1998: 280), McMichael (1993: 321) and Tignino (2010: 649), who see 
such water scarcity as just one of the factors of conflict and not the primary element. Research 
conducted by Maxwell and Reuveny (2000: 301) and Li and Correa (2009: 12), on the other 
hand, places the emphasis on the reality that such scarcities will have the hardest impact on 
low-income countries. The reason for this, they believe, is that most low-income countries do 
not possess well-outlined or easily enforceable property rights, meaning that people can abuse 
resources easily. Furthermore, they do not possess enough wealth for research and 
development. Unfortunately, the economies of most low-income countries are heavily reliant 
on the ecosystem (Maxwell & Reuveny, 2000: 302; Li & Correa, 2009: 12; Ashton, 2002: 
237).  
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Maxwell and Reuveny (2000: 302), Leisinger (1984: 64) and Derman, Odgaard and Sjaastad 
(2007: 1-2) claim that societies which make up low-income countries are crippled by 
elements such as unemployment, bad health and poverty, which make them prone to civil 
unrest and conflict. Derman et al. (2007: 2) add to this by noting that Africa experiences the 
highest rates of poverty and famine in the world.  Maxwell and Reuveny (2000: 302) believe 
that conflict and unrest as a result of factors such as poverty, bad health and unemployment 
are able to form a cycle of resource abuse and further conflict. Conflict causes many people 
who are willing and able to fight to leave the labour force. This means that the death rate of 
any specific conflict rises. The people who remain fighting use more natural resources to fund 
their conflict, thus continuing a cycle of abuse and conflict (Maxwell & Reuveny, 2000: 302; 
Gleditsch, 1998: 381). 
Maxwell and Reuveny (2000: 302) go on to explain their findings based on the research they 
conducted, the first being that conflict based on scarcity cannot last forever, for as Gleick 
(1993: 79-80) states, such conflicts do not necessarily lead to violence but rather cooperation. 
The second finding is that there is almost always a possibility for a resource or a population to 
settle down to sustainable levels that ensure that the possibility of internally caused conflict is 
diminished significantly (Maxwell & Reuveny, 2000: 302). The authors also claim with 
agreement from Richard Connor (2012: 16), that technological innovation and discovery can 
have a positive impact on the outbreak of conflicts by ensuring that scarcity is managed more 
efficiently and that the resource is distributed more equally (Maxwell & Reuveny, 2000: 302). 
This, however, is not always the case with technological innovation as sometimes certain 
technologies can work to abuse the scarce resource which, according to the authors, will result 
in more conflict (Maxwell & Reuveny, 2000: 302; Hoekstra, 2013: 1-3; Falkenmark, 1986: 
85, 101). It is their belief that resource scarcity and conflict are interdependent; conflict 
impacts on resource scarcity and, equally, resource scarcity impacts on the willingness and 
ability of people to involve themselves in conflict (Maxwell & Reuveny, 2000: 303; 
Falkenmark, 1986: 101-102).  
Maxwell and Reuveny (2000: 303) and Falkenmark (1986: 102) believe that the path towards 
scarcity-based conflict typically involves economic decline directly because of a diminished 
quality or quantity of natural resources. Another element that plays into this type of conflict is 
when large numbers of people become environmental refugees and are forced to migrate to 
more resource-rich areas; these new areas are almost always home to a different ethnic 
people, and this can cause great tension between the natives and the immigrants (Maxwell & 
Reuveny, 2000: 303; Martin, 2005: 331). Resource scarcity, especially water scarcity, causes 
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people to lose confidence in their government. This results in civil unrest, which if not dealt 
with properly, leads to conflict. In turn, such conflict leads to weaker government institutions 
(Maxwell & Reuveny, 2000: 303; Martin, 2005: 329; Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 280; 
Ashton, 2002:73). 
It is the social contract
6
 between the state and its population that is weakened when the state 
comes into contact with environmental scarcity. This is because the demands of the 
population increase as scarcity increases. This is significant as in weak states and institutions 
their capability to meet these demands decreases (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 281; 
Martin, 2005: 329). In this regard, Homer-Dixon and Percival (1998: 281-282) agree with 
Maxwell and Reuveny through their reference to a vicious cycle, which has the ability to 
proliferate conflict and violence. Accordingly, when environmental scarcity is experienced by 
a state, the state becomes reliant on short-term “survival strategies”. Coincidently these 
strategies reduce interactions between the state and society. In turn, this works to further 
isolate society from relations with their government and therefore results in society being 
more likely to take violent measures to communicate their grievances. The authors claim that 
this is exacerbated if the state cannot be seen to work in order to lessen the grievances and 
fragmentation of its population even further (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 282). In Africa 
this cycle is of increasing importance, as Africa contains one of the highest number of low-
income countries, meaning that their ability to deal with environmental resource scarcity is 
minimal (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 282).  
David Taylor (2004: 169-170) also highlights another dimension of these weaker institutions, 
claiming that “when a slower-moving but more predictable threat to environmental security is 
at work, governments are unlikely to bring” major force to the situation. Africa is considered 
an unstable continent. This is partly the result of the colonial history of the continent (Turton, 
2000: 35; Cleary, 2002: 16 & Okoth, 2006: 44). When resources are scarce, the political 
cleavages that already exist are exacerbated (Maxwell & Reuveny, 2000: 303; Turton, 2000: 
35).  
Theisen and Gleditsch (2007: 3-9) have constructed four theories that explain the relationship 
between water scarcity and conflict: 
                                                 
6
 The social contract refers to the rights of the people and their responsibility to government, and the 
government’s responsibility and duty to the people (Bawden, 1984: xi).  
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1) Neo-Malthusianism:7 Resource scarcity leads to conflict; 
2) Cornucopianism: There is no inherent resource scarcity, therefore, no resultant 
conflict; 
3) Political ecology: The distribution of resources causes conflict; 
4) The liberal argument: Cooperation can overcome scarcity. 
Neo-Malthusians 
The neo-Malthusians blame the rapid growth of populations for environmental degradation 
and scarcity and they do not predict a happy ending for the world (Urdal, 2005: 418; Levy, 
1995: 48; Homer-Dixon, 1991: 99-100; Ashton, 2000: 66). Growing populations mean 
degradation and scarcity of some of the most important resources, such as fresh water, 
fisheries and croplands; Urdal (2005: 418) and Ashton (2000: 66) claim that this increases the 
probability of violent conflict because of competition over these resources. Urdal (2005: 418) 
points to the events after the Cold War, when 
[a] wave of alarmist neo-Malthusian literature emerged, predicting that the rapidly 
growing world population would soon exceed the resource base and lead to serious 
environmental destruction, wide-spread hunger and violent conflicts. 
Gleditsch (1998: 383) highlights the neo-Malthusian perspective in this diagram which 
explains the purported links between population growth, scarcity and conflict: 
Figure 2.2: Neo-Malthusian beliefs on population growth and violence 
 
 
 
 
Conversely, there are many authors who do not believe there is such a strong link between 
conflict and resource scarcity, or more specifically, water scarcity. The neo-Malthusians 
blame the rapid growth of populations for environmental degradation and scarcity (Urdal, 
2005: 418). But this is not the case for the cornucopians, who are considered resource 
optimists (Urdal, 2005: 419; Gunter, Liotta, Marquina, Rogers & Selim, 2012: 479; Homer-
Dixon, 1991: 99-100).  
                                                 
7
 Neo-Malthusianism originates from the works of Thomas Malthus. His theory claimed that population growth 
is exponential, whereas agricultural growth is not, and therefore the population can increase too rapidly for 
agricultural growth to keep up. This will result in there not being enough food for the population. This theory is 
applicable to water sources as well (Dritschillo, 2004: 294). 
Population growth/high resource consumption per capita  deteriorated environmental 
conditions  increasing resource scarcity  harsher resource competition  greater 
risk of violence 
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According to Mark Whitehead (2014: 32), the future that neo-Malthusians predict is already 
evident in West Africa. Whitehead states that areas in West Africa are already experiencing 
negative population growth, which is directly caused by hunger and conflicts over scarce 
resources. These apparent “positive checks” on population growth were also associated with 
an increase in anarchy and the breakdown of rule of law and government. He goes on to claim 
that what is happening in West Africa is what the rest of the world can look forward to if 
there are no viable solutions to population growth and over-exploitation of natural resources. 
What do neo-Malthusians believe are viable solutions to these issues? The solution lies in 
“positive checks”, which means that people take population growth into their own hands by 
controlling the size of their families through birth control, thus limiting their use of important 
natural resources. If this is not done, then “negative checks” will come into play. Negative 
checks involve higher death rates because of scarcity and the resultant conflict that will arise 
(Whitehead, 2014: 31). 
Cornucopians 
Cornucopianism is the belief that there are “unlimited natural resources, unlimited ability of 
natural systems to absorb pollutants, and unlimited corrective capacity in natural systems” 
(Dryzek, 1997: 45). Cornucopianism is popular among neoliberal economists as they promise 
that the issue of climate change can be dealt with without disrupting current, dominant 
economic patterns (Lawson, 2015: 225). The cornucopians are in direct disagreement with the 
neo-Malthusians, with three major points of disagreement. The first is that they do not believe 
that the most debated natural resources are scarce at all, at least not at an international level 
(Urdal, 2005: 419).  Urdal (2005: 419), Middleton (2013: 35) and Gunter et al. (2012: 479-
480) note that cornucopians do not believe that any form of crisis will occur because of 
increasing populations. 
Cornucopians insist that if some natural resources are increasingly becoming scarce, then 
humans across the globe are able to adapt to this (Urdal, 2005: 419; Middleton, 2013: 35; 
Gunter et al., 2012: 480). They strongly believe that humans are capable of adapting to such 
challenges. Adaptation, whether at a global level or a local level, can range from conservation 
programmes to efforts to reduce consumption of scarce water sources (Bugaug et al., 2010: 
78). They have a strong faith in market mechanisms, claiming that the more scarce a resource 
is, the higher it will be priced and therefore people will move away from making such 
purchases, naturally leading the resource base to grow because of less consumption(Urdal, 
2005: 419; Middleton, 2013: 35; Homer-Dixon, 1991: 99-100; Gunter et al., 2012: 480).  
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The cornucopians claim that scarcity can actually work to become the catalyst that spurs on 
technological innovation, which can ensure that scarcity is not experienced in the future 
(Urdal, 2005: 419). Boserup and Schultz (1990) similarly support this claim by stating that 
“population pressure on natural resources is actually key to development and implementation 
of new techniques in agricultural production”. Almost controversially, the cornucopians go on 
to claim that it is not the scarcity of resources that creates conflict but rather their abundance 
(Urdal, 2005: 419; Floyd & Matthew, 2013: 70; Earle et al., 2013: 127). They believe that 
“income from rich natural resources, such as gems, tropical timber, cash crops and drugs may 
be regarded as an incentive for armed conflict”, either through greed or in order to fund 
warfare opportunities (Urdal, 2005: 419). There is a gap in this cornucopian hypothesis as 
they do not account for an abundance of fresh water as a catalyst for conflict. The 
cornucopians ignore the fact that a resource, such as water, which ensures the basic survival 
of the human populations world-wide, could cause more conflict if it were more abundant. 
When conflict does occur due to scarcity, the cornucopians believe that government inference 
is the core cause of such conflict (Gleditsch & Theisen, 2007: 4). The cornucopian theory 
provides a helpful framework within which to assess whether the links between water scarcity 
and conflict are valid; however, a few academics draw attention to gaps in such a perspective. 
Such academics include Buhaug, Theisen and Gleditsch (2010: 78), who agree that 
cornucopian beliefs are helpful; however, they are only helpful when applied to incremental 
environmental degradation. They claim that human’s ability to adapt is severely limited when 
environmental degradation occurs suddenly and catastrophically. “Gradual changes, such as 
desertification and sea-level rise, are generally suitable for a gradual response, including 
various forms of adaptation” (Buhaug et al., 2010: 78). Unpredictable rainfall and resultant 
droughts demand immediate adaptation, which is not possible for developing African 
countries. If the population is not able to adapt to these sudden changes, then they are more 
likely to flee the area or turn to violence in order to secure their survival (Buhaug et al., 2010: 
78).  
Homer-Dixon and Percival (1998) provide a more moderate stance between the cornucopians 
and the neo-Malthusians. They believe that almost all cases of environmental scarcity and 
conflicts are increasingly context specific (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 280; Matthew et 
al., 2004: 858). These contexts can take the form of either a lack of quantity or quality of 
specific environmental resources, or more broadly a country/region could be experiencing an 
unbalanced political culture. Therefore, the nature of the state does also contribute 
significantly to scarcity (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 280; Falkenmark, 1986: 95). 
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Homer-Dixon and Percival (1998: 280) take a strong position on state institutions and indicate 
how, if they are already weak or characterised as fascist, issues around resource scarcity will 
increasingly lead to conflict and violence among people.  
Political Ecology 
Political ecologists strongly disagree that there is a causal link between resource scarcity and 
conflict (Gleditsch & Theisen, 2007: 8). According to DeRouen and Newman (2014: 132) and 
Peluso and Watts (2001), political ecology states that it is the distribution of a resource that is 
the core mediating force between conflict and the environment. Political ecologists claim that 
local “scarcities” may occur in the context of local abundances. This could happen as a result 
of bad management of distribution and the favouring of one group over the other (DeRouen & 
Newman, 2014: 132). It is issues around distribution and discrimination that cause scarcity, 
not the actual amount or quality of a resource (Gleditsch & Theisen, 2007: 8). A good 
example of this would be the distribution of land during colonial times. Land policies during 
colonial and postcolonial times ensured that land was concentrated in the hands of a select 
few. This resulted in an artificial scarcity of land, which later resulted in bitter ethnic clashes 
(Kahl, 2006: 161).  
They dislike the fact that other perspectives ignore the point that resource extraction 
precipitates resource degradation mostly through mining, dam construction and industrial 
activities. The biggest issue political ecologists have with neo-Malthusians and cornucopians 
is that they believe that poorer populations are to blame for scarcities and resulting conflicts 
(Hartmann, 2001: 50; DeRouen & Newman, 2014: 132). It is rather the mismanagement of 
such distribution and extraction which causes scarcity-related conflict. Much like the neo-
Malthusians, political ecologists do not accept the optimistic perspective of the cornucopians. 
However, they also strongly disagree with the neo-Malthusians about how and why conflicts 
begin (Gleditsch & Theisen, 2007: 8).  
The Liberal Argument 
The liberal argument claims that a shared demand can facilitate cooperation rather than 
conflict (Suzuki, 1994: 475; Braucher et al., 2009: 678). Their attention remains focused on 
political institutions and how they shape human behaviour. They do not focus on the state of 
the environment (Gleditsch & Theisen: 2007: 7). The liberals are primarily concerned with 
democracy and cooperation. According to the liberal argument, collective issues such as 
floods or droughts can be catalysts for water cooperation. It is important to note that this 
perspective pays specific attention to transboundary water scarcity and, therefore, leaves out 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 29 
 
the large issue of internal water scarcity and resultant conflict. Nevertheless, the liberal 
argument still states that it is when there are asymmetries in interests and demands for water 
that conflict will occur. However, this can be dealt with through external incentives such as 
development aid to poorer countries (Braucher et al., 2009: 678).  Another incentive might be 
that of international treaties, which prescribe what actions should be taken when 
transboundary water sources run dry (Tir & Stinnett, 2012: 211).  
The liberals also place a strong emphasis on the “self-correcting capacity of markets” 
(Lawson, 2015: 225). This resolves a major issue for the liberals. They want to come across 
as protectors of the environment; however, if there is a profit to be made liberals will turn a 
blind eye to damaging the environment. This makes their belief in a self-correcting market all 
the more convenient, as it means that liberals can deal with environmental deterioration 
without harming dominant economic models and profits (Lawson, 2015: 225).  
The topic of international cooperation has many consequences for the ever-changing structure 
of state sovereignty. The liberal argument and cooperation will be studied in greater depth at a 
later stage in this chapter. Types of scarcity, ecological marginalisation and resource capture 
continue to scrutinize environmental issues and therefore will be discussed next.  
Types of Scarcity, Ecological Marginalisation and Resource Capture 
Environmental scarcity is a term that points to the decreasing availability of renewable 
resources such as soil, freshwater and land (Mehta, 2013: 25). Homer-Dixon and Percival 
(1998), Onyekuru and Marchant (2013) and Peterson and Pardo-Guerra (2006: 135-136) all 
highlight how there are three types of environmental scarcity: 1) demand-induced scarcity, 
which results after populations have grown rapidly and thus have caused the per capita 
demand for resources to increase simultaneously; 2) structural scarcity, which occurs when 
the distribution of a resource is unequal and the resource becomes concentrated in the hands 
of a few people, while the majority of the population experiences great scarcity; and 3) 
supply-induced scarcity, which is “caused by degradation and depletion of an environmental 
resource” (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 280; Onyekuru & Marchant, 2013). Homer-Dixon 
and Percival (1998: 280) claim that two “patterns of interaction”, namely ecological 
marginalisation and resource capture, exist between these types of scarcities. 
Ecological marginalisation refers to the situation in which growing “consumption of a 
resource combines with structural inequalities in distribution.” When significantly weaker 
groups of the population are denied access to the resource, they migrate to ecologically 
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weaker areas, which then become even more degraded (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 280; 
Peterson & Pardo-Guerra, 2006: 135; Tovey, 2007: 25). Resource capture occurs when the 
“increased consumption of a resource combines with its degradation”; this leads to the 
powerful groups in a given population, in an attempt to predict future scarcities and shortages, 
cleverly ensuring that distribution of the resource favours them (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 
1998: 280; Peterson & Pardo-Guerra, 2006: 135; Tovey, 2007: 25). 
Ecological marginalisation and resource capture can further influence marginalised factions to 
turn to violent action against groups whom they deem to have unjust access to resources 
(Homer-Dixon, 1998: 280; Tovey, 2007: 25-26; Peterson & Pardo-Guerra, 2006: 135). A 
secondary effect of these elements is a lowering of production, specifically in agriculture, the 
migration of groups and an undermining of institutions (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 
280). Homer-Dixon and Percival (1998: 280), however, state that in order for these issues to 
cause heightened likelihood of conflict, the people have to believe that there is a relative drop 
in their standard of living “compared with their aspirations, and they must see little chance of 
their aspirations being addressed under the status quo”.  
But grievances do not immediately lead to groups taking violent action (Opp, 1988: 853; 
Aspinall, 2007: 950). Homer-Dixon and Percival (1998: 280) believe that two other factors 
must exist for grievances to escalate into conflict: 1) a group needs to have a “strong 
collective identity” in order for them to comprehensively challenge the state authority and 
take the “opportunities for violent collective action” against such authority; and 2) the groups 
experiencing the grievances must perceive themselves as being capable of participating in 
collective action; more importantly they need to believe that the optimal way to successfully 
address their grievances is through violence. Homer-Dixon and Percival (1998: 281) again 
highlight their interest in the role of the state and resource-driven conflict by stating that “civil 
violence is a reflection of troubled relations between the state and society”. It is the nature of 
the state that is of particular importance, because a fully representative state would register 
grievances from groups and respond in a way that ensures that ecological marginalisation and 
resource capture do not happen on the same scale as they would in a non-representative state 
(Aspinall, 2007: 951; Opp, 1988: 853; Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 281). 
Turton (2000: 37) supports Gleick’s (1998) understanding that there are four major links 
between water scarcity and conflict. Gleick (1998: 108) explains that the first link is related to 
the degree of water scarcity, the second link is “the extent to which the water is shared by two 
or more groups”, the third link takes into account the amount of power each of those groups 
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has compared to one another, and the final link is the ease and capability of gaining access to 
another source of water. Although there are many opinions on this subject of water scarcity 
and conflict, most commentators (as mentioned above) disagree that water scarcity itself can 
be the root cause of conflict. Lipshutz (1989: 2), who would agree with these opinions, still 
believes that it is increasingly important to study the links between scarcity and conflict, as 
increasing scarcity of an important resource such as water can lead to more and more people 
turning to violence.  
Matthew et al. (2004: 858) and Graeger (1996: 110) highlight the debate as to whether there 
are links between environmental scarcity and violent conflict. There has been a great deal of 
theoretical criticism of the view that environmental scarcity leads to conflict; the most noted 
critics are Diehl (2001) and Gleditsch (2001) (Matthew et al., 2004: 858). These academics 
note that environmental scarcity does not always lead to conflict, but it can and does 
occasionally lead to cooperation (Matthew et al., 2004: 858). Like Homer-Dixon and Percival 
(1998), they also claim that an abundance of a resource can be the real reason that groups 
decide to involve themselves in violent conflict; this is known as the “resource curse” 
(Matthew et al., 2004: 858; Floyd & Matthew, 2013: 70; Earle et al., 2013: 127). The 
resource curse is a term coined to explain the phenomenon whereby states that possess within 
their borders a great deal of natural resources tend not to benefit from them (Humphreys, 
Sachs & Stiglitz, 2013: xi; Floyd & Matthew, 2013: 70; Earle et al., 2013: 127). Interestingly 
enough, countries that are resource-rich are often less financially stable and more conflict-
ridden than any other countries around the globe, Africa being a prime example (Humphreys 
et al., 2013: xi; Earle et al., 2013: 127; Floyd & Matthew, 2013: 70).  
Even though Matthew et al. (2004: 858) highlight some legitimate criticisms, it is important 
to note that they believe that the “most influential arguments in the field have concluded that 
environmental stress is linked to conflict indirectly, but significantly”. Matthew et al. (2004: 
858) explain that this linkage differs from case to case; nevertheless, the link is still possible 
because environmental scarcity is believed to completely diminish the adaptive capability of 
most societies, while simultaneously facilitating and enforcing conflict and instability. 
Nevertheless, critics such as Homer-Dixon and Percival (1998: 280), McMichael (1993: 321) 
and Tignino (2010: 649) still claim that it is not environmental scarcity that leads to such 
conflicts, but rather it is other elements such as systemic corruption, lack of economic growth, 
and political or group identity clashes that are more likely to be the root causes of conflict 
(Matthew et al., 2004: 858).  
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Matthew et al. (2004: 858) instead adopt the view that proposes that environmental scarcity 
and stress bring about a wide range of social reactions; however, ecological and social 
systems perform a type of double-loop learning from one another whereby they both alter 
because of their interactions with one another, and this often results in some sort of 
equilibrium. They go on to claim that it is increasingly uncommon that a society loses its 
adaptive capacity completely and breaks down into protracted violent conflict over a resource 
(Matthew et al., 2004: 859). 
Types of Conflict  
Before looking at the types of conflict, it is important to note that the topic of conflict is vast 
and usually warrants a chapter on its own. However, in order to make the topic more 
applicable to this thesis, a brief definition of conflict will be given. Conflict is defined by the 
2015 Conflict Barometer as the “clashing of interests” between at least two parties, whether 
these parties are groups of states, organisations or organised groups (Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research, 2015). In order for conflict to erupt, the parties involved must 
be “determined to pursue their interests and achieve their goals” (Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research, 2015). The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) states 
that armed conflicts are “contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or 
both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths in a year” (Edstrom & Gyllensporre, 2013: 16). Conflicts can be divided into two 
categories, the first being low-intensity conflicts, which are called minor armed conflicts, and 
the second being major armed conflicts (Edstrom & Gyllensporre, 2013: 16). Minor armed 
conflicts involve the battle-related deaths of 25-1,000 people in a year; major armed conflicts 
cause 1,000 or more battle-related deaths in a year (Edstrom & Gyllensporre, 2013: 16).  
There are four types of conflict that were identified by the UCDP (Harbom & Wallensteen, 
2009: 577; Gleditsch, Melander & Urdal, 2016: 15). The first type of conflict is referred to as 
inter-state conflict (Gleditsch et al., 2016: 16; Landman, 2013: 117). Inter-state conflicts 
involve two or more countries; this means that the drivers of violence are the states 
themselves (Landman, 2013: 117; Gleditsch et al., 2016: 16). The second type is called intra-
state conflict, which involves the government fighting a non-governmental group (guerrilla 
fighters, separatist movements, rebels etc.). This type of conflict occurs within the borders of 
a specific country (Landman, 2013: 117; Gleditsch et al., 2016: 16). The third type of conflict 
is called international intrastate conflicts. This type involves the government of a country, a 
non-governmental group and external troops from a third country which could support either 
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the government or the non-governmental group (Landman, 2013: 117; Gleditsch et al., 2016: 
16). The final type is called extra-systemic conflict and it “involves a state and a non-state 
group that is outside its own territory”; a good example of this would be colonial conflicts 
(Landman, 2013: 117; Gleditsch et al., 2016: 16). All of these types of conflicts can be 
present when water scarcity occurs; however, the most prominent form is the intra-state 
conflict, as in Africa there were at least 12 intra-state conflicts in 2008 alone (Harbom & 
Wallensteen, 2009: 577-578).  
When it comes to the types of conflict that occur as a result of scarcity, it would be amiss not 
to include the earlier perspective of the Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Group.
8
 They conclude 
that the rapid population growth rate is the key reason scarcities are being experienced. The 
UN has projected that by the end of the 21
st
 century the global population will be 11 billion. 
This poses a problem for water use and will require a solution, whether technological or 
management-based, in order for all people to have access to water. Undoubtedly, whether 
solutions are found or not, this puts immense stress on limited resources such as water. 
Conflict is to be expected, according to Homer-Dixon and his colleagues at the Toronto 
Group (Homer-Dixon, 1991: 104).  
The Toronto Group asks the question: What kinds of conflict will occur if access to water 
diminishes, impoverishment of people increases and environmental migration occurs? It is 
important to note that there is not a great deal of empirical data on this topic, as such water 
stress has not yet occurred. Nevertheless, the Toronto Group proposes three theoretical types 
of conflict: simple scarcity conflicts, relative-deprivation conflicts and group-identity 
conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1991: 105).  
Simple scarcity conflicts are conflicts that occur because state actors and non-state actors seek 
zero-sum gains, which occur because of scarcity. The realist perspective of International 
Relations best explains such conflicts. These conflicts are realist in nature because they mean 
that when one group has a resource, other groups do not have that resource. They are conflicts 
that involve the understanding that fighting is necessary to a group’s survival. They do not 
look to cooperation, as found in the liberal perspective. Simple scarcity conflicts occur over 
three types of resource scarcity: water, agriculturally productive land and fish. Conflicts are 
more likely to occur over these resources, because they are becoming increasingly scarce as a 
                                                 
8
 The Toronto Group is a research team that has dedicated many years to studying the links between conflict and 
environmental scarcity.  
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consequence of over-exploitation and they are key to the survival of humans (Homer-Dixon, 
1991: 106-107).  
Relative-deprivation conflict theories stress that as developing states produce less 
economically as a result of environmental stress, their people will more than likely become 
increasingly unhappy with the increasing gap between economic delivery and their 
expectations. The more rapid the deterioration, the more intense the discontentment will be. 
The wealthy elite are likely to protect their supply at a high cost, which increases the 
unhappiness of deprived poor people. This, if not addressed, will lead to conflict, with the 
deprived groups taking up arms to secure their share of the resource. This theory also notes 
that the arrival of environmental refugees will dilute the distribution of the resource to the 
native land-dwellers, which could lead to conflict between two such groups (Homer-Dixon, 
1991: 109-110). Opposed to this idea of environmental refugees, Salehyan (2005) believes 
that people fleeing from environmental stress such as water scarcity, as opposed to political 
refugees, are not likely to contribute to violence. Usually such an influx takes place over a 
long time and, although spontaneous conflicts may erupt over competition for water, 
receiving states are able to adapt over time (Salehyan, 2005: 12-14).  
Group-identity conflicts occur when populations are forced to move for environmental 
reasons such as droughts or floods. When different ethnic groups meet under stressful, 
deprived conditions, group hostilities arise. The native group will want to defend their identity 
while discriminating against and threatening the outsiders. Martin et al. (2006) point to the 
fact that leaders often abuse the notion of environmental scarcity by encouraging their 
followers to “make up” environmental problems in order to advance their aim of dominating 
the other group. Countries with backgrounds of violence make them more vulnerable to 
further conflict; this makes it easy for leaders to construct environmental issues to serve their 
own interests. With an increase in population and environmental stresses in low-income 
countries, an increase in migration to more developed countries is likely. With this comes an 
ethnic imbalance in cities and urban areas, which often leads to xenophobic attacks which are 
hard for governments to quell (Homer-Dixon, 1991: 109). 
The next section will provide an array of experts’ opinions on the topic of environmental 
security. This section is relevant to this thesis because it highlights the point that resource 
scarcity can be a catalyst for violence. 
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Environmental Security 
As a broad field of study “environmental security” has much to say on the topic of 
environmental scarcity and conflict. Noted academics Richard Matthew, Ted Gaulin and 
Bryan McDonald (2004) wrote an article, “The Elusive Quest: Linking Environmental 
Change and Conflict”, that describes the link between environmental resource scarcity and 
conflict, and also gives an account of the criticism of this perspective. They first highlight 
how environmental scarcity fits into the broader scope of “environmental security”, which is a 
contested term (Matthew, Gaulin & McDonald, 2004: 857; Levy, 1995: 35; Graeger, 1996: 
109).  
Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, issues environmental security was non-existent. 
The issue of environmental security only became prominent after the Cold War (Matthew et 
al., 2004: 857; du Plessis, 2000: 9; Graeger, 1996: 109). Environmental security’s main focus, 
however, is on conflict, natural resource scarcity and on how environmental stress impacts on 
social adaptation (Matthew et al., 2004: 857; Graeger, 1996: 109; Levy, 1995: 35). When the 
term first emerged many academics studied scarcity, environmental security and climate 
change, and a number of them found that environmental scarcity, combined with many other 
elements, did indeed influence violent behaviour, which naturally, was considered an 
increasing threat to national and international security (Matthew et al., 2004: 858; Graeger, 
1996: 110; Levy, 1995: 46).  
Matthew et al. (2004: 860) point out that there is a consistent dominating trend running 
throughout the literature on environmental security that assumes that environmental scarcity 
simultaneously decreases adaptive abilities and increases conflict. Among the more 
contemporary writers, according to Matthew et al. (2004: 860), to perpetuate this view of the 
dominant trend are Thomas Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Group. Their research claims that 
“scarcity of renewable resources such as forest, fisheries, cropland and water give rise to a 
number of deleterious social effects – including economic decline, social segmentation and 
human migration – and these social effects, in turn, contributed to conflict” (Matthew et al., 
2004: 860; Ronnfeldt, 1997: 475). Included in their conclusion was the recognition of a 
disparity or “ingenuity gap” between the solutions which were needed to aid in addressing 
environmental scarcity and the social, human and institutional capital that could be used to 
provide these solutions (Matthew et al., 2004: 861; Homer-Dixon, 1995: 592).  
It is the ability of populations to adapt that plays a pivotal role in environmental security. 
Homer-Dixon (1991, 1999) calls this the “ingenuity gap”, which refers to the gap between 
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those who cannot deal with scarcity through innovation and adaptation and those who can.  
Homer-Dixon (1991, 1999) uses this theory of the ingenuity gap to explain why developing 
nations experience more scarcity-related conflict than developed nations do. Matthew et al. 
(2004: 861) see that it is this ingenuity gap that gives Homer-Dixon (1995: 592) and the 
Toronto Group the ability to argue that it is the actual gap that underscores human adaptive 
abilities. Their studies explain that environmental scarcity and decreasing human adaptive 
capabilities combine the elements that contribute to the perpetuation of violent conflicts that 
threaten national and international security and the field of environmental security.  
These studies by the Toronto Group did not entirely escape criticism –with two specific 
criticisms standing out from the rest (Matthew et al., 2004: 861; Ronnfeldt, 1997: 475). The 
first criticism claims that even if environmental scarcity does play a major role in conflict, 
there are more likely other legitimate explanations for the conflict (Matthew et al., 2004: 
861). The second criticism claims that adaptation, resolution and cooperation are not as far-
fetched as they are made out to be (Matthew et al., 2004: 861). Matthew et al. (2004: 861), 
however, are not impressed by these criticisms, as they believe that most of the criticisms 
later turned out to also follow the dominant thread in environmental security and landed up 
looking a lot like what Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Group were criticised for in the 
beginning (Ronnfeldt, 1997: 475 & Homer-Dixon, 1995: 592). For example, the Environment 
and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) stated that the “environmental conflicts manifest themselves 
as political, economic, ethnic, religious or territorial conflicts. They are traditional conflicts 
induced by environmental degradation” (Matthew et al., 2004: 862). This is similar to the 
Toronto Group’s point as it highlights how scarcity is alleged to increase conflict indirectly.  
There also appears to be a lack of consideration or debate over the relevance of human 
adaptation to environmental scarcity (Matthew et al., 2004: 862; Homer-Dixon, 1995: 592). 
In the ENCOP studies the belief is that human adaptation is an issue of “mal-development”, 
which looks increasingly similar to the disparity that Homer-Dixon believes exists; the 
disparity and “mal-development” work to undercut human reactions and therefore almost to 
encourage conflict (Matthew et al., 2004: 862; Homer-Dixon, 1995: 592). According to 
Matthew et al. (2004: 863), these studies and criticisms of the dominant paradigm in the 
literature on environmental security all fundamentally tell an increasingly similar tale. In each 
study there is a “general theory that links resource scarcity and conflict that are the same” 
(Matthew et al., 2004: 863). ENCOP subscribes to the belief in “mal-development”, whereas 
Homer-Dixon (1995: 592) believes in the ingenuity gap or the disparity mentioned above. 
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Matthew et al. (2004: 863), however, do not see these theories as different because they both 
outline a similar process, which is the limited capacity to respond to scarcity.  
The following section highlights the point that certain discourses around the topic of water 
and “future water wars” are sometimes over-exaggerated and not based on facts but are rather 
fearful narratives.  
‘Water Wars’ and the Water Discourse in Africa 
Turton (2000: 35) notes that there are proximately 80 river and lake basins on the African 
continent. He adds that more than 21 of these water resources are in use by more than 10 
African states (Turton, 2000: 36; UN, 2012; Ashton, 2002: 236). This creates the conditions, 
as described by Hirji and Grey (1998: 78) and Tignino (2010: 651), where management, more 
specifically bad management, can become the catalyst for violent conflict and what they call 
‘water wars’. Although a ‘water war’ is not, specifically, what this literature review is focused 
on, the subject does help to better understand conflict over water within Africa. According to 
Turton (2000: 36-37) and Alam (2002: 341), a water war must have three elements for it to be 
considered a legitimate water war. The first element is that a water war has to be caused by 
people’s need for access to the resource to be classified as the direct cause of the war, 
meaning that water scarcity is the necessary condition for war (Turton, 2000: 36; Alam, 2002: 
341).  
The second element is that the ‘enemy’ sees water and hydraulic infrastructure – for example, 
pipelines, dams, rivers and water treatment plants – as targets during the war which would 
severely weaken their opponent (Turton, 2000: 36; Alam, 2002: 341). This condition does not 
require there specifically to be water scarcity in the area and it is therefore not considered a 
legitimate water war, but is rather classified as a conventional war with water being used a 
tactical component (Turton, 2000: 36). The third element is that trans-boundary water sources 
become the central point of the war (Turton, 2000: 36). This last type of water-related war is 
not considered by the author as a legitimate ‘water war’, because water scarcity is not the root 
cause of the conflict; hence the author rather refers to them as quasi- or pseudo-water wars 
(Turton, 2000: 37). One can already see in these classifications that much of what the world 
and policy makers perceive to be scarcity-induced conflict does not in fact relate to scarcity at 
all.  
Charlotte Church (2000: 20) claims that even though this classification of ‘water wars’ is 
based on years of research, and that when water is scarce it needs to be more carefully 
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managed, the possibility of ‘water wars’ erupting all across the African continent and other 
water-stressed regions is increasingly over-exaggerated. Stetter, Herschinger, Teichler and 
Albert (2011: 441) similarly believe that the water wars theory and current dominant water 
discourse are increasingly over-exaggerated as there is still no evidence that any international 
or intra-national conflicts or ‘wars’ have ever had water scarcity as the sole reason for their 
eruption. Alam (2002: 341), however, would disagree as he believes that water wars are 
essentially any conflicts that are spurred on by a lack of access to water. Church (2000: 20) 
and Stetter et al. (2011: 441) go on to state that they agree that, while water scarcity has been 
a part of some major conflicts, these conflicts may actually fall under Turton’s above-
mentioned quasi-water wars and as conflicts that have water as a tactical target, but yet are not 
legitimate water wars.  
If this is the case, then why are there so many newspapers and prominent politicians claiming 
that the next great wars are going to be fought over water and that water is now seen as ‘the 
new oil’ (Homer-Dixon, 1996: 362; Alam, 2002: 341; Barnett, 2000: 275-276). The current 
water discourse has done much to undermine many economies in Africa. The statement made 
by Ismail Serageldin, claiming that “the wars of the next century will be over water”, has had 
an impact on African economies (Homer- Dixon, 1996: 362; De Villiers, 2000: 13; Berry, 
2008: 15). This statement by a prominent political figure placed Africa in a bad economic 
light, as international investors began to see Africa as the hotspot where most water wars 
would play out, which caused many investors to disinvest and look at Africa with suspicion 
and fear (Turton, 2000: 36). Turton (2000: 36) explains that Serageldin’s statement is 
consistently repeated in the media, which has ensured that the general public and politicians 
who are not completely informed on the true nature of water wars come to believe the 
statement. This statement is considered by many scholars as unsubstantiated and lacking in 
empirical evidence; however, it still distorts the perceptions of investors, the public and 
policymakers about what water and conflict can really amount to (Turton, 2000: 36).  
Barnaby (2009: 282) confidently claims that “countries do not go to war over water; they 
solve their water shortages through trade and international agreements”. She claims that 
cooperation is the most common response to transboundary water scarcity. She highlights this 
claim through providing the relevant figures; between 1948 and 1999 cooperation over scarce 
water was much more common than conflict. There were approximately 1,831 cases of 
interactions around international water sources; of these 67 per cent were cooperative and 28 
per cent were conflictual – the remaining 5 per cent were insignificant or neutral (Barnaby, 
2009: 282). Do these hard facts silence and nullify claims by neo-Malthusians that scarcity 
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causes conflict? Not necessarily, as Barnaby does not account for conflicts that occurred 
internally, leading to civil wars. Her facts also do not account for more recent conflicts and 
for the fact that climate change is only speeding up. Barnaby, nevertheless, makes an 
important point about cooperation, which will be explained further.  
Cooperation and the persistent liberal paradigm has much to add to the topic of this thesis. 
The following section discusses how, when cooperation is the chosen diplomatic course to 
address scarcities, it often brings about a change of state sovereignty.  
Cooperation and the Reshaping of State Sovereignty 
State sovereignty is defined as “the authority of a state to govern itself or another” (Haljan, 
2014: 128). This means that states believe that other states may not militarily or legislatively 
involve themselves in their business unless explicitly asked to, or do so in times of crisis 
(Haljan, 2014: 128; D’Anieri, 2013: 29). In summary, sovereignty means that states govern 
themselves independently and free from outside interference. State sovereignty ensures that 
states have the power to create legislation on most issues within their territorial boundaries 
(Thomas, 2011: 1). It is only the state’s constitution that can limit such power of the state 
possesses, not an outside force (Thomas, 2011: 1). According to John Agnew (2005: 437), 
sovereignty is a norm “that legitimises central state authority”.  
This norm has not been researched enough because it remains the dominant way elite leaders 
perceive their power over the state. When it comes to state sovereignty one could question 
why it has been prescribed a territorial definition of political authority. This would later lead 
the world to question why states are the only “proprieters” of the territory (Agnew, 2005: 437-
438). As one can see, sovereignty is not a term with a clear and fixed meaning; however, this 
definition is still widespread today (Hashmi, 2010: 15-16). The term itself has been evolving 
since 1648 and the creation of the modern state, so it would be inaccurate to state that there is 
only one unambiguous definition of state sovereignty (Agnew, 2005: 438). Agnew (2005: 
437) states that “the dominant Westphalian model of state sovereignty in political geography 
and international relations theory … is even more inadequate today”, because of its 
problematic emphasis on “geographical expressions of authority”. There are many powerful 
forces that deny this type of sovereignty from working in modern times. Globalisation and 
climate change are the biggest catalysts for altering the reality of state sovereignty and how it 
evolves (Hashmi, 2010: 17; Lawson, 2015: 240). Globalisation and climate change have to 
date caused state sovereignty to diminish in many people’s eyes; however, as will be shown 
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later, it is not a mere diminishing but rather a reshaping that has occurred (Hashmi, 2010: 17; 
Lawson, 2015: 240).  
Throughout much of this chapter there has been brief mention of how cooperation could be a 
possible alternative to conflict. Cooperation is the most desirable outcome when issues of 
scarcity become prominent. However, cooperation brings with it another set of precarious 
consequences. The state and sovereignty suffer when cooperation is used to resolve issues of 
environmental scarcity. This will be discussed further in this section.  
In 1972 the international agenda for the environment became prominent in the sense that 
organisations were forming and agreements were being signed which all advocated for the 
wellbeing of the environment(Lawson, 2015: 237). It was in 1972 that Greenpeace was 
founded, the UN was organising its Environment Programme, and the Stockholm Conference 
was organising the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (Lawson, 2015: 237). It was a 
watershed year that pointed to the path ahead towards a “greening of sovereignty”(Lawson, 
2015: 241). The world was beginning to see that the wellbeing of economic development 
depended on the wellbeing of the environment. Issues such as water scarcity, acid rain and 
ozone depletion were now seen as possible threats that were nearly on the same level as that 
of invading militaries (Lawson, 2015: 238). These issues threaten each and every modern 
state’s sovereignty as much as an outside force does. Therefore, cooperation was seen as one 
of the measures that could support the global community. Cooperation, however, can be seen 
as a privilege only high-income countries can gain anything from. When faced with famine, 
lack of innovation and illnesses, low-income countries seem to avoid cooperation as violence 
ensures their immediate survival. Cooperation takes time and strong governance, two things 
low-income countries typically do not have. Nevertheless, cooperation has a role to play in 
mitigating issues of environmental degradation. It is important to point out that liberal thought 
is what brought about the idea and manifestation of cooperation in this sphere.  
As has been stated above, there are many instances whereby cooperation rather than conflict 
has been the chosen method, one that has worked well to quell dissent and stabilise an area or 
region that has been experiencing water scarcity and grievances around it (Uitto & Duda, 
2002: 366; Meissner, 2000: 104-105; Martin, 2005: 330). Cooperation is seen by many as the 
only real resolution to issues such as environmental scarcity and therefore should be the no-
brainer choice among states that are currently experiencing stress (Uitto & Duda, 2002: 366; 
Puchala, 1971: 5; Cramer, 2000: 114; Martin, 2005: 330). Litfin (1997: 167), Weinthal (2002: 
204) and Wolfrum and Matz (2003: 163) recognise that there is an inherent understanding in 
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states that sees that cooperation with their neighbours can undermine their state sovereignty. 
Man-made borders and boundaries, however, cannot confine and limit problematic 
environmental issues such as water scarcity; this therefore requires a certain level of 
international cooperation in order to avoid violence (Litfin, 1997: 167).  
Litfin (1997: 167) and Wolfrum and Matz (2003: 163) claim that international cooperation 
does not work to actually undermine state sovereignty, but that it rather indirectly restructures 
and reshapes the concept. Research on the topic shows that growth in international 
cooperation on the topic of ensuring the longevity of the environment and all that it offers has 
brought about a movement away from the traditional norms and practices of state sovereignty 
(Litfin, 1997: 167; Eckersley, 2004: 53). Liftin (1997: 179) and Eckersley (2004: 53-54, 203) 
both claim that state sovereignty in the international realm is also a flexible concept that is 
required to shift and change with the times in order to survive at an international level.  
Litfin (1997: 169) asks two empirical questions. The first is whether international cooperation 
in the form of treaties and responses to environmental scarcity is decreasing the sovereignty 
of states? The second question is whether sovereignty has the power to halt environmental 
protection and awareness? The belief that international environmental cooperation has the 
ability to decrease state sovereignty is rather unsubstantiated as state sovereignty should be a 
term and practice that can adapt to different circumstances (Litfin, 1997: 168). The second 
question asks the deeper question of the two, one that relates to how people who are 
concerned with the subject of environmental scarcity go about dismantling sovereignty, so 
that states can work interdependently against the threats of conflict over scarce resources such 
as water (Litfin, 1997: 168).  
To some, this may seem like a radical position to take; however, there are legitimate reasons 
to believe that sovereignty inhibits international environmental cooperation (Litfin, 1997: 
168). Litfin (1997: 168) goes on to claim that it is, after all, the modern, sovereign state that 
has caused the deterioration of the environment and created the current environmental 
scarcities. Litfin (1997: 168) therefore concludes that it is almost impossible to trust the 
sovereign state to perform collective actions, since it claims to be inherently against such 
action. The counter to this argument is that the state is the only vehicle that is able to take 
actions which would help the environment, because it has the necessary resources, territorial 
control and authority, which can all aid in protecting populations from further scarcities 
(Litfin, 1997: 168).  
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As a response to the notion that international environmental cooperation results in 
diminishing sovereignty, Bryant and Bailey (1997: 72), Sassen (1996: xxii) and Biersteker 
(1980: 207) claim that it is rather the inherent nature of globalisation that is diminishing 
sovereignty. They go on to state that they believe it is the major transnational corporations 
(TNCs) that are in fact working against sovereignty (Bryant & Bailey, 1997: 72; Biersteker, 
1980: 207; Sassen, 1996: 7; Omagu, 2012: 70). TNCs are always attractive investors for 
places such as Africa, as they bring in revenue and create thousands of jobs; however, at the 
same time they work to severely undermine a state’s sovereignty (Bryant & Bailey, 1997: 72; 
Eckersley, 2004: 65). TNCs are attracted to places such Africa because of the wealth of 
natural resources such as gold, diamonds and uranium; they over-exploit these resources and 
the cheap labour that is supplied by the state (Bryant & Bailey, 1997: 72). From Bryant and 
Bailey’s (1997: 72) perspective, TNCs rather than international environmental cooperation 
are what is causing a diminishing in state sovereignty. This is because countries alter their 
national policies through becoming more lenient on environmental regulations. This allows 
TNCs to take advantage of countries’ already scarce resources while encroach on large 
amounts of a country’s sovereignty (Bryant & Bailey, 1997: 73; Frynas, 2004: 365). TNCs 
are believed to be the actors that undermine sovereignty because they are not held accountable 
for the over-use of water, overfishing and pollution (Bryant & Bailey, 1997: 72-73; Frynas, 
2004: 365-366).  
In order for international environmental cooperation to prevail, according to Green and 
Colgan (2013: 473) and Bryant and Bailey (1997: 72), states will have to realise that their 
sovereignty is being largely ceded to TNCs, which are also the causes of environmental 
degradation and over-exploitation. International cooperation in the form of treaties and other 
measures does not claim to take sovereignty away from states, yet it has the proven capability 
to provide valuable assistance in instances of scarcities and conflict (Green & Colgan, 2013: 
473). The previous three decades have been significant as they have seen the proliferation of 
international law. Today there are over 1,300 bilateral environmental treaties/agreements and 
1,000 multilateral treaties/agreements (Green & Colgan, 2013: 473). This has resulted in the 
further growth of environmental international organisations (IOs) that work against water-
based scarcities which can lead to conflict (Green & Colgan, 2013: 473; Verweij, 1999: 454). 
These IOs have a good reputation of providing necessary relief aid; however, states are still 
apprehensive about handing over control to external actors (McCarthy, 2007: 179; Verweij, 
1999: 454).  
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The prominence of IOs in Africa has increased, indicating that more states are handing some 
control over to them. IOs are now able to secure buy-in from states as their beneficial impact 
with regard to conflict over scarce resources has been noted (Green & Colgan, 2013: 473-474; 
Epstein & O’Halloran, 2008: 80; Verweij, 1999: 454). States have therefore been delegating 
many tasks to IOs in order to help deal with such environmental scarcities. However, Green 
and Colgan (2013: 473-474) and Epstein and O’Halloran (2008: 80) question the extent to 
which states are doing so. As a result of a state’s reservations about losing its sovereignty, IOs 
are often delegated tasks with a lower level of sovereignty cost (Green & Colgan, 2013: 474; 
Epstein & O’Halloran, 2008: 91). Lower levels sovereignty costs involve things such as the 
implementation of an environmental policy as well as the monitoring that accompanies such 
policies; this means that a states’ sovereignty is diminished only minimally (Green & Colgan, 
2013: 474; Epstein & O’Halloran, 2008: 91). Alternatively, higher sovereignty costs involve 
activities such as law-making and law enforcement; these are rarely, if ever, delegated to IOs 
(Green & Colgan, 2013: 474; Epstein & O’Halloran, 2008: 91-92).  
Conclusion 
It is undeniable that climate change is altering our physical environment; the security 
implications, however, cannot be predicted. If conditions continue as they currently are, there 
will be displacements and a wide array of reasons to turn to violence in order to survive. 
Water is one of the most vital resources for the survival of humans. Water scarcity/insecurity, 
therefore, naturally poses a great threat for the future, but environmental specialists do not 
believe that it is a threat that cannot be avoided. There are an increasing number of elements 
involved in the relationship between water scarcity and possible conflict, but not all of them 
foreshadow a dehydrated future. These elements include factors such as the belief that water 
scarcity can be overcome through cooperation, technological innovation and better 
management of the resource.  
The different types of scarcity play a major role in whether groups turn to violence. Here one 
can see that the relationship between the people and the state is increasingly important. If the 
state does not see to all people’s needs for resources and favours one group over the other, 
then the probability of violence breaking out is high. When conflict does occur it usually takes 
the form of intra-state conflict. The likelihood of water scarcity-related conflict turning into 
international intra-state conflicts is also high if water scarcity is not dealt with in a sustainable 
manner. This can be dealt with through trusting that people and states can think of innovative 
ways to share water and address issues around scarcity.  
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Water scarcity does not mean that the world is doomed to “water wars”. The construction of 
such a discourse around the topic of water scarcity has done much to inhibit the development 
of Africa. It has also driven people into a panic about the future. Cooperation could be seen as 
the only viable solution. Cooperation, however, does undermine state sovereignty, but this 
does not have to be to the detriment of states.  
Water scarcity has many people wondering what the future will bring. Will a lack of water 
lead to the third world war? Will it bring about new technologies? Or will it just mean that 
international cooperation becomes even stronger? The security implications are vast, yet no 
one can accurately predict what will happen. This chapter has reviewed what prominent 
academics have to say about water scarcity/insecurity and its purported relationship with 
violent conflict.  
As one can see, there are many different perspectives on the topic of water scarcity and 
conflict. What can be agreed on is that this relationship has a severe impact on Africa. 
Africa’s history as a continent, its lack of proper governance and development, its peoples’ 
impoverishment and their bad health all contribute toward water scarcity issues turning into 
conflicts. When it comes to studying the relationship between water scarcity and conflict, 
these elements have to be taken into account. These elements are what make it almost 
impossible to confidently claim that there is a direct relationship between water scarcity and 
conflict. All of these elements come together and make the probability of conflict that much 
higher.  
The question of whether the “panic-fuelled” narrative of water wars is warranted might well 
be answered through understanding that water scarcity is one of the major factors in future 
conflicts. It is not, however, the only factor. It is the position of this thesis, after reviewing 
what the experts have to say about the relationship between water scarcity and conflict, that 
concern about water scarcity is warranted. Although it is not a direct relationship, it is still one 
that raises some concern, especially in Africa. 
It would be foolish to ignore signs that water scarcity has the ability to alter IR. Water scarcity 
has the ability to reconfigure IR and security studies. If distribution and management of 
current water sources are not properly maintained, then fearful discourses could become self-
filling prophecies. However, just as a conflict-ridden future seems likely, a future that has put 
adaptive capabilities to the test could also be likely. Innovation and technology could resolve 
issues of water scarcity and conflict, yet how will continents like Africa manage to acquire 
such technology? The lack of development in Africa will continue to hinder it in this matter.  
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This chapter has laid the foundation for the rest of the thesis through providing a review of the 
literature on the topic of water scarcity/insecurity and conflict. It has outlined how other 
chapters will deal with the relationship between water scarcity and conflict. This is helpful 
when attempting to address the research problem and answer the research questions as it 
shows all angles and opinions on the real causal relationship, if any, between water scarcity 
and conflict. Mostly this chapter has highlighted that the relationship between water scarcity 
and conflict has major security consequences, which can and do alter IR. It has also 
highlighted that the IR scholarship which has framed the link between water insecurity and 
violent conflict is increasingly credible. One can see that real concern is warranted when it 
comes to water scarcity and conflict; however, the chapter has also indicated that there are 
many other elements which are involved in the eruption of conflict. 
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Chapter 3: The Green Theory 
Perspective and the Securitization 
Stance 
Introduction 
The effects of industrialisation on the Earth have been tremendous. Green Theory is a 
response to these damaging effects. Socially, politically and economically people over the 
past 50 years have begun to see that the current norm of abusing the environment is no longer 
sustainable (Lawson, 2015: 219). From Chapter 2 one can see that the links between water 
scarcity/insecurity and violent conflict are increasingly credible within IR. This chapter aims 
to provide the perspective of Green Theories and how they could possibly provide an 
alternative or addition to the conservative theories of realism and liberalism with regards to 
environmental issues. The chapter highlights these perspectives through studying the works of 
experts such as Stephanie Lawson, Andrew Dobson and Robyn Eckersley, all of whom are 
published academics within the political/environmental field. Another question which is 
asked in Chapter 1 is whether there is any heuristic utility in the securitization of water. This 
chapter is therefore also dedicated to Securitization Theory and the question as to whether 
environmental issues would be addressed more efficiently if they were considered in terms of 
“high politics”. 
In recent years Green Theories have become more prominent as concern for the welfare of 
planet has increased. If left unchecked climate change will destroy the natural world beyond 
repair. The general, educated public are aware of this and are now turning toward green 
solutions. One of these green solutions is to adopt political paradigms that condemn actions 
that have brought about crises in the natural world. It is predicted that by 2050 the global 
population will be nine billion, but only if no neo-Malthusian negative checks intervene. This 
population size once again puts immense stress on resources, especially drinkable water 
(Lawson, 2015: 219). International relations will be affected by this, as we have seen 
throughout Chapter 2. Concerns are warranted, but they need to be researched correctly and 
dealt with in innovative ways. Securitization Theory will provide a different perspective on 
this later in the chapter.  
The initial sections of this chapter discuss the founding of environmentalism and its links to 
political and social awareness and the general emergence of Green Theory as a sub-section 
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within International Relations. Later in the chapter, Securitization Theory is conceptualised 
and examined. This section aims to address the question of whether there is any heuristic 
utility in the concomitant securitization of water.  
The Emergence of Environmental Awareness 
It is not news that human activity has been causing environmental damage; however, it was 
only in the 1960s that this awareness manifested as political concepts and people began to talk 
openly about the environment in political debates and discourses (Dryzek, 1997: 4).  Engels 
and Marx, however, had already in the 19
th
 century identified that this awareness may have 
come too late, as the Industrial Revolution had already damaged the environment and society 
as a whole (Lawson, 2015: 220). Engels and Marx famously said:  
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive 
and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. 
Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry 
and agriculture, steam navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, cleaning of whole 
continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the 
ground – what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces 
slumbered in the lap of social labour (Marx & Engels 1969: 16).  
These innovations were all seen as great progressions in industrialisation; however, “the 
‘subjection of Nature’s forces to man’ produced a whole array of problems which in turn 
prompted philosophical and theoretical speculation on such categories as ‘nature’ and the 
‘environment’” (Lawson, 2015: 220). This led to the formation of the first group of people to 
openly want to protect the environment. This group was based in England and they were 
founded as far back as the 1860s. Almost simultaneously in America people were gathering to 
discuss their concerns about the protection of the wilderness (McCormick, 1991: vii). In 1866 
Ernst Haeckel, a biologist, coined the term “ecology” and a year later the term “biosphere” 
made an appearance in the Oxford English Dictionary (Lawson, 2015: 221). Scientific links, 
however, were yet to be made (Crosby, 1995: 1182-1183).  
Environmental awareness continued throughout the 1800s with more academics identifying 
links between industrialisation and environmental degradation; this continued  into the 1960s 
when Rachel Carson published her book entitled Silent Spring. Silent Spring broached the 
topic of the use of dichloro-diphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), which is a powerful insecticide 
that was used for spraying crops. DDT is extremely poisonous and it was killing small 
animals and damaging many ecosystems. DDT would seep into the earth and find its way into 
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waterways, making it spread to all ecosystems. It was not only animals and plants that 
suffered poisoning from DDT; humans who were exposed also died (Carson, 1962: 20).  
Silent Spring was a book that had global implications because it put environmental issues on 
the map. It can be argued that it was this book that led to the 1970s being a decade that was 
very focused on the environment. The American Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) 
and Earth Day were founded in 1970 and it said of Carson and Silent Spring:  
In the process of transforming ecology from dispassionate science to activist creed, 
Carson unwittingly launched the modern idea of environmentalism: a political 
movement which demanded the state not only preserve the Earth, but act to regulate 
and punish those who polluted it (EPA, 1992). 
DDT was completely banned in 1972, the same year that the UN Environment Programme 
was founded and the first Earth Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro. In Vancouver, Canada, 
Greenpeace was also founded. Arne Naess, a Norwegian philosopher, came up with the term 
“deep ecology”,9 and in Australia and New Zealand the first green political parties were 
formed. This was a watershed moment in history for the environment. With all these 
developments people who were aware of environmental issues either adopted a “promethean” 
perspective on environmental issues or a “survivalist” stance (Lawson, 2015: 222).  
Survivalist Perspective 
The prominent academic, Garret Hardin, and his article entitled “The Tragedy of the 
Commons” (1968) formed part of the survivalist perspective. There was a strong belief at the 
time that technical innovations could solve all environmental issues. Hardin disagreed with 
this and saw that it was human values that needed to change in order for the environment to 
recover. Self-interest was the one human value that Hardin strongly wanted to alter. He 
believed that self-interest was rational when it came to individual self-interest; however, in 
the long term self-interest was unsustainable for the environment (Hardin, 1968: 1244). In 
line with the thinking of the neo-Malthusians, who believed that the rapid growth of 
populations was to blame for environmental degradation and scarcity, Hardin saw that 
population growth was the core issue when it came to resource depletion: “a finite world with 
finite resources can carry only a finite population” (Lawson, 2015: 222; Homer-Dixon, 1991: 
99-100; Ashton, 2002: 66). Hardin also believed that if positive checks were not put in place 
                                                 
9
 “Deep ecology” refers to an environmental movement/philosophy that believes humans are one of many parts 
of the global ecosystem. It is a holistic perspective which provides a new understanding of global environmental 
issues, one that does not see humans as more important than that of the natural world or animals (Johnstone, 
2010). 
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to control the population, then negative checks were bound to occur (Hardin, 1968: 1248). 
Paul Ehrlich stated that there were only two solutions to over-population: “one is a ‘birth rate 
solution’, in which we find ways to lower the birth rate. The other is the ‘death rate solution,’ 
in which ways to raise the death rate – war, famine, pestilence – find us” (Ehrlich, 1968: 17).  
A group of businessmen, scientists and politicians noticed that governments were not doing 
much to ensure environmental protection and so they decided to form a group called the 
“Club of Rome”. Their intentions were to focus on topics such as population growth, 
malnutrition, non-renewable resources and environmental degradation, and work to find 
possible long-term solutions. In 1972 the group published a book called The Limits to Growth, 
which proved to be very influential because it used intricate models and highlighted that 
governments were neglecting the environment. The book had a survivalist undertone 
throughout which claimed that if the world were to continue abusing the environment for 
economic gains, then the consequence would be rapid decline in population and industrial 
production (Meadows, Randers & Meadows, 2004: 21-22). They did outline an alternative, 
which stated that the world had to start planning immediately for economic and ecological 
stability. Economic and ecological stability would indirectly lead to a worldwide equilibrium 
that would ensure that all people have their basic needs met (Meadows et al., 2004: 23-24). 
The Promethean Perspective 
In stark contrast to the doom and gloom approach of the survivalist theme lies the Promethean 
stance. Much like that of the cornucopians, Prometheanism claims that humans and 
technology can move the world away from environmental catastrophe, meaning that through 
technology one can reverse all the damage done to the Earth. Garrett Hardin claims this was 
an extremely dangerous thing to believe in (Dryzek, 1997: 45). Hardin and others see this 
approach as “passing the buck” or not taking responsibility for harmful actions. It means that 
people can continue to abuse the environment without having to feel responsible or 
accountable, because they hope that a scientist somewhere will come up with a solution, one 
that does not undermine the current economic paradigm. Prometheanism is, therefore, very 
popular among neoliberal economists, because of its belief that people can solve climate 
issues without altering their economic activities. In the 1970s Prometheanism was 
increasingly popular because people saw astronauts going to space and many other 
phenomenal technical triumphs and believed that technology could solve ecological issues.  
Although the scientific evidence of climate change was available, there was a backlash. 
People such as Rachel Carson were personally attacked and accused of being irrational. The 
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commercial world or businesses that survived from making large profits turned against the 
scientists who were claiming that environmental degradation was caused by the practices of 
these businesses, who denied that anything was wrong. Businesses shut down and discredited 
anyone who threatened their profit margins by exposing how detrimental industry was to the 
environment (Lawson, 2015: 226). In the USA conservative think tanks were forming in order 
to fund their own scientists and studies that would negate results that showed the detrimental 
consequences of industry for the environment (Oreskes & Conway, 2010: 5-8). Green 
Theories, however, do not base themselves entirely on the Prometheans and survivalists. They 
are also concerned with values and beliefs, which shift and change over time, and how they 
affect the environment. It is important to note that the environmental movement is considered 
“the biggest assortment of ill-matched allies since the Crusades – young and old, radicals of 
left and right, liberals and conservatives, humanists and scientists, atheists and deists” 
(McCormick, 1991: ix). In addition to this wide assortment of members, there are also a 
number of different perspectives on environmental problems. Robert Goodin cleverly refers to 
this as the many “shades of green” (Goodin, 1992: 7). These ‘shades’ are highlighted in a 
number of Green Theories, which will be examined next.  
Green Theory and the Shades of Green 
Environmentalism as a term is broad; it refers to social movements, political thought and 
beliefs about the environment (Lawson, 2015: 227). Therefore, a more specific term was 
needed to indicate the different perspectives, beliefs and ideas that had political implications. 
Green Theory was the term that emerged to indicate this perspective. Green Theory, however, 
is not a “singular, uncontested body of thought”; there are multiple bodies of thought within 
Green Theory. If one wanted a definition of Green Theory, it would be “a form of normative 
theory that has, as a central and defining focus, a concern for the protection of the natural 
environment” (Humphrey, 2010: 573). It is important to note that when the “environment” is 
mentioned, it refers to the global environment (Attfield, 1999: 9-10). Green Theory is 
composed of two core categories: ecologism and environmentalism (Lawson, 2015: 227). 
Environmentalism has an anthropocentric view of the environment and human behaviour. 
Environmentalism believes that “the interests of humans are of higher priority than those of 
nonhumans” (Buell, 2005: 134). This signifies that the ecosphere is at the core of the 
environmentalist ethic of value; thus no specific species is more important than the 
ecosphere/biosphere (Buell, 2005: 134-137). Ecologism takes a more radical political 
approach when compared to environmentalism. Ecologism believes that environmental issues 
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can only be properly resolved if radical changes are brought about in “patterns of production 
and consumerism” (Lawson, 2015: 228). This is highlighted well by Dobson (2007: 2-3): “a 
sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the 
non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life”. Ecologism is formed 
on the base of ‘ecosystems’ and ‘ecology’, which are both scientific elements.  
An ‘ecosystem’ is a collection of organisms found within a certain area. The environment 
where they live and the energy flows between the many different organisms make up an 
interactive system that is mostly self-contained (Lawson, 2015: 228). ‘Ecology’ constitutes 
the examination and study of the relationships between all the organisms within an ecosystem. 
Ecologism, as one can see, adopts a holistic perspective on environmental issues. It notes that 
environmental issues are not isolated from one another and therefore demands a solution that 
is all-encompassing. An all-encompassing solution is hard to imagine, as where would it end? 
The planetary system or the global system? In ecologism the relationships between political, 
cultural, social, economic, geographic, biological dimensions are all elements which are 
examined in order to gain insight into where an issue originates and how it can be resolved 
properly (holistically). All of these elements are interdependent and indirectly affect the 
environment every day. 
Similarly, the ‘bright green’ environmentalists believe in ideas that stem from ‘ecological 
modernization theory’, which emerged in the 1980s. This is a social theory that adopts both 
an environmentalist and an ecologist stance on how to attain a sustainable future. Bright green 
environmentalists are anthropocentric, but do not see halting industrialisation as the 
appropriate response to addressing environmental issues. Rather, they see that a complete 
revolution in the current economic and social order is needed to obtain sustainability for the 
environment (Bloor, 2010: 247). Bright green environmentalism is strongly influenced by 
Prometheanism, yet is also strongly against the “business as usual” approach. The main focus 
is on “design, technology, innovation, entrepreneurialism, and consumption practices” 
(Newman, 2011: 39). Economic growth and prosperity cannot, therefore, be determined as 
detrimental to environmental sustainability. It is through economic prosperity that ‘green 
social engineering’ can be conducted that might bring about positive change to environmental 
degradation (Newman, 2011: 39-40).  
It is in the distinction between “light” green and “dark” green where one can in turn 
distinguish between “environmental” political thought and “green” political thought. 
Ecologism can be found in the green political thought arena. Light green and thus 
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environmental political thought can be described as “shallow ecology, humanist and 
anthropocentric” (Lawson, 2015: 229). Dark green and “green” political thought are on the 
other side of the scale. Dark green entails a belief in deep ecology and an ecocentric approach 
to environmental issues (Eckersley, 1992: 7-8). This detailed outline of which shades of green 
each political thought belongs to is rather complex, but there is another way to view green 
political theory; as Humphrey (2010: 182) states, it is a “broad category encompassing all 
forms of political though that have as a high priority the conservation or preservation of the 
natural environment”. For the purpose of clarity, this chapter will use this definition of Green 
Theory and, when a more precise distinction is needed, it will refer to ecocentric theory and 
ecologism.  
There is a definite difference between these two shades of green; they are highlighted further 
in Figure 3.1, which outlines the many different Green Theories and where they are located 
on the shade scale. The figure showcases how Green Theories can be classified as either 
“light green” or “dark green”. Through “Environmental thought”, light green splits into 
“Shallow Ecology”, “Environmentalism” and then “Bright Green Environmentalism”. The 
Environmentalism branch further splits off into the “Bright green environmentalism” branch. 
Under each main branch (Environmentalism, Shallow Ecology and Bright Green 
Environmentalism) one can see their characteristics and normative theoretical assumptions. 
On the Dark Green side one can see that Green Political Thought brought about “Ecologism” 
and “Deep Ecology”. The beliefs of Deep Ecology are shown beneath the main branch and 
the beliefs of Ecologism are shown above its main branch.  
(Figure 3.1 created by author) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 53 
 
Figure 3.1: Shades of Green Theory 
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Ecologism and Green Theory 
Ecologism has two distinct characteristics: one is its political dimension and the other its 
philosophical dimension. On the political side, as mentioned above, the focus is on ending all 
threats to humanity and the natural world through deindustrialisation and economic, social 
and political reform. The philosophical aspect is a theory of value which looks to challenge 
the dominant Western political paradigm. The philosophical side is anthropocentric; however, 
ecologism is found to be ecocentric, which means that ecologists assign value to the natural 
world first and foremost (Humphrey, 2010: 573-574). The Green Theory of value gives a 
“unified moral vision” and tells one what is to be valued and why (Goodin, 1992: 15; Carter, 
2007: 52). In ecologism the unit which is to be valued is the natural world; it should not, 
however, be valued “for the support and comfort of being” it provides for humans, as John 
Locke (prominent liberal academic) once stated in an instrumentalist writing (Eckersley, 
1992: 23). Ecologism states that the natural world should be seen as something that has 
enormous value in and of itself. In conclusion, ecologism believes that “nature” has value that 
is independent from that of humanity (Goodin, 1992: 45). As one can see, there are two types 
of theories of value that have been highlighted; they are known as axiological and 
instrumental. The axiological theory of value highlights how “nature” has its own intrinsic 
value, while the instrumental theory of value sees that “nature” has value only insofar as it 
aids humanity (Lawson, 2015: 230 & Carter, 2007: 52).  
It is important to note that it is not only liberals who believe that the value of the natural 
world is directly tied to its benefit to humankind. Marxists also adopt this stance: “while 
social relations between humans are theoretically different under capitalism and socialism, the 
relationship between humans and the rest of nature appears to be essentially the same” 
(Eckersley, 1992: 22).  Both Marxism and liberalism want people to have access to the 
“material good life”, which can only be brought about through industrialisation. This 
highlights the point that both traditional liberalism and Marxism are at their core 
anthropocentric (Eckersley, 1992: 22). This is not true for all forms of liberalism and 
Marxism, yet it is crucial to acknowledge that the traditional forms of these theories are 
anthropocentric.  
The Natural Question 
Ecologism sees that all that is “natural” should be highly valued; however, where must the 
line drawn on what is classified as natural and what is unnatural or artificial? Ecologism 
believes all that is manufactured or constructed by humans is artificial. With the theory of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 55 
 
value being ecocentric, this would mean that ecologism believes that natural is good and 
artificial is not good, or at least not as good as “the real thing” (Lawson, 2015: 231). There is 
a stigma that comes with labelling something “unnatural”; it takes the item which is unnatural 
and judges it on a moral level. The question that arises in this line of thinking is: Are humans 
natural and therefore part of nature, or are they unnatural? If they are regarded as natural, then 
all their actions are to be labelled as natural as well. Or are humans above nature? Many 
religions believe that humans are at the top of the natural hierarchy, which reflects the view of 
theories that are anthropocentric. Regardless of all of these questions, the fact that humans 
ponder and study “nature as an entity defined apart from human activity or agency, and 
possessing intrinsic value, implies a distinction between ‘humanity’, on the one hand, and the 
‘natural world’ , on the other, even if we want to dismiss the distinction as an artificial one” 
(Lawson, 2015: 231).  
In order to fully comprehend the question one needs to reconsider the idea that the value of 
nature exists independently of humans and is therefore a type of moral value. This raises the 
question as to how, without humans to give the natural world such value, could it be valued in 
any moral way at all? The notion of moral values is constructed by humans; it is not 
constructed by animals or inanimate rocks/stones. Therefore, one must ask how moral value 
can exist in the absence of humans? Many might say that it is God(s) that bestow moral value 
on the natural world; however, it is humans who gather and think about such moral value and 
behave towards nature in a way that implicates moral values. 
Nevertheless, if one believes that reality is socially constructed, then one must think of the 
natural world as a social construct, “a product of the human imagination as situated in specific 
historical and/or cultural contexts and which may therefore vary quite radically according to 
these contexts” (Lawson, 2015: 232). This, is in fact, the most anthropocentric notion, 
because while it tries to give moral value to the natural world, it simultaneously privileges 
human thought and not the natural world. There is, therefore, no escape from 
anthropocentrism when it comes to imparting moral value to any type of inanimate object or 
even the biosphere (Carter, 2007: 53 & Doherty & de Geus, 2003: 217).  
Another aspect of the Green Theory of value and morality is the question as to how far the 
boundary extends when thinking of the “moral community”. Many believe that the moral 
community includes more than just humans – it includes all life on Earth and the Earth itself 
(Dobson & Lucardie, 1993: x). This results in challenges for the more traditional theories of 
morality and justice, which see nature as an object of moral rhetoric but not as a subject. They 
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believe that “nature is not a moral agent and cannot itself distribute justice” (Wissenburg, 
1993: 51). This is still not an issue for people who have dedicated themselves to ecocentrism, 
which is represented well through the notion of ‘deep ecology’ (Lawson, 2015: 232).  
Deep Ecology and Biocentrism 
The first person to distinguish between anthropocentric, human-centred “shallow 
environmentalism” and deep ecology was Arne Naess. Deep ecology sees the value of all 
living things from that of single cell amoebas to humpback whales (Drengsen, 2008: 27). 
Deep ecology also respects social justice, cultural diversity and advocates for non-violence in 
the natural and cultural spheres (Drengsen, 2008: 27). Naess came up with the notion of deep 
ecology because he wanted to highlight that there was a difference between the science of 
facts in ecology and how in deep ecology things went a step further by assigning value to the 
natural world. Deep ecology is characterised by this approach, which adopts an explicitly 
normative stance. Arne Naess states:  
Chemistry, physics, and the science of ecology acknowledge only change, not valued 
change. But … a change in the bio-conditions of a river or ocean which excluded most 
forms of life contends that it would constitute a devastation of diversity. The inability 
of the science of ecology to denounce such processes … suggests that we need another 
approach which involves the inescapable role of announcing values, not only ‘facts’ 
(Naess, 1989: 47).  
Deep ecology is filled with spiritual leanings, which many critics interpret to be the downfall 
of the theory. The spiritual dimension that attracts the most criticism is the belief that humans 
should live in harmony with both the natural world and the cultural world. Critics believe this 
indicates that deep ecologists believe that humans should become subordinate to nature, but 
this is not true. Living in harmony with one’s surroundings does not mean that one has to alter 
all aspects of one’s lifestyles, but rather points to the need for integration. Deep ecologists, 
therefore, do not see humans as separate from the biosphere, but rather as an integral part of 
that biosphere. This does not mean that they place humans at the centre of this biosphere. 
They see that humans have created the large-scale environmental issues that the world is 
experiencing today and it is the dominant thought patterns of humans that need to be altered 
in order for abuse of the environment to end.  
Bioregionalism is the political dimension of deep ecology. Bioregionalism claims that all 
issues – environmental and social – that have arisen in the industrial age can be combatted 
through people returning to community living. The aim of community living, according to the 
tenets of bioregionalism, would entail becoming self-sufficient both economically and 
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environmentally. These communities would organise themselves close to the land, in 
“naturally defined areas” (Lawson, 2015: 233). The communities aim to actively reduce the 
toll they take on the environment through organic farming, use of natural medicines and 
region-based marketing; this all would assist communitarianism, “nature-based wisdom, 
spirituality, mutual aid, participatory politics and ‘speciate humility’” (Sale, 2000: xix). This 
method of ‘healing’ and ‘helping’ the environment, naturally, has faced many criticisms.  
Small communities, which ideally would have a population of around 10 000, would have to 
deal with many issues. These issues may include the intellectual and cultural impoverishment 
that would result in stagnation in innovation, including innovations that are helpful to the 
environment. Another issue would include the fact that large-scale environmental issues 
would be much more difficult to resolve with small communities. Socially, these communities 
would also more easily become oppressive rather than democratic (Carter, 2008: 59). 
Ecofeminists have a lot of negative things to say about deep ecology. However, many 
ecofeminists do agree with the values of deep ecology and the “human identity with nature 
and the ethic of care that stems from this” (Salleh, 2000: 110). The problem they see with 
deep ecology is that deep ecology neglects to include a gender perspective, which is easily 
adoptable from ecofeminism. Salleh (2000: 110) states that deep ecology, through neglecting 
gendered perspectives, is unable to identify issues around identity and difference.  
Difference and identity are not only specific to questions of gender but also to indigenous 
identities. Eurocentrism is a major issue and many deep ecologists are accused of ignoring the 
topic, while still unintentionally promoting it. According to ecofeminists, this was a terrible 
oversight, as indigenous people had learnt how to live within their means, and therefore deep 
ecologists could learn a lot from them. They do not believe that all humans should try to time-
travel, but that “Western societies” should challenge their “ingrained habits of thought and be 
more fully conscious of what we are about” (Salleh, 2000: 121). There is an alternative 
approach which also believes that value is based not on only human interest, but rather is 
found in all living organisms. It also points out that “ecosystems are not the repositories of 
value insofar as they support life” (Humphreys, 2010: 574). The ecosystems are not moral 
subjects and therefore “the purely physical conditions of a natural environment must, from a 
moral point of view, be sharply separated from the animals and plants that depend on those 
conditions for their survival” (Taylor, 2011: 18). This approach or point of view raises many 
questions which are centred on environmental ethics: 
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 Is human behaviour towards natural ecosystems subjected to moral constraints, or 
should such moral constraints only be applicable to the ways in which humans relate 
to each other? 
 If yes, human behaviour is towards ecosystems is subjected to moral constraints, then 
what specific constraints are active and how exactly are they different from those that 
guide our actions towards other humans? 
 How should the rules and standards derived from such constraints be justified? 
 Hypothetically, say humans do have a moral obligation towards the natural world, 
how is the moral obligation to be contrasted with human values and interests (Taylor, 
2011: 10).  
Taylor’s (2011) answer to these questions is that we do have a moral obligation to the 
environment, which is completely isolated from that of which humans have to each other. 
This is in direct opposition to an anthropocentric environmental ethic, which believes that all 
moral obligations that we possess towards the natural world should come from our moral 
obligations to one another and future generations. In this perspective, even the obligation to 
protect endangered species is derived from human values. This is one of the first real 
intellectual inquiries within biocentrism into the field of environmental ethics and normative 
theory. Populist literature, however, sees biocentrism from a different perspective, one that 
advances extreme claims. The main point of reference in this regard is Biocentrism: How Life 
and Consciousness are the Keys to Understanding the True Nature of the Universe by Robert 
Lanza, written with Bob Berman (2009), which states that the current theories of the physical 
world are trapped in “the cages in which Western science has unwittingly managed to confine 
itself” and do not account for “life and consciousness” (Lanza & Berman, 2009: 1-2).  
The notion of consciousness in this book is used to highlight a different truth, one in which 
“the animal observer creates reality and not the other way around” (Lanza & Berman, 2009: 
15). Biocentrism becomes a completely different theory if one takes into consideration this 
populist perspective. Populist authors believed this was a revolutionary discovery regarding 
reality; however, it mostly derived from a type of very old idealist philosophy, which states 
that reality can only ever reside in human consciousness. There are some distinct similarities 
with the sociology of knowledge whereby facts about the material world are believed to be 
mediated by cultural and social organisations/institutions and experienced by them, but not 
created by them. Knowing this, there is an isolated, “independent, non-social reality such as 
‘nature’, even though it may be subject to many different interpretations” (Lawson, 2015: 
235; Bloor, 1996: 35). The key focus point here, however, is that the eccentric and mystical 
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form of biocentrism that has been described here as an adaptation of idealist philosophy 
(which has been supported by mystic, Deepak Chopra) does not have much to do with the 
biocentric environmental ethic formulated by Taylor, “which belongs squarely within a 
tradition of green theory with serious philosophical credentials” (Lawson, 2015: 235-236).  
Eco-anarchism and Eco-authoritarianism 
Ecologism is an ever-expanding field, another two important forms of it are eco-anarchism 
and eco-authoritarianism. As one can tell from their names, they are antithetical ideological or 
political stances. During the 1970s eco-authoritarianism became increasingly popular; 
however, there are still supporters of this ideology today. It has its foundations in a 
Malthusian/Hobbesian survivalist perspective and is strongly linked to “doom and gloom” 
academics such as Garrett Hardin. One of the key figures to propagate eco-authoritarianism 
was William Ophus. He states that not only is liberal democracy unable to resolve issues of 
the environment and resource scarcity, but indeed believes that liberal democracy has created 
environmental problems and scarcities. Currently we are facing an ecological crisis and he 
believes that what is needed is a “‘green Leviathan’ with a knowledge and power to make 
prudent, enforceable ecological decisions” (Barry, 1999: 196; Keulartz, 1983: 3). 
The opposite stance to that of eco-authoritarianism is eco-anarchism, which is also referred to 
as social ecology. Its best known advocate, Murray Bookchin (1921-2006), believed that the 
notion that the domination of the environment by man stemmed from the reality of 
domination among humans themselves (Bookchin, 2005: 1). Bookchin was influenced heavily 
by the nineteenth-century anarchist, Peter Kropotkin, “who promoted a benign view of nature, 
seeing it as essentially interdependent and egalitarian and certainly without hierarchies” 
(Bookchin, 2005: 2-3). Humans, according to Bookchin and eco-anarchism, are naturally 
cooperative and best suited to live with nature, whereby they undertake egalitarian social 
arrangements in which they do not dominate each other or the natural world. Life was like 
this in preliterate times when people lived in organic communities. These communities were 
changed when the rise of social hierarchies became dominant through divisions such as 
gender, class, race, age and religion. This brought about competition over resources which 
ended an era of cooperation (Carter, 2008: 75; Bookchin, 2005: 5).  
Deep ecology also seemed too esoteric for Bookchin, which he described as “mystical eco-la-
la”. He was against the idea that positive changes came from “a transformation of individual 
world-views stimulated by better spiritual connections with nature” (Bookchin, 2005: 76). He 
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felt that deep ecology was a movement that harboured a misanthropic perspective, believing 
that their ideas supported “coercive forms of population control, immigration and aid policy” 
(Bookchin, 2005: 76-77). It is true that some deep ecologists have supported the idea of 
“letting nature take its course”, believing that natural disasters such as famine and disease 
would take care of environmental issues through reducing the global population (Chase, 1991: 
20). Bookchin found this to be morally repugnant. There were many differences between eco-
anarchism and deep ecology, which have been highlighted; however, there was also some 
common ground. They both have a hostile view of the state, they believe a hostile view of the 
state is necessary because of their ecological and social values (Carter, 2008: 76). Another 
commonality is there dedication to radical ecologism, in the many different forms that it 
takes, as a challenge to superficial environmental reformism. Environmental reformism does 
not challenge the foundation of modern capitalist industrial society, which has, in the final 
analysis, brought about the social and environmental damage that ecologism aims to fix at the 
most foundational level (Lawson, 2015: 237).  
The Greening of International Relations 
Concerns about environmental degradation have shown, throughout this Chapter that groups 
and individuals have worked to better understand the reasons, and possible solutions through 
abstract ideologies and political and social actions. Green-minded experts and specialists have 
all sought to further their understanding about the relationship humans have with the 
environment. The belief is that only once a holistic understanding of this relationship has been 
established can solutions be effective. The belief has been the case since the 1970s on a global 
stage; it has been pointed out that 1972 was a watershed year for the formation of 
organisations, the publishing of books and growing awareness about the plight of the 
environment. This was the year that the international political agenda could no longer ignore 
environmental issues and this in turn set the foundations of global environmental governance 
(Elliot, 2004: 7). Writers and academics from this time – Garrett Hardin, Rachel Carson, Paul 
Ehrlich and others – were followed by philosophers and political theorists who developed a 
wide range of normative approaches to the environment under the umbrella of Green Theory 
(Lawson, 2015: 237). Green International Relations (IR) theory cannot be considered as 
separate from the more general field of Green Theory, yet there are some issues that are of 
specific concern to green IR. These issues include the development agenda, the international 
political economy, the role of the sovereign state (which was discussed in Chapter 2) and the 
changing nature of security (which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter).  
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When the environmental issues were put on the agenda in the 1970s, they started to gain 
momentum at the same time as the international political economy which was evolving into a 
specialist field within IR. These two fields both required attention as one was demanding 
issues of economic development be resolved, while the other was demanding that 
environmental protection be enforced. The UN recognised that both these demands were 
intrinsically linked, because they saw that if the low-income countries of the South were to 
develop through the same model as the North (heavy industrialisation), then the environment 
was going to suffer even more. However, for the developed world to stand by idly as the 
South became even more impoverished would also be morally wrong and went against all that 
the UN stood for (Lawson, 2015: 238).  
This led to the forming of the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1983. 
This Commission focused on three intertwined themes: environmental protection, economic 
development and social equality. The Commission published a report called “Our Common 
Future” and it introduced the term “sustainable development” into the vocabulary of 
international politics (WCED, 1987). “Sustainable development” in this sense was defined as 
meeting of the needs of the present generation without compromising the resources available 
to future generations. The report noted many environmental disasters, including severe 
weather as well as horrific industrial accidents around the globe. It highlighted the fact that 
many states were spending the biggest proportion of their GDP on their militaries rather than 
on protecting the natural world and non-renewable resources (WCED, 1987). Issues such as 
ozone depletion, species loss, acid rain and global warming made it clear that threats to 
national security were changing. It was not only the threat of invading militaries or rebels that 
could be considered national security threats. These fears were confirmed in 1992 at the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio Summit, 
which was the largest gathering ever of world leaders at that time. The Rio Summit included 
the Rio Declaration, which set out guidelines for the protection of the environment and how 
the global community could restore it (UN, 1992).  
The intertwined relationship between the environment and security was once again brought to 
the forefront in the UN’s Human Security Report of 1994. It was in this report that the term 
“human security” was first used – it was a term that shifted people’s focus on security to 
“people rather than territories, with development rather than arms”, which promoted “a new 
paradigm of sustainable human development” (UNDP, 1994a). Human security is a 
multifaceted notion, which has environmental security listed as just one dimension of security 
along with economic security, health security, personal security, food security, political 
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security and community security (UNDP, 1994b). It was agreed that all these forms of 
security were important; nevertheless, the theme that generated the most concern 
internationally was environmental security. This is because environmental security underpins 
many of the other types of securities – health and food being the most prominent. Other types 
that are not mentioned include water and energy security; however, they are also closely tied 
to environmental security. Only today is a deteriorating environment recognised as a 
traditional threat to national security. As seen in Chapter 1, many people have recognised that 
there is an increasing potential for violence over scarcities, which is related to environmental 
issues (Dalby, 2002: xix).  
Securitization Theory and the Environment 
Appeals to environmental security highlight a fairly new and successful attempt to place 
environmental issues on the security agenda and is where a better understanding of 
securitization stems from. Although there has been momentum in this regard, the relationship 
between security and environmental change is still a contested subject. This is because 
environmental issues are often pushed to the back burner, while “more important” traditional 
security threats are dealt with; there is also the issue that many people disagree that the 
environment should even be considered an area that is a part of the national and global 
security regime. Environmental security provides a more comprehensive account of the new 
and different “typologies of vulnerability as well as the potential for conflict and violence 
with which these vulnerabilities could be associated” (Trombetta, 2008: 586). The term 
‘environmental security’ has caused many people concern, as they believe that this would 
result in the securitization of the environment. Why is this a concern for these people? Would 
the securitization of the environment not aid governments to take proper action in curbing 
environmental degradation? Securitization comes with many benefits, but with many, many 
more disadvantages, as will be discussed below.  
Ole Waever and Barry Buzan were the prominent academics who worked on the topic of 
securitization and the environment in the Copenhagen School. They developed a framework 
which conceptualised the theory of securitization (Trombetta, 2009; Balzacq, 2012: 59). 
Securitization Theory showcases the political aspects of “doing” security and challenges the 
current dominant approach to security, which is concerned with finding and eliminating self-
evident threats, and introduces a social-constructivist stance which considers how issues are 
transformed into security threats (Trombetta, 2009). Securitization is “the successful process 
of labelling an issue a security issue and results in the transformation of the way of dealing 
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with it” (Trombetta, 2009). Such transformation would have many implications: the label 
“security” environmental issues would be transformed into an existential threat, which would 
generate exceptional emergency measures, which would in turn include breaking rules or 
requiring governing through decree – effectively ignoring democratic rule (Trombetta, 2009).  
Many commentators have raised the question as to how effective the global community has 
been in trying to untangle these intertwined dimensions of security. Barnett (2001: 10) 
believes that it is political institutions and their governance that are responsible for the failures 
of environmental security. Barnett states that there is a need to securitize the environment at 
an institutional level in order for positive change to occur. This perspective comes from the 
fact that even though the intentions and principles of organisations such as the UN are noble, 
they never seem to translate into sustained action. On the other hand, there are people who 
believe that organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) 
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have taken the norms of sustainable development 
and internalised them, thus formulating integrated notions about environmental protection 
within a liberal economic world order over the last two decades (O’Neill, 2009: 161). 
Multinational corporations (MNCs), according to O’Neill (2009: 191), are also making a 
concerted effort to become more conscious of their brand and how they treat the environment. 
Public image, instead of moral obligation, is the driving force behind MNCs becoming more 
environmentally friendly. They have also realised that they need to “minimise risks and 
uncertainties associated with multiple and shifting governmental and inter-governmental 
rules” (O’Neill, 2009: 161).  
This is important to note because it indicates how there is a reformist approach, however slow 
it might be. The unfortunate side of this is that this reformist approach exists within a well-
established framework of industrial capitalism and its neoliberal economic framework, which 
is unlikely to support, much less promote, a green approach. Reformists will not satisfy those 
who want to change the status quo, especially because those that have the power to do so are 
profiting so much from the current framework. A good example of reformist wanting to keep 
the current status quo would be the anti-globalisation movement, which emerged to protest 
organisations such as the WTO and other organisations that promote globalisation. In 1999 a 
mass protest was held at the WTO conference in Seattle. This protest consisted of 
approximately 30,000 activists from all over the world. They were all different, yet they were 
“unified by trenchant critiques of neoliberal globalisation and a commitment to ecological and 
social justice” (O’Neill, 2009: 162). Global protests groups have continued to protest at major 
international conferences and meetings, such as the IMF, G8 and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
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Cooperation forum, which has resulted in these events becoming increasingly monitored by 
security. This highlights the fact that such institutions are not willing to consider complete 
reformation of liberal economics and globalisation. Protesters disagree with reformists 
because they believe that simple reforms do not guarantee a healthier relationship with the 
environment and only an end to liberal economics will ensure a healthier environment.   
Regardless of the legitimacy of other claims within the anti-globalisation movement, there is 
no doubt that the international cooperation that has developed because of strong global 
institutions has caused increased environmental damage. This growing cooperation is a 
“liberal institutionalist approach and accords with what appears to be a common sense 
position, namely, that when it comes to threats posed by environmental degradation – of 
which climate change is possibly the most significant at the present time – individual states 
cannot simply go it alone” (Lawson, 2015: 240). In the 1970s, interestingly, state sovereignty 
was viewed as an obstacle to dealing with environmental issues. This made the notion of a 
global government seem like the only viable option to tackle environmental degradation, but  
this notion soon attracted great criticism as many people felt such a form of government 
would result in global authoritarianism. Liberal regime theory strongly criticised the idea of a 
global government because it saw that the extent to which international cooperation was 
taking place and believed that increasing regulations concerning the environment meant the 
further diminishing of state sovereignty (Paterson, 1999: 798-799).  
The Discursive Nature of Security 
The Copenhagen School (CS) was formed in order to reconceptualise security studies on the 
basic assumption that security is a speech act. The CS noted that threats show themselves as 
security issues through the discursive politics of security (Dillon, 1996: 47). Waever (1995: 
55) states that: 
with the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this 
light, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the 
utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, a promise, 
naming a ship) … The word “security” is the act … In this instance, security is an 
illocutionary act, a ‘self-referential’ practice; its conditions of possibility are 
constitutive of the speech act of saying ‘security’. 
There are, however, criticisms of this perspective. One is that security cannot always be self-
referential; it regularly executes a type of reference – however partial or biased this may be 
(Nightingale & Cromby, 2002: 705). If one believes that security is a speech act, theoretically 
and methodologically it becomes hard to substantiate, even if it makes sense for other 
instances. In reality, what has often been understood to be the result of the performative use of 
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the concept of security does not align with that assumption. Instead, securitization comes 
about from other unarticulated assumptions about the symbolic power of security. To sum up, 
“securitization is a pragmatic act, i.e. a sustained argumentative practice aimed at convincing 
a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific 
development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to curb it” (Balzacq, 2012: 
60). This points to two different ways of seeing security: the CS approach is considered 
philosophical, while the pragmatic perspective is sociological. The differences between the 
two will be examined below. 
The Philosophical and Sociological Models and Green Theory 
Both of these perspectives were developed simultaneously, although in different areas of the 
world. The sociological perspective was developed in Denmark, while the philosophical 
perspective was developed in the UK, France and Belgium. But, taking into account strong 
cross-pollination, the borders between these two perspectives are extremely porous, some 
academics refer to both without distinguishing one from the other. However, the CS 
philosophical approach is more common than the sociological approach, which is often 
regarded as superficial (Balzacq, 2012: 60). Elements of both approaches will be discussed 
below. 
Many understandings and works that describe securitization are based on the philosophical 
approach. Speech act theory and poststructuralist ideas have been used to describe issues such 
as infectious disease, identity, and transboundary crime and human trafficking (Emmers, 
2000: 426). Although this philosophical theory of securitization can be applied to a diverse 
range of issues, there is still a disconnect between the theoretical assumptions and the 
methods which tend to follow on from the assumptions (Leonard, 2007). In fact, in the CS or 
philosophical approach to securitization, most peer-reviewed studies fall beyond the scope of 
the framework of speech act theory. The next section will revisit the idea that security is a 
speech act. It will take a closer look at speech act theory, and the relationship between what 
security means and what it does. Each of these sections is an examination of the weaker CS 
presumptions about security and securitization (Balzacq, 2012: 60). 
JL Austin’s work will be used to summarise speech act theory. Austin (1962: 107) believed 
that every sentence has the potential to convey three forms of acts, the combination of which 
forms the total speech act situation: 
1) Locutionary – “the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and 
reference”, 
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2) Illocutionary – the act performed in articulating a phrase. In a way, this type highlights 
the performative class of utterances, and the idea of the “speech act” is predicated on 
that form of agency; 
3) Perlocutionary acts, which are made up of sequels which are aimed to bring about 
feelings, thoughts, beliefs, or actions of the target audience (Searle, 1977: 59-82).  
For a clearer understanding it is important to notice that the illocutionary and perlocutionary 
are different when it comes to the direction and the nature of consequences they bring about. 
Illocutionary, by convention, is intertwined with the effects that will occur if all four of the 
“felicity conditions” are met; these include: 
1) A condition which is determined by the presence of a “conventional procedure having 
a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by 
certain persons in certain circumstances”; 
2) An executive condition to decide whether the procedure has been properly and fully 
executed by all participants; 
3) A sincerity condition that proposes that participants in this conventional procedure 
must have specific feelings or thoughts, and “must intend so to conduct themselves”; 
4) A fulfilment condition which is determined by whether participants “actually do 
conduct themselves subsequently” (Austin, 1962: 14).  
Perlocution is “specific to the circumstances of issuance, and is therefore not conventionally 
achieved just by uttering particular utterances, and includes all those effects, intended or 
unintended, often indeterminate, and some particular utterances in a particular situation may 
cause” (Austin, 1962: 14). This, therefore, means that if perlocution does not meet these rules 
which condition the realization of an illocutionary act, which the CS uses for its definition of 
security and securitization, one can see that viewing security as a speech act can become 
rather restrictive (Balzacq, 2012:61). Also, in all processes such as securitization, the purpose 
is to trigger a significant response from the other (perlocutionary) and unless this occurs then 
no securitization happens. This highlights the point that perlocution is imperative to 
understanding how and why a specific public issue can transform into a security issue. This 
means that perlocution could be the key to describing how the environment and water scarcity 
could become securitized. 
The sociological approach to securitization is based upon symbolic interactions and the 
symbolic uses of language. The language in which people choose is an imperative component 
of resultant interactions. Securitization aims to shape interactions – through the use of specific 
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language – which is used in order to persuade a specific audience to see the world in a 
particular way and therefore people act as the situation demands. The sociological approach 
also adds a new process – persuasive reasoning and argument – to securitization, which 
studies how alterations in security symbols determine the nature and the consequences of 
political structure of threats (Balzacq, 2012: 63). According to such outlines, securitization is 
a process whereby: 
1) There are patterns of heuristic artefacts (image repertoires, analogies, metaphors, 
emotions and stereotypes), 
2) These are contextually mobilized through a recognised person, who 
3) Works persuasively in order to prompt a target audience which builds a 
comprehensive network of implications (sensations, intuitions, feelings and thoughts), 
which all agree with that person’s reasons for actions and choices by 
4) “Investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening 
complexion” that 
5) A unique political action must be made immediately in order to block the threats 
development (Balzacq, 2012: 63).  
This section has involved heavy theoretical foundations which are important as they lay the 
foundation for understanding Securitization Theory. It is imperative as most academics are 
more focused on the consequences of securitization and not what the foundations of 
securitization are (Huysmans, 2006: 246). The main aim of this section has been to highlight 
how even the most foundational assumptions of securitization theory are still problematic, yet 
they still remain extremely important methodologically, conceptually and empirically 
(Balzacq, 2012: 68).  
Securitization is rigid in its conceptualisations of security and, therefore, does not allow for 
the conceptualisation of the second aspect of recent developments in the security arena, 
whereby the appeal of security highlights an increasing concern for preventative measures 
(Trombetta, 2009). Although the issue of securitization raises an important point by outlining 
the power of the political nature of security and corresponding discourses, it is argued that the 
Copenhagen School and their researchers impose an unnecessary rigidity on security as a type 
of social practice. The term “security”, according to the Copenhagen School, sets up a very 
specific mindset and outlines a set of problematic practices that are linked with the logic of 
war and emergency. These practices are closed to negotiation, political debate or general 
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flexibility, which results in it being almost impossible to account for any alterations in 
security practices (Trombetta, 2009).   
For many the idea of securitizing the environment is a matter of concern because (as seen 
above) the term “security” “evokes a set of confrontational practices associated with the state 
and the military which should be kept apart from the environmental debate” (Deudney, 1990: 
75; Trombetta, 2008: 586). Through securitizing environmental issues one allows for the 
military to create new ways and weapons, which could lead to nationalistic methods of 
protecting resources and to fighting instead of approaching issues through the greening of 
securitization (Trombetta, 2008: 586). Deudney (1990) highlighted the fact that the 
institutions and practices which were characteristic of traditional security would be ill-fitted to 
deal with environmental issues; he also stated that he felt that the security rhetoric and 
practice would bring about a zero-sum rationality to the environmental discourse, which 
would create winners and losers and would completely undermine the efforts of Green 
Theories to bring about cooperation when it came to environmental issues. Low-income 
countries were in agreement with Deudney, adding that they felt “security” was a rich 
countries’ solution in order to protect their resources and consumption patterns (Dalby, 2002: 
85). In 2007 this debate was taken to the UN Security Council, where the members remained 
divided as to whether securitizing environmental issues would bring about real, holistic 
solutions or not.  
High Politics and Green Theory 
Chapter 1 showed that high politics refers to important issues that have to do with inter-state 
relations such as war, diplomatic cooperation and peace. It specifically refers to problems that 
affect state sovereignty and autonomy. The state is the main unit of concern and analysis in 
“high politics” (Dikshit, 1999: 8). This means that it is essential to study both securitization 
and high politics together, noting that one could not exist without the other. Much like 
securitization theory, high politics does not have one concise definition or manifesto. It is a 
multifaceted topic; however, the foundational ideas of high politics will be examined further 
in this section, as well as the way that scholars deal with the topic and political consequences 
of high politics at present (Turnbull, 2016: 82).  
In Cowling’s (1971: 3) study of high politics he investigated “the intentions and actions of a 
political leadership network, which consisted of ‘fifty or sixty politicians in conscious tension 
with one another whose accepted authority constituted political leadership’”. To Cowling high 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 69 
 
politics is merely a matter of manoeuvring and rhetoric by powerful executive leaders. 
Through examining the war diaries of the powerful elite, as well as letters and private papers, 
Cowling was able to conclude that executive leaders behave “situationally” when deciding to 
elevate an issue to high politics (Turnbull, 2016: 82). However, in order to fully comprehend 
high politics it is important to go back to theories of Realism to show the distinction between 
“low politics” and “high politics” (Motaal, 2010: 4). 
Realism, also known as realpolitik, provides a clear rationale for “high politics” to prosper in 
modern times. It is an old theory of International Relations, but it is increasingly relevant to 
the debate over whether the environment should become securitized. Proponents of realism 
believe that it is the primary goal of states to acquire, maintain and exercise power (Motaal, 
2010: 4). Since the treaty of Westphalia states have been the central actors in international 
relations. The state is a rational, unitary actor that is a sovereign entity, even if sovereignty is 
diminishing. Realists argue that it is the state and the delicate balance of power between all 
states which creates the dominant international paradigm (Motaal, 2010: 4). Realists are the 
theorists who separate “low politics” from “high politics”. “Low politics” involves issues 
such as economics, human health, human rights and possibly still the environment; these are 
issues that the state views as low priority. “High politics”, on the other hand, is associated 
with conflict, war and military capability, which are all matters of high priority to the state.  
High politics deals with all issues that are pertinent to inter-state relations, elements such as 
peace, war and diplomatic missions. High politics also has a lot to do with state sovereignty 
and issues around constitutional alterations – distinct issues that pertain to the state as an 
autonomous entity. Therefore high politics involves politicians and diplomats who sit in “high 
positions” – the elite positions within the state apparatus. The security of the state is what 
drives high politics. Low politics, on the other hand, relates to issues that are considered 
“everyday”. Such issues involve “human survival relating to economic policies and public 
administration – including public health, education and welfare administration in general” 
(Dikshit, 1999: 8). Low politics does not exclude elites from its policy formation; however, 
elites do not involve themselves in any other aspects of low politics.  
It is important to note that the distinction between high and low politics is not always definite. 
Sometimes there is an overlap in states that consist of participatory democratic institutions 
and practices. People often regard high politics and low politics as the same as formal and 
informal politics, but this is not correct. Informal politics involves the “inter-personal 
relationships between heads of States which may play a significant part in the conduct of 
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international relations” (Dikshit, 1999: 8-9). Formal politics, on the other hand, consists of 
foreign policy organisations, diplomatic correspondence and intergovernmental commissions. 
One can see that both high politics and low politics, though not interchangeable with informal 
and formal politics, involve several aspects of both formal and informal politics.  
Through the ages the pertinence of high versus low politics has altered significantly. This was 
highlighted well during the colonial era, when high politics was increasingly involved 
“because the colonial model of the European State represented the model example of the 
Razelian concept of organismic State with an inbuilt tendency to expand territorially in the 
process of its growth, so that problems of security – internal as well as external – had loomed 
large in the political life of the state” (Dikshit, 1999: 9). It was only through the formation of 
the “modern State as a secular civic authority based on the consent of the ruled” that low 
politics could emerge (Dikshit, 1999: 9). The formation of the modern state had the impact of 
tipping the scales in favour of low politics. Low politics was once again dominant after World 
War II, when decolonisation led to the creation of more independent nation-states.  
Realists argue that “might makes right” and therefore it is of the utmost importance that the 
state acquire power. Weakness or the lack of power has exceptionally bad consequences. For 
this reason the plight of the environment for realists has still remained in the category of “low 
politics”. Realists do not see that it is necessary for states to coordinate their domestic or 
international policies; therefore the transboundary nature of issues such as water scarcity 
remains within “low politics” (Motaal, 2010: 4). International and domestic security is of the 
utmost importance to realists; however, this does not mean that realists will not classify 
conflicts over environmental resources as “high politics”. When a conflict stemming from 
scarcity breaks out, it is natural for the realist state to consider labelling it “high politics” if it 
threatens the survival of the said state. 
The Pitfalls of Securitizing the Environment 
The securitization of environmental resources is helpful because it puts issues like water 
scarcity on the public and political agenda (Fourie & O’Manique, 2010: 249). However, 
securitization is criticized as often as it is praised when it comes to environmental issues. The 
securitization process has two noteworthy pitfalls, which will be analysed. The first pitfall is 
attributed to the fact that “the binary logic of the approach lacks complexity” (Stetter et al., 
2011: 445). Environmental issues are characteristically complex and intertwined with many 
other developmental problems; they therefore require an approach that can move beyond 
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labelling problems as either “security” or not security.  Environmental threats such as water 
scarcity come about slowly and unobtrusively and therefore need an approach that takes this 
into account. The second pitfall is that securitization places such an emphasis on studying the 
actors and audiences of a security issue that it side-lines the bigger societal structures “within 
which socially meaningful notions of actorhood develop in the first place, including the 
construction of actorhood in the context of securitization” (Meyer, 2000: 235-238; Stetter et 
al., 2011: 446).  
In recent years the issue of securitization has embraced politics, society and the environment 
(which includes “baseline concerns about the relationship between the human species and the 
rest of the biosphere”) (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998: 22-23). All threats, which are 
identified and become a security issue through speech act, cannot be “properly” measured on 
an objective scale (Vultee, 2010: 35). Instead security threats are assessed by the political elite 
who decide what course of action to take and then “build a shared understanding of what such 
threats look like” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23 & Vultee, 2010: 35). This leaves an incredible 
amount of power in the hands of just a few members of the elite. Their intentions for 
securitizing an environmental issue may not always be pure. Because securitizing issues often 
allows states to take advantage of the lack of democratic processes, political elites may take 
advantage of this in order to achieve goals other than what is being securitized. How do these 
elites frame environmental issues as security threats? This is a different approach to that of 
securitizing military issues, as will be discussed below.  
Securitizing the environment, or specifically water, is a unique process as it is an object and 
there is not always an identifiable enemy. Political elites are able to securitize the 
environment through describing resource provisions in existential ways. It is then important 
for them to link the resource in question with surrounding conflicts (Fishhelder, 2011: 13). 
This highlights the point that securitization is a speech act and that it requires a significant 
amount of framing. Elites manage to frame such issues through the use of the media; when it 
comes to environmental resources, they identify symbols which are used to detail resource 
dependence and the looming volatility if the scarcity were to worsen. Elites also make links 
between resource scarcity and issues of high politics; even if there are no direct links, the 
portrayal represents direct links. It is the jobs of the elites to create a real fear of political 
instability and human insecurity. This requires them to place environmental issues “beyond 
normal politics”, which ultimately means placing them “beyond public debate” (Fishhelder, 
2011: 14). Most securitization decisions are made on impulse and always seem to involve a 
willingness to sacrifice democratic procedures. 
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The Pros of Securitizing the Environment 
One of the pros of securitizing the environment is that it puts environmental issues on the 
political agenda (Fourie & O’Manique, 2012: 249). There is evidence that when 
environmental issues are securitized, the state mobilizes power and policy makers more 
rapidly in order to find new ways in which to protect the environment. There is a foundational 
assumption, however, that the securitization of the environment will only succeed if elites link 
environmental issues with poverty, health, housing and security (Fishhelder, 2011: 16). 
Nevertheless, securitization of the environment brings about rapid action that aims to resolve 
the threat and can be extremely successful. In low-income countries the intervention of their 
own government in making environmental resources a security issue is sometimes the only 
way for the state to take note that its people are suffering. If securitization of environmental 
issues becomes as popular as the securitization of conflict, then one could see that the 
dominant system of abuse of the global environment is no longer sustainable and could be the 
catalyst for real change.  
Securitization of the environment is not as straightforward as dealing with many other 
security threats. It entails “several peculiarities and does not follow the fixed format suggested 
by the Copernhagen School” (Trombetta, 2010). One of the difficulties/peculiarities has been 
summed up as follows: “One of the most striking features of the environmental sector is the 
existence of two different agendas: a scientific agenda and a political agenda” (Buzan et al., 
1998: 71). The scientific agenda aims to prove (through scientific evidence) that an 
environmental issue is worthy of the high politics actions. The international community, more 
than ever before, is demanding scientific proof on matters of environmental security. This is 
not a bad thing, when one takes into account how many other issues have been securitized 
merely because they were politically manipulated for ulterior motives (Trombetta, 2010). This 
approach to environmental issues highlights the point that “some threats are more real than 
others, thanks to scientific proof. The only drawback of this approach is that it takes much 
longer. Acquiring scientific evidence is not a quick process and may delay actions which 
would result in the situation worsening. Another difficulty lies in the fact that environmental 
issues involve a multitude of actors” (Trombetta, 2010: 95). Not many other issues that are 
securitized involve a multitude of actors, when it comes to the environment; there are many 
discourses and power struggles that ensue. Nevertheless, it is the position of this thesis that 
there is great heuristic utility in the concomitant securitization of water because it could save 
thousands of lives, this is discussed further in Chapter 4.  
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Conclusion 
Chapter 1 raises the question of whether Green Theories within IR provide an analytically 
useful alternative/addition to the conservative theories of realism and liberalism, specifically 
with regards to environmental issues. This chapter has highlighted the point that Green 
Theories can do so. It is through a drastic change in the way people see themselves within the 
natural world which could hinder environmental degradation.  
Global environmental politics and theories are a relatively new field within IR. Many 
components of environmental politics have been merged to construct a grand theory that 
neatly outlines values and norms (Princen, 2008: 1). As one can see from this chapter, there 
has yet to emerge just one concise theory, but this is not surprising as there is such a diversity 
of perspectives on even the most foundational definitions of ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’. 
The close yet simultaneously opposing links between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism (or 
biocentrism), the intertwined relationship of the local environment and the global 
environment make it impossible to promise that one grand Green Theory will emerge in the 
future. Green Theory is unlike any other IR theory because of this diverse nature of its 
components; however, as environmental degradation continues the many Green Theories are 
in constant use.  
The beginnings of environmental awareness in the 1960s precipitated the emergence of the 
many different types of Green Theories. It was through the works of people such as Rachel 
Carson, the Club of Rome and various UN conferences that people were made aware that 
industrialisation and economic greed were having an adverse effect on their natural habitat. 
After this awareness took hold, divergent explanations of why the environment was suffering 
also emerged. These beliefs or approaches have been labelled Prometheanism and the 
Survivalist approach. Prometheanism contends that technology and human adaptability can 
put a halt to environmental depletion. The Survivalist approach believes that the growth of the 
human population is to blame for environmental degradation and believes that only through 
changing patterns of consumption can the planet return to being healthy. Both approaches 
borrow much from neo-Malthusianism and Cornucopianism, which were discussed in Chapter 
2.  
Traditional security threats are never going to be side-lined, but environmental security will 
continue to become more significant as the world continues to experience flood, droughts, 
natural disasters, desertification and many other environmental issues. This chapter has 
examined the subject of environmental security and the idea of ‘securitizing’ the environment. 
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It has examined the theory behind Securitization, involving both the sociological approach 
and the philosophical approach, which revealed that securitization is only possible if certain 
criteria are met and if the political elite are able to frame environmental issues successfully 
through discourse and use of the media. It has also studied the concepts of high and low 
politics and how they relate to issues of environmental securitization. Through analysing the 
notions of high and low politics, this chapter has highlighted the way that the environment 
straddles the blurred boundaries between high and low politics. It also showed how the 
presence of high politics within current international relations is still dominated by Realist 
Theory which remains a dominant paradigm when it comes to comprehending issues of 
security.  
An outline of the pros and cons of securitizing the environment was also provided. Much 
information was available on the pitfalls of securitizing the environment, but on the other 
hand, not much was available on the pros of securitizing the environment. This signifies that 
many academics are sceptical about securitizing the environment, even if it might bring about 
greater awareness of the plight of the environment and the societies that benefit and survive 
from it. A small section of the chapter considered the reasons why it is increasingly 
challenging to securitize the environment. The characteristics of environmental issues such as 
the multitude of actors that are involved and the fact that scientific proof is often required for 
governments to take action make it a hard task to securitize environmental issues.  
Green Theories provide a new, fresh approach to engaging with the environment. Through 
theories such as anthropocentrism and ecocentrism one can see that Green Theories do relate 
to environmental issues from an alternative perspective compared to that of the Realist and 
Liberal theories that still dominate IR. It is through Green Theories that people have to start 
questioning whether their needs are more important than those of animals or ecosystems. 
They provide a framework which give people and components of nature equal status. This 
may be the way forward. If people globally can change their reality by noticing that the 
environment is just as important as they are, then maybe the real “solutions” (which are 
holistic) can begin to be implemented. The Green Theory perspective is increasingly 
divergent from that of Realism and Liberalism. However, if Green Theories’ characteristics 
were incrementally consolidated with those of Realism and Liberalism, especially in terms of 
production, then the world would see improvements in terms of decreasing or eliminating 
environmental degradation.  
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The relationship between Securitization Theory and the environment is challenging, because 
not many can agree as to whether Securitization Theory should be utilised to address 
environmental issues. It is true that if issues of the environment are securitized, they would be 
solved more efficiently, but at what cost? Governments would become aware of 
environmental degradation and mobilise rapidly, yet in the process they would be ignoring 
democratic processes and might be motivated by ulterior motives which harm the 
environment further. High politics and its involvement in environmental security could result 
in neglecting human rights, yet it may save a particular resource from depletion.  
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Chapter 4: The Conflict in Darfur and its 
Links to Water Scarcity 
Introduction 
Water, like religion and ideology, has the power to move millions of people. Since the 
very birth of human civilisation, people have moved to settle close to it. People move 
when there is too little of it. People move when there is too much of it. People journey 
down it. People write, sing and dance about it. People fight over it. And all people, 
everywhere and every day, need it.  
                                                                                                         -Mikhail Gorbachev 
So far this thesis has presented the main opinions on the topic of water scarcity and conflict; it 
has studied at length all the elements which make up such a wide-ranging topic. Chapter 2 
highlighted the foundations of the topic and fully explained several elements such as types of 
scarcity and types of conflict. These are all elements which feature within this final chapter 
and the analysis of the Darfur conflict. Chapter 3 provided the theoretical underpinnings of 
this thesis; they allow for a deeper comprehension of the conflict in Darfur and the normative 
assumptions of what could have been different. Chapter 4 provides a background to the 
conflict in Darfur and a thorough analysis of all the role players in the conflict. It is the 
intention to apply ideas developed in Chapters 2 and 3 to the case of Darfur. This gives 
different perspectives on the conflict while also highlighting the real relationship between 
water scarcity and conflict.  
Ethnic clashes in Sudan between the Arab population and Black African population date back 
several decades. These two populations have long been competing over scarce water and 
other natural resources. In Darfur, which is located in the western region of the Sudan, the 
conflict between these two groups intensified in 2003, when two African groups from Darfur 
rebelled against the Sudanese government. The government had just granted concessions to 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM); this led to these two groups demanding 
“inclusion in a new power-sharing arrangement between them and the government” (Du 
Plooy, 2005: 1; Leach, 2013: 1). The Sudanese government responded to this rebellion by 
training and arming Arab militias, which were known as the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed were 
allegedly sponsored and supported by the Sudanese armed forces. The Janjaweed rode into 
villages in Darfur and executed thousands of people. They were responsible for murdering, 
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raping and disfiguring thousands, which led many people from Darfur to flee to neighbouring 
countries such as Chad. This conflict has taken approximately 50 000 lives and forced 1.2 
million people to become refugees (Bassil, 2013: 3).  
This chapter asks whether the conflict is a manifestation of tensions that have been present 
since the partitioning of Africa in the 1880s. It looks at what other elements, other than ethnic 
tensions, were at play in the conflict in Darfur. By examining why these groups were pushed 
to take violent actions against one another, one can decipher the nature of the conflict and 
what elements catalysed the conflict. The events which led to these groups into conflict are 
important and are analysed in this chapter. These “events” are linked to ethnic and religious 
clashes, the biased policies of the Sudanese government and competition over scarce 
resources such as water (Ye’or, 2002: 204). These are the elements that this chapter examines. 
It is through studying such elements that this chapter is able to provide an answer to the 
question that was posed in Chapter 1: Is there evidence that water scarcity in particular can be 
associated with armed conflicts in diverse ethnic communities in Africa, specifically in the 
Sudanese province of Darfur?  
 
The chapter explores elements such as ethnic and religious divisions, exclusionary 
governmental policies and tensions over water sources. The region of Darfur is focused on 
more than the situation in the south. Firstly, the chapter outlines the background of the 
conflict, as well as study what the conflict entailed. Secondly, the various elements that led to 
the conflict are explored through studying the “role of ethnicity, together with the 
environment and actors” (Du Plooy, 2005: 1). Thirdly, the chapter assesses whether “high 
politics” was involved in this environmental conflict and whether the involvement of the 
international community can be seen as the securitization of the environment. 
Sudan’s Political Background 
Britain and Egypt took control of Sudan in 1989. They did not, however, take control of 
Darfur, as it was ruled independently by a sultan. Britain took charge of southern Sudan and 
Egypt of northern Sudan. This turned out to be a flawed decision, as it emphasised the 
differences between the two regions. Egypt promoted and embraced Islamic rules and values 
in the predominantly Arab north, while Britain advanced the cause of Christianity and the use 
of English in the south. Britain eventually took over control of Darfur in 1916. It was only 
after the end of the Second World War in 1945 that both Egypt and Britain considered giving 
Sudan complete independence. They prepared for this step through “uniting” Sudan’s range 
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of communities into one state. They made Khartoum, a city in the north, the capital and chose 
wealthy northern Arab men to run the government. This was moment when the years of 
Darfur and the south not being included in local politics began. Independence was eventually 
granted in 1956; however, it was mired in instability as building a stable government proved 
almost impossible (Levy, 2009: 16; Sharkey, 2003: 4-5). Sudan endured several coups d’état, 
which will be briefly outlined below.  
In 1958 General Ibrahim Abboud led a coup d’état and overthrew the government. Abboud’s 
government, however, proved to be just as instable as its predecessor and lasted only until 
1964. Abboud and his military government were overthrown and replaced with a civilian 
government. Not five years later, in 1969, the civilian government was also overthrown and 
replaced with military rule led by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri. The Nimeiri-led government 
remained in place for 16 years. The next coup was led by General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-
Bashir and the extremist Islamic Front (NIF) in 1989. None of these governments paid any 
attention to the issues of Darfur. With a lack of rich resources or minerals, Darfur was not 
important to any of these governments (Tutlam, 2013: 47-54; Levy, 2009: 16).  
The administrative structure of Sudan and more specifically Darfur provide a new perspective 
on why the conflict escalated in 2003. Under colonial rule Sudan was divided into provinces. 
After 1916 Darfur was further divided into districts: el Fashir, Kutum, Nyala, Um Kaddada, 
Zalingei and Geneina. Darfur, much like all the other provinces, was administered by military 
leaders. This ensured that there was a Governor-General in Khartoum who was assisted by 
regional governors. El-Fashir was the seat of the regional governor for Darfur. A district 
commissioner was assigned to the remaining districts. At a later date the military cadre were 
replaced by civil administrators; however, the territorial divisions and responsibilities 
remained the same under colonial rule. When independence was granted, extreme instability 
ensued. The continuous changes of government, administrative boundaries and titles at local 
and regional levels proved to be destructive to stability. These changes are closely linked to 
the disturbances that followed in Darfur (Abdul-Kalil, Mohammed & Yousuf, 2007: 56).  
It is important to note here that even though the majority of victims in the conflict in Sudan 
and Darfur have been non-Arab-speaking black Africans, there have also been Arab victims, 
and Arab communities that strongly disagreed with the violent policy of Arabization. Extreme 
Arabization policies began when Abboud was in power and as each successive Arab 
government came to power, Arabization intensified. In 1983 Khartoum passed the 
“September laws”, which legalised strict Islamic law across Sudan. Islamic extremist groups 
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were constantly being formed in the 1980s, all which had increasing influence over the 
government and the policies that were approved. Khartoum became the hot spot for the 
radical Islamic community and even became the home to Osama bin Laden from 1991-1996. 
Peaceful Islamic governments around Sudan all cut Sudan off and it became a pariah within 
Africa and the world (Murdico, 2004: 33; Levy, 2009: 18).  
Background to the Conflict in Darfur 
The Sudanese government has been marginalising black Africans in Darfur economically and 
politically for decades. This has led to extreme underdevelopment in Darfur, exacerbated by 
the fact that the government was sponsoring and arming “militias from Darfur’s Arab 
nomadic tribes” (Du Plooy, 2005: 2). The militias would attack the black African farming 
communities. This highlights the power of the government; it was capable of manipulating the 
ethnic divisions between the Africans and the Arabs, even when the population of Darfur is 
mostly Muslim. Through pitting these different ethnic groups against one another, the 
government has been able to act out its own bias against the black African population in 
Darfur, inciting a hatred which did not exist before its rule. This has led to hatred and 
competition over every possible resource (Olsen & van Beek, 2015: 72; International Crisis 
Group, n.d.).  
The violence started with two allied rebel groups active in Darfur at the time. These rebel 
groups were the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA). In 2003 JEM and SLA attacked several government military bases and facilities. 
Much like the rest of the conflicts in Sudan, the conflict in Darfur was caused by the 
marginalised ethnic groups turning against their government, which was clearly 
discriminating against them, and attempting to gain back some power (Bartrop & Jacobs, 
2014: 695). One major event that could be seen as a catalyst for the first outbreak of violence 
was the “peace process between the government and the country’s main rebel group in the 
South of Sudan, the SPLM” (Du Plooy, 2005: 3). This event angered the groups in Darfur 
because they knew that they would have little to no power if there was a concrete agreement 
between the South and the North. The JEM and SLA had successfully conducted many 
government attacks in the early months of 2003; however, the government did retaliate. A 
campaign by the government to suppress the insurgency involved the Janjaweed militias. 
Khartoum aided the Janjaweed financially and militarily; they attacked any civilians who 
were perceived to be part of the insurgency or merely inactive supporters of it (Dagne, 2010: 
22). 
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Each successive government that ran Sudan used the Janjaweed as military weapons to 
suppress any insurgencies and the black Sudanese population. They were “a counter-
insurgency proxy force which attacked civilians”, while on many levels tried to cover up the 
government’s true involvement (Du Plooy, 2005: 3). The Janjaweed are estimated to be a 
group of 20,000 Arabic camel-herders from the North. It is through the Janjaweed and the 
government that Darfur has experienced increasingly high amounts of displacement of people, 
“indiscriminate killings, looting and mass rape” (Hoffmann-Holland, 2010: 130; Tubiana, 
2007: 69). These attacks are part of an attempt by the government to eradicate communities 
that are suspected of supporting and harbouring rebels in Darfur. The attacks, however, only 
occur on black African communities; Arab communities are ignored. It is clear today that the 
relationship that once existed between the African and Arab communities is now destroyed 
beyond repair because of the government and their use of the Janjaweed (Berhanu, 2011: 
190). 
It is important to note here that there has never been any actual evidence that the SPLA and 
the Darfur rebels are in fact linked. This is not to say that the SPLA does not see that a 
rebellion helps their cause. They see that a rebellion pressures the government, which might 
yield to accepting a more promising peace agreement. Therefore, it is extremely likely that the 
SPLA encouraged and supported Darfur rebels to cause an insurgency (Arnold & LeRiche, 
2013: 200). The Sudanese government, however, sees these two groups as one and the same. 
This supports the conclusion that it is impossible to distinguish the Darfur rebellion from the 
Naivashaa negotiations which were being run by the Regional Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD). On 8 April 2004 the Khartoum government and the Darfur 
insurgents signed a ceasefire in N’djamena. This was an agreement overseen by the 
government of Chad, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). The negotiations 
did not proceed smoothly, as they were handled badly by the parties involved and in 2005 
people were still waiting for the ceasefire to take effect (UNMIS, 2012).  
The agreement can be seen as a failure since the Khartoum government refused to reign in the 
Janjaweed; this was a key point in the agreement. Even though the agreement is still seen as a 
failure, it did offer a helpful framework that could end tension and hatred on the ground and 
aid in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the refugees and displaced people; it promised to 
build a trustworthy, internationally-run forum to eradicate the roots of the insurgency. The 
implementation of the agreement would focus solely on the refugees first, as their plight was 
the most severe (Ciment, 2015: 299). An assessment of whether the agreement has been 
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successful to this day will be offered later in the chapter. The causes of the conflict will now 
be examined. 
Causes of the Conflict 
There has been a tradition in Sudan of different ethnic groups co-existing peacefully. This all 
changed when the government in Khartoum introduced divisive policies in the 1980s. It was 
through these policies that the government was able to “manipulate ethnicity diversity” 
(Sorenson, 2016: 21). This is when tensions began to grow and conflict resulted. The policies 
favoured the interests of central, elite politicians and their provincial friends. The conflict is 
the result of 20 years of these divisive policies carried through by successive governments; it 
is through these policies that the government was capable of retaining power and causing the 
conflict. But there are many other variables involved when it comes to the relationship 
between water scarcity and conflict; this section will showcase all the elements involved in 
the conflict in Darfur.  
The Environment and Ethnicity 
It is hard to notice any other variables in the conflict in Darfur other than ethnic tensions; 
however, there are elements that are not purely ethnically motivated. It is believed that this 
conflict also has roots in the fact that there has been competition over water and land in 
Darfur since the 1970s. The competition has been exacerbated by the intense desertification in 
the North of Sudan and the “drought that has affected Darfur on-and-off since the 1970s” (Du 
Plooy, 2005: 4; Matthew, Brown & Jensen, 2009: 9). Groups which were affected by the 
desertification in the North moved incrementally to more fertile land. Firstly, the geographical 
context of Darfur will be examined. 
Darfur is situated in the Sahelian region in western Darfur. The population is 8.5 million, with 
the majority residing mostly in southern Darfur because of the extremely dry conditions in the 
north. “Isohyets10 for the region decrease from 800mm in the south to 50mm or less in the 
north” (Bromwich, 2015: 378). The isohyets, are however, interrupted by the presence of the 
Jebel Marra massif, which is located in the centre of the region. The Jebel Marra massif with 
an elevation of 3088 m acts as a naturally occurring water tower. Darfur has a unique drainage 
pattern which consists of ephemeral rivers or “wadis” which flow out of the Jebel Marra to 
the Central African Republic, the Chari Basin in Chad and to the Nile in the northern area. In 
                                                 
10
 Isohyets are the lines on maps which join areas of equal rainfall. All areas along an isohyet experience the 
same quantity of rainfall (Reddy, 2005: 127).  
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many instances the wadis cannot reach big water courses and in these cases the water either 
drains into aquifers or merely evaporates. The Sahel lies between the extremely arid Sahara 
Desert in the North and the flourishing, vegetation-packed Sub-Saharan Africa to the South. 
This helps one to understand why the Sahel has such inconsistent rainfall patterns as it was 
caught between the dry North and the wet South (Bromwich, 2015: 378).  
Figure 4.1: Geographic Map of Sudan 
 
This map shows where the Sahel is in relation to Darfur. It also shows the Jebel Marra 
mountain range, indicated as “Marra Mtns” on the map. One can also see by looking at the 
key at the bottom left of the map that Darfur is an extremely dry area, with no signs of green 
anywhere near it.  
The variability of rainfall in Darfur has been explained through its geographical location and 
it also attributed to climate change; however, what has yet to be examined is the groundwater 
sources in Darfur. Northern Darfur consists largely of Nubian sandstone, which makes for 
large aquifers of fossil water. In the south there is the Baggara Basin, which collects water 
from the south-flowing wadis. One may now wonder why Darfur had so many issues with 
water scarcity; however, these underground sources of water were so far away from populated 
areas that they have not been turned into useable sources for the people. There are some much 
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smaller underground aquifers, which are key to the water supply of El Fashir and El Geneina. 
The Jebel Marra consists of volcanic rock; however, in the flatter foothills, which are well 
populated, there are rocks which are fractured allowing for potentially good boreholes. 
Nevertheless, what one can extract from such boreholes relies heavily on “their being 
connected to a network of fractures with sufficient recharge and storage capacity” (Bromwich, 
2015: 378). Unfortunately, this results in the boreholes not producing much water at all.  
The most giving wells are those which are found along the wadis. They are “water-rich 
alluvial deposits” which are found close to the many wadis which run off the Jebel Marra. 
These particular aquifers are crucial for their role in feeding the underlying aquifers within the 
fractured rocks which surround them. Therefore, it is easy to see that groundwater sources 
(and rainfall water) are more plentiful when in close quarters to wadis. These facts on 
groundwater variability are important as they explain the spatial variability within the Darfur 
region, which consists of water-rich wadis which are used for crops and villages, and the 
“drier interfluvial rangelands used less intensively for crops and more for migratory livestock 
production”, which support a lower population density (Bromwich, 2015: 378).  
The 2003 conflict, even though not solely caused by lack of water, had a major impact on the 
water sector in Darfur. The greatest impact was found when the demand for water in the city 
centre rapidly increased. The city of Nyala originally housed an estimated 400 000 people, but 
this figure tripled during the conflict. Groundwater in Nyala was constantly in short supply as 
the city was on top of basement complex geology with no fractures. During the drier months, 
Nyala experienced extreme shortages of water and often had to deal with empty wells. A 
report by the UNEP stated that 800,000 internally displaced people were at “risk of 
groundwater depletion” (Bromwich, 2015: 381-382).  
More than resulting in depleted water sources, the conflict also ensured that secure-water 
collection areas became targets in warfare. Collaboration between the different tribes or ethnic 
groups had long ended and a consequence of this was that pastoralists and displaced people 
were unable to access water points. The IDPs (internally displaced persons) were not safe 
anywhere other than inside their camps; in all other areas it was the African pastoralists who 
were not safe to travel to water sources. The only way in which these groups were able to 
survive was through organisations such as UNICEF. UNICEF worked tirelessly to provide 
water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services to more than 2 million people during the 
conflict and during times of extreme restrictions by the Khartoum government. This UNICEF 
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action saved hundreds of thousands of lives from death by dehydration. Nevertheless, there 
was one difficulty which concerned UNICEF: 
Humanitarian work is rights-based and draws on Sphere standards for humanitarian 
programming, under which the volume of water to be provided is widely interpreted as 
being 15 litres per person per day. Anecdotal reports indicate that this may be more 
than rural Darfurians are accustomed to using, leading to some distortions in aid 
provision and a disincentivization of return (Bromwich, 2015: 382). 
This was a great concern, as when organisations such as UNICEF have to withdraw support to 
areas like Darfur, this dependence can become a major issue in peace talks and negotiations. 
The difficulty for all organisations which bolster the Darfurian’s water sector during the 
conflict is how to invoke higher expectations of access to water, while also giving 
communities the ability to live within their means during drier seasons when scarcity is 
common (Bromwich, 2015: 382).  
Darfur is considered to have a green belt, which means groups from the North moved to 
Darfur. The presence of these nomadic groups in Darfur caused tensions with the “already 
existing farmers in the area, whose herds grazed on the land” and drank the water (Du Plooy, 
2005: 4; Matthew et al., 2009: 9). This led to incremental degradation of the environment and 
an absence of development aid from Khartoum. The combination of environmental 
degradation and lack of development aid led to Darfur becoming completely impoverished 
and ignored. Ever since independence in 1956, Khartoum has continuously shifted borders in 
order to ensure that it gains the most economically, which further deprived Darfur of natural 
resources. When rich oil-fields were discovered in the 1970s, this became a serious issue. 
Copper-mining also had a major impact on where borders were moved to. In Darfur and the 
South, issues of oil, copper and water “only built upon the pre-existing problems of identity” 
(Leach, 2011: 159).  
There are many elements to the conflict in Darfur; however, the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) stated that, through studying the conflict over many 
years, it found that water scarcity, climate variability and rapid loss of fertile land play an 
important role in the conflict (Matthew et al., 2009: 9). It is this lack of water and fertile land 
which has been exacerbated by the arrival of environmentally displaced people. Other 
environmental contributors to the violence are deforestation and overgrazing, which have led 
to a loss in vegetation cover, which has in turn led to rapid decrease in topsoil quality and 
quantity. The declining annual rainfall in Darfur has meant that “sixteen of the twenty driest 
years on record have occurred since 1972”; this has had a major impact on conflict between 
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groups trying to survive (Matthew et al., 2009: 9). In the Darfur region more than 75 per cent 
of the population relies on environmental resources for survival.  
The UN Environmental Programme reported that there was scientific evidence that “long-
term regional climate change” was affecting Sudan (UNEP, 2011a). This climate change 
manifests through a drastic decline in rainfall, specifically in Darfur. The rate of climate 
change which was recorded in the northern region of Darfur was unprecedented; the UNEP 
report noted that the conflict which broke out in 2003 had definite links to this unprecedented 
rate of climate change. On top of the high rate of climate change, years of conflict and ethnic 
tensions have ensured that environmental services have become completely obsolete. It is the 
conclusion of the UNEP that the move away from conflict would only be successful if 
investments in environmental management occurred alongside peace talks (UNEP, 2011a). 
Robin Bovey, UNEP’s Sudan Programme Manager, stated that in order “to support stability 
in Darfur, major investment is needed to improve surface water management – for example 
the construction of rainwater harvesting infrastructure and small dams” (UNEP, 2011b).   
There is a danger in typecasting Darfur as a scarcity-related conflict, as often this becomes the 
only issue that audiences focus on. They see the one variable, water scarcity, and ignore the 
multitude of other variables that prevail (Bromwich, 2015: 376). When the international 
community eventually came to know of the true atrocities which were taking place in Darfur, 
there was a struggle between labelling it an ecological crisis or a political crisis. At the time of 
the conflict in Darfur, the international audience was increasingly interested in issues of the 
global environment and were also wrapped up in a culture of political activism (many people 
in Western countries only came to know of the conflict from U2 music videos and Bono’s 
heartfelt plea for donations to Darfur). Influenced by both political activism and global 
environmental issues, this audience found it difficult to make sense of the conflict and find 
something specific to blame. This highlighted the zero-sum game: environmental narratives of 
the conflict were said to be distractions from the political background, and political narratives 
in turn hid the need for detailed analyses of manipulation by high-ranking political elite 
(Bromwich, 2015: 375).  
Much like a time before Africa had colonial borders imposed on it, in Darfur there are still 
numerous ethnic groups that live in both Darfur and Chad. Historically, trade between these 
two countries led to a great deal of migration across this porous border. While the populations 
of both countries remain predominantly Arab, there are still great ethnic, linguistic and 
cultural divisions in the area. There are two methods to depict the ethnicity of Darfur’s 
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population – through language and through occupation. The indigenous population (non-
Arab) do not possess Arabic as a lingua franca and migrated to the Darfur region from the 
Lake Chad region many centuries ago. There are also those which claim Arab descent and 
they speak Arabic. The other distinction is that between pastoralists and agriculturalists 
(Tidwell & Zellen, 2015: 184).  
Many see that the distinction between pastoralist and agriculturalist as blurred and containing 
great amounts of overlap; however, there are also noteworthy nuanced differences. Darfur’s 
pastoralists are predominantly of Arabic descent and they preside over the northern belt. This 
area is incredibly arid and is also inhabited by semi-nomadic and nomadic camel herders, 
which include Arab ethnic communities such as the Rizeigat, Irayqat, Mahariya, Beni Hussein 
and the African Zaghawa (Brosche & Rothbart, 2012: 51; Tidwell & Zellen, 2015: 184-185). 
The eastern and southern regions of Darfur are also inhabited by Arabic cattle herders: the 
southern Rizeigat (Baggara), Beni Halba and the Habbaniya. It is the pastoralists from the 
North (the Rizeigat, Mahariya, Zaghawa and others) which relocate to the South in search of 
water in the dry months. This is when tensions were the highest and when conflict usually 
ensued (Kalayjian & Paloutzian, 2009: 194; Brosche & Rothbart, 2012: 51).  
In the 1980s the Sahel region experienced an on-and-off drought which severely increased 
desertification. The droughts also caused “the southern migration of the Arab pastoralists”, 
which in turn caused water disputes with the African agricultural groups. The disputes were 
usually sparked when the cattle and camels of the pastoralists would trample and damage the 
fields of the non-Arab farmers who lived in the southern region of Darfur (Jones, 2014: 29; 
Cordell & Wolff, 2009: 109). The resultant tensions would often be resolved through the 
leadership of traditional leaders from both sides. Negotiations between the traditional leaders 
were successful when compensation for ruined crops and depleted water sources was paid. 
Negotiations also entail a detailed agreement on a schedule and route map for forthcoming 
dry seasons (Du Plooy, 2005: 5).  
There are an estimated 36 dominant tribes found in Darfur, but this figure is difficult to 
pinpoint exactly; others believe that the number is far higher because of sub-divisions of 
tribes and the smaller clans that make up such tribes (Kalayjian & Paloutzian, 2009: 194). The 
population, however, is usually divided into two important blocs, non-Arabs and Arabs; non-
Arabs are locally referred to as either “Zurga” or “blacks”. It is important to note that after 
centuries of inter-marriage and coexistence the distinction between Arabs and non-Arabs 
should not be made on the basis skin colour “as members of both groups are dark-skinned” 
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(Du Plooy, 2005: 5). The Zaghawa are the only non-Arab, African group that herds camels. 
All other native African groups survive off animal husbandry and subsistence farming 
(Brosche & Rothbart, 2012: 51-52). The insurgents, or rebels, believe that the root cause of 
the conflict is the Arabization movement of consecutive governments. The rebels are not 
Arabic and when they fled to Khartoum after the severe droughts in the 1980s, they were 
perceived as a major threat by the Arab-led government and considered as second-class 
citizens.  
When trying to understand the conflict, it is important to take into account the concept of 
“Dar”, or tribal homeland. Indigenous groups which settled in Sudan centuries ago each 
“settled in an area and they each had their own Dar” (Ray, 2009: 48). The dominant tribes 
decided the settlement of other groups and gave themselves administrative status. This was 
destroyed when the Khartoum government altered this tradition and started to disrupt this 
peaceful coexistence. The increased escalation of violence can also be attributed to the lack of 
development and governance within Darfur. The government is believed to have deliberately 
weakened Darfur through making the African administration look ineffective to the people of 
Darfur; meanwhile Khartoum was withholding development. It was the African 
administration which was able to quell disputes over water and grazing land (Ray, 2009: 48).  
Over the last 30 years Darfur has experienced several conflicts over resources between and 
amongst Arab and non-Arab groups; these conflicts have been exacerbated because of the 
lack of development initiatives by the Khartoum government (Ray, 2009: 97). In the past, 
traditional leaders were able to dissipate tensions and keep any conflicts short; however, in 
2003 a culmination of policies of division, resource depletion and lack of development led to 
a different type of conflict altogether.  
With the rapid onset of environmental degradation, coupled with the government’s 
manipulation of the ethnic fabric of the region, an alarming shift in the nature of 
conflict became evident, with ethnicity being a main mobilising factor (Du Plooy, 
2005: 6) 
There is a significant difference between the two kinds of conflicts which were resolved by 
traditional leaders. Such conflicts contained low-level violence and were sporadic in nature. 
When the divisive government policies came into effect in the late 1980s, things changed for 
the worse. The violence escalated and was primarily ethnically-based; often external groups 
would involve themselves in order to show support for one side over the other. It was in the 
period from 1987 to 1989 that people who were violent identified themselves as either ‘non-
Arab’ or ‘Arab’ during the conflict between the Arabs and the Fur (an African tribe). The 
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government’s policies were first seen in the civil war of the 1980s between the government 
and the SPLA (Lobban, 2010: 94-95).   
Cleverly the government noted that through arming the southern militias to fight the SPLA, 
they were strengthening their own military position in the South, which was instrumental in 
the government taking control of the oil fields in that region (Wennmann, 2010: 38). The 
government was able to turn several groups of south Sudanese against the SPLA through 
manipulating ethnic, political and socio-economic divisions. The government was capable of 
doing so because they could afford to support such groups financially and militarily. This 
“divide and conquer” style policy led to decades of violence amongst the people of the South, 
and the consequences can still be witnessed today. It is the same method that was used in 
Darfur in 2003; the Khartoum government armed the Arab tribes in Darfur, who used 
violence to quell the insurgency. It was a successful operation for the government as it 
destabilised the population base of the SPLA insurgency, which itself contained the threat of 
the insurgency spreading to the central and northern regions of Sudan. The military also relied 
heavily on tribal forces during its fight with the SPLA in the 1980s (Leach, 2012: 120). The 
rebel forces in Darfur in 2003 had no support militarily or financially except for the minimal 
amount of arms they would get from their neighbouring state, Chad (Black & Williams, 2010: 
58).  
Political leaders in Darfur also took advantage of the ongoing conflict. Both Arab and non-
Arab leaders grabbed at the opportunity to advance themselves economically, politically and 
socially when the conflict broke out. They did so through launching many manoeuvres which 
exploited not only their own people, but mostly exploited the “government’s proxy war 
strategy” within Darfur. These leaders had become increasingly influenced by Chad and how 
Chadian politicians openly used conflicts to catapult their own careers. Conflicts in Chad 
resulted in many Chadian exiles using Darfur as a “training ground for ethnic militias” (Black 
& Williams, 2010: 58; Du Plooy, 2005: 6). The exiles would go onto take power in Chad and 
become elite members of the new governments. This is true for both President Hussein Habre 
and his successor, President Idriss Deby (Amnesty International, 1996). 
The Zaghawa, who make up a large portion of JEM, put immense pressure on the 
government. The Zaghawa have never been clear as to whether they were participating in the 
rebellion of 2003 in order to redress local grievances or in order to eventually take control of 
the government. They are a small, economically-challenged community; however, they are 
trans-national traders who were the most organised group in Darfur. JEM was founded after 
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the SLA in 2003, but were more organised. The JEM had a robust political agenda, while the 
SLA had a stronger military force. This made them well-balanced allies in the attacks against 
the government in 2003 (Human Rights Watch, 2004: 12; Bartrop & Jacobs, 2014: 695).  
The conflict in Darfur did not remain within the borders of Sudan, as Janjaweed attacks were 
also taking place in Chad. In 2004 attacks were being reported to be well inside Chad borders 
and were leading Chadian leaders to plead with Khartoum for them to halt Janjaweed attacks 
on the people of Chad. This did not help in stopping the attacks, as the government believed 
many Chadians were supporters of JEM and SLA (Human Rights Watch, 2004a: 40). These 
attacks have also caused a great deal of instability in ethnic terms. When the conflict began in 
Darfur, ethnic tensions were ignited in Chad as well. Some Chadian ethnic groups “share 
blood ties with Darfurians, and who previously had a working relationship with the people of 
Chad” (Du Plooy, 2005: 7). With the conflict breaking out, skirmishes were taking place on 
the south-eastern borders because villages found on the south-eastern borders were ethnically 
divided. Along with Janjaweed attacks, these villages were influenced by the hatred they 
could see amongst the Darfurians (Human Rights Watch, 2004a: 40).  
The Janjaweed 
In order to fully comprehend the Janjaweed, it is important to study migration within the 
region and how that related to Sudan and specifically Darfur. The Janjaweed originated from 
the “Abala” camel-herding, nomadic tribes who had migrated to Darfur from West Africa, 
Chad and north Darfur in the 1970s (Haggar, 2007: 113). Long before the conflict Sudan and 
more specifically Darfur had a long past of peacefully accepting settlers from all over the 
region. There were far more Western Africans than Chadians, who proved to be dangerous as 
they had many ties to armed groups who had fought for power in Chad. They were not 
successful and migrated to Darfur and soon began to look for ways to gain power in Darfur. 
They were more than Chadian militias looking for power; they also set up bases in Darfur 
during their many attempts to take over the Chadian government. This strongly influenced the 
way that Darfurians saw their own government and the methods through which to gain power 
(Haggar, 2007: 119-120). These migrants, along with others from Libya, were all prone to use 
violence and became extremists who were the perfect subjects for Khartoum to recruit for the 
Janjaweed.  
The Janjaweed built on a “tradition called ‘Hambati’ or ‘social bandits’ taken from among the 
Arab tribes” (Jurdi, 2016: 86; Wusu, 2006: 50). These ‘Hambati’ were admired for being 
thieves and vagabonds who had been exiled from their communities because they had gone 
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against entrenched traditions. They were nevertheless envied for their freedom and bravery. 
Other members of the Janjaweed were professional criminals, some whom had been released 
from prison so that they could join the Janjaweed. Through using the Janjaweed, the 
government was able to further exacerbate ethnic tensions and create a raider culture, all the 
while turning a blind eye to the mass rapes and lootings which the Janjaweed actively 
engaged in (Wusu, 2006: 50).  
The Janjaweed originated when local Darfurian politics met with “the military mobilization of 
Chadian Arabs under Libyan sponsorship during the 1970s and 1980s” (Haggar, 2007: 113-
114). The Darfur-specific Janjaweed only became active in 2001 and 2003, when Arab 
leaders came to an agreement. This agreement involved both Chadian migrants and Sudanese 
residents; both these groups had come under the supervision of both regional authorities and 
the central government. This supervision led to the expansion of the conflict into southern and 
eastern Darfur in 2004, when more and more Arab men joined the Janjaweed movement. The 
Janjaweed are considered to be members of the Juhayna group of Sahelian and Saharan 
Arabs, whose ideology is a Arab nationalist ideology. This is the key to explaining why the 
Janjaweed were able to secure support from successive Sudanese governments. Haggar (2007: 
114) writes: 
The justification given for this support is the belief, held by members of Sudan’s 
ruling elite, that the Arab tribes’ involvement in controlling Darfur constitutes the only 
guarantee that Darfur will remain part of the Republic of the Sudan … many suspect 
that the overall plan is to create an “Arab belt” across all of western Sudan, displacing 
the non-Arab population.  
The role of the Janjaweed is to ensure a strong Arab presence in Darfur, at least, and at most, 
to obliterate the demography of Darfur. As one can see through UN mission reports and 
Human Rights Watch reports, the results of the Janjaweed assaults look to be more in line 
with obliterating the demography (Haggar, 2007: 114).  
The government’s “scorched earth strategy” aimed at eradicating any and all supporters of 
JEM and SLA was acted upon by the Janjaweed. In the Janjaweeds’ attempts to suppress all 
forms of dissent they commit increasing numbers of human rights violations. Members of the 
Janjaweed would either be armed with G-3 assault rifles or AK-47s and they would ride into 
villages on camels or horses, all provided by the government (Roach, 2009: 210). It was 
reported that when the conflict first began each member was paid $100, but as the conflict 
continued they would gain compensation from looting. This sent a message to surrounding 
countries such as Central African Republic and Chad that Khartoum supported robbery and 
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looting, therefore attracting many criminals from these countries to enter Darfur and join in 
the pillaging and terrorising. Information on the Janjaweed and its control and command 
structure is still challenging to come by, but it is known that there are three divisions which 
were developed by the government: the Hamina (traditional leaders), the Border Guard and 
the Strike Force (Jurdi, 2016: 86).  
It is important to take note that much of the government forces and armies were often seen as 
being part of the Janjaweed. The original Janjaweed “have become part of a wider 
phenomenon of ‘Janjaweedism’ in Darfur, which includes armed groups that were not 
previously identified as Janjaweed” (Haggar, 2007: 113). In total there are six pro-Khartoum 
groups in Darfur that are somehow linked with the Janjaweed: the nomad protection forces, 
the “Peace Forces (Quwat al Salaam)”, the Um Kwak attacker forces, the Um Bakha irregular 
forces, the Popular Police Force and the Popular Defence Force (Haggar, 2007: 113; 
Gebrewold, 2016: 169). This list does not include the official police force or the national 
army, but these institutions still have strong relations with the Janjaweed.  
Actions of the Janjaweed caused a dire humanitarian crisis in Darfur, with more than 110,000 
people of the Zaghawa and Masaalit tribes fleeing into neighbouring countries to seek refuge. 
In addition, more than 750,000 people, predominantly Fur, were internally displaced in Darfur 
(Chacko, 2004: 1389; Tubiana, 2007: 68). The internally displaced were at extreme risk of 
being victims to attacks which would involve abductions, rape, assault and murder. Further 
encouraged by their freedom to loot and rape, the Janjaweed started practising cross-border 
attacks into Chad, where they knew many Darfurians had fled to; this only worsened the 
conflict within the region (Humans Rights Watch, 2004b). As one can see, “the government’s 
alleged recruiting arming and otherwise backing of bands of Janjaweed militia has built on 
and drastically escalated ethnic polarisation in Darfur” (de Waal, 2007: 7; Du Plooy, 2005: 7).  
Ironically, urban migration was the most popular form of survival for the Zaghawa, Fur and 
Masaalit during the conflict. For these IDPs, their entire livelihoods change. The Janjaweed 
still restricted the movement of such IDPs, ensuring that they could not make money as they 
were not able to migrate for work, travel for trading or move their livestock to fertile areas for 
grazing and water. The large numbers of Zaghawa, Fur and Masaalit who did migrate to 
urban centres either joined other migrant networks or chose to live in IDP camps (set up and 
run by humanitarian organisations). In late 2006 it was recorded that IDPs made up 4.1 
million Darfurians, of whom 2.06 million joined migrant networks and 2.10 million lived in 
IDP camps (Young & Jacobsen, 2013: 130).  
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Given the severity of the Janjaweed attacks, their expansion across Darfur and into Chad as 
well as their relationship with official government institutions, it seems like disarming the 
Janjaweed and finding peace would be impossible. What is important to take into 
consideration is the involvement of regional politics, the migration of armed Chadian militias, 
and how the Chadian civil war influenced destabilisation in Sudan. The adoption and spread 
of Janjaweedism after the rebellion in 2003, ensured that the conflict continued. Khartoum’s 
attempts at militarizing both Arab and non-Arab groups in all areas of Darfur led to a situation 
whereby native administration became indistinguishable from militia command. Even tribal 
organisation was seen as one in the same as military organisation. This phenomenon of 
blurred groups and blurred intentions made peace talks nearly impossible and definitely 
played a role in prolonging the conflict (Haggar, 2007: 139).  
The Politics and Internal Conflicts in the Insurgent Groups 
The Insurgent Groups  
African ethnic groups such as the Masaalit, Fur and Zaghawa all predominantly form the 
rebels groups. These communities are the main targets of Janjaweed attacks. The UN reports 
that approximately one million people have fled their homes since the conflict started in mid-
2003. The Arab-centred migration into black African Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa pastoral 
land, and the over-use of water sources led to these groups taking up arms in order to defend 
themselves and their land. They were the groups which the government had neglected and did 
not care to defend, hence they were forced to defend themselves. In response to these black 
African communities taking up arms, the government increased financial support to Arab 
groups and the Janjaweed (Ryle, 2011: 139).  
Both rebel groups, the SLA and JEM, claimed they formed in order to “redress decades of 
grievances over perceived political marginalisation, socio-economic neglect, and 
discrimination towards African Darfurians by successive federal governments in Khartoum” 
(Levy, 2009: 25). The SLA first emerged in February 2003, under the initial name of the 
Darfur Liberation Front (DLF). After the DLF took control of Gulu, it changed its name to the 
SLA. The SLA made many demands in the early months of its emergence, including a halt to 
tribal militia (Janjaweed) attacks, the socio-economic development for Darfur and a “power-
sharing deal with the central government” (Stapleton, 2013: 130). The government responded 
by labelling the group as bandits and denied any opportunities to negotiate. 
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In retaliation, in April 2003 the SLA organised surprise attacks on El Fashir, the capital of 
north Darfur. The surprise attacks were a great success as they destroyed helicopters and 
Antonov aircraft, while looting arms depots and important fuel deposits (Hagan & Rymond-
Richmond, 2009: 208). It was in this attack that the SLA kidnapped a Sudanese air force 
colonel and interviewed him on an Arab television news station, El Gezira. This had a major 
impact on letting the government know that the SLA were serious (Daly, 2010: 280). 
Immediately after the El Fashir attack the SLA went on to attack the second largest town in 
north Darfur, Mellit. Here the aim was to loot government stocks of arms and food. The 
government did not sit idly by as these attacks were taking place; they retaliated through 
firing black African governors and administrators in Darfur and started to build military 
strength.  
In 2004 political talks began to take place; however, they were mired in confusion as the rebel 
groups did not know how to deal with international actors who wanted to be mediators. This 
confusion ultimately led to the rank and file halting all negotiations and rejecting the possible 
deal, while their delegations accepted the deal. This indecision and confusion were also 
caused by “serious infighting between the military and political wings of the two respective 
groups” (Du Plooy, 2005: 8). As the peace talks proceeded, one could see the serious rifts 
between the JEM and SLA, with the government cleverly using this to its own advantage. 
Noting that something had to change, the SLA attempted to fix issues through holding 
consultations between the military coordinator and its chairman. The JEM, on the other hand, 
handled issues in a much more authoritarian manner. The JEM dismissed all dissident 
commanders and political cadres who were suspected of being disloyal. Despite all the 
infighting within the SLA and JEM, the international community saw that they were the only 
real hope for the conflict in Darfur to end and therefore took their leadership seriously and 
attempted to help in all ways possible (Bartrop & Jacobs, 2014: 724).  
The government’s brutal counter-insurgency methods ensured that more young men joined 
groups such as JEM and SLA. This was confirmed by the lack of young men found in refugee 
camps or camps for the internally displaced. This highlights how the rebel groups were 
successful in recruiting young men in communities which were the most vulnerable to 
government and Janjaweed attacks. This resulted in the rebel groups focusing more attention 
on their diplomatic and political profile. Elite members of the SLA did so through conducting 
missions to Central African Republic, Uganda and East Africa in an attempt to gain logistical 
and diplomatic support for their cause. The JEM rebels, however, focused on attacking the 
Janjaweed instead of raising their political profile. One can see that there were major 
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differences in the ways in which these groups conducted themselves; however, they appeared 
to coordinate their attacks, which led to many onlookers to believe they would merge into one 
group (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2005: 180).  
Both the SLA and JEM agree that the government and the way in which it is able to alter 
borders to suit itself disturbed the “traditional balance of power and peaceful coexistence 
between Darfur tribes” (Du Plooy, 2005: 9). They were also in agreement that Sudan needed 
to have democratic elections (de Waal, 2007: 194-195). They saw that Darfur’s issues were 
founded in larger national issues and that a political solution was strongly linked to nation-
wide problems of governance and power. This originally manifested itself in calls for proper 
representation of Darfur within the Khartoum central government. Both the SLA and JEM 
strongly pushed for further investment in their region and greater access to national resources. 
The SLA was a secular group which strongly disagreed with the Islamic sharia law which had 
been imposed on Sudan. JEM did not take a firm stance on this topic and veered away from 
offering any opinion on sharia law. JEM stated that they would back any legal system which 
was democratically selected by the people of Sudan. Most of the differences between the SLA 
and JEM were superficial and could easily be worked out when peace talks started. 
Nevertheless, these differences could only be reconciled if the two groups knew that they had 
accomplished the biggest goal: shared power and a more fair central government (Stapleton, 
2013: 130).  
The Sudanese Government 
Both the rebels and the government were under serious internal stress when political talks 
began in 2004. The government, however, continued their divisive policies which targeted 
only Darfur at the time. They were still dedicated to their “divide and conquer” methods of 
keeping the insurgency at bay. Another method the government used was undermining the 
ethnic alliances which had formed between tribes such as the Zaghawa, Fur and Masaalit, 
which were the groups which made up both the SLA and JEM. The government also launched 
a smear campaign which described the rebel groups as being the protagonists of the ethnic 
cleansing of the Arab race from Darfur. All the while they remained supporters of the 
Janjaweed and encouraged new attacks and assaults every day. In the government’s attempts 
to alienate the Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa from one another, it tried to reconcile the Masaalit 
and Fur with their Arab neighbours, all the while isolating the Zaghawa, whom the 
government saw as the real threat and initiators of the insurgency (Gebrewold, 2016: 170).  
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At the talks the government’s attempts to precipitate infighting between the SLA and JEM 
became clearer. It is reported that the government openly exploited JEM-SLA differences at 
the talks, a move which met with moderate success. Several factional issues were also present 
within the government itself at these 2004 talks.  
In March 2004, the government arrested 10 middle-ranking army officers on suspicion 
of plotting a coup. These officers all stemmed from western Darfur and the 
neighbouring Kordofan region. A few days later, it detained the Islamist leader, 
Hassan al-Turabi, and 6 top figures in his dissident Islamist faction, the Popular 
Congress (PC), which the government accused of inciting regionalism and tribalism in 
Darfur. The PC consequently denied the charges and accused the government of 
manufacturing the coup allegation as a pretext to repress the PC and justify a military 
campaign against the people of Darfur. The detained officers were mostly air force 
pilots, and it had been suggested that they were arrested, in part, for refusing to bomb 
civilian targets in Darfur. Indiscriminate aerial bombings were apparently 
independently verified by observers as playing a key role in the government’s military 
campaign in Darfur (Du Plooy, 2005: 10). 
These events led the government to become divided when the time came for the talks in 2004. 
With a history of many coups, the government was extremely suspicious of other political 
groups within the army. The government ensured that coups were never started through using 
strict pre-emptive purges as well as recruiting only officers and other official who were 
known to be loyal supporters of the government (Mohammed, 2007: 199). It would have been 
considered suicide to plan a coup against the government; this therefore made it highly 
unlikely that the PC had done what the government was accusing them of. Nevertheless, the 
PC was not quiet about their disdain for the fact that the army had become politicised. They 
were the group within the government that called for democratic practices and an end to the 
oppressive regime. The alleged coup took up a great deal of time as the government felt the 
need to deal with the dissension amongst its own members and supporters. This did not help 
at all as a northern secessionist group formed in April 2004 which was comprised of members 
from the ruling party itself (Baltrop, 2011: 126; Jok, 2015: 48).  
The main cause of fissures within the government had to do with the way in which they 
would be able to retain power after the peace talks were concluded, and how the agreement 
will be implemented. The divisions in the ruling elite came to light during these talks, yet it is 
important to note that they were not divided on issues of ideology, but rather on issues of 
control and who would maintain control if a peace deal was reached. Dealing with all these 
issues the government became tougher in their on-the-ground managing of the crisis in 
Darfur. The crisis was further catalysing the internal divisions within the government and 
definitely led to serious infighting. This infighting, however, could also be attributed to 
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government officials trying their best to position themselves so that they would be in powerful 
positions no matter the outcome of the Naivasha peace talks (Grunfeld & Vermeulen, 2014: 
173-).  
The Darfur Crisis and the International Community 
It would be foolish to see the crisis in Darfur and the IGAD process as two separate entities, 
because they were certainly linked. The evidence of human rights abuses committed on the 
people of Darfur became more noticeable at the end of 2003. The international community 
that was involved with IGAD and seen as partners to the government became sceptical of 
their alliance with Khartoum. The international community stalled for awhile and became 
focused on how they could act against the abuses being perpetrated in Darfur at the time. 
This, however, gave the government time to “take advantage of the situation and pursue its 
military campaign” (Du Plooy, 2005: 12). The government further delayed international 
involvement by claiming that it was the SLA and JEM who had caused ceasefire talks to end 
in N’djamena; however, it was the government that had refused to show up. In causing 
confusion as to whether the rebels were to blame or the government, the international 
community halted its actions once again. The army was able to launch a brutal attack on JEM 
and SLA during this time, and they were also able to force their terms upon the rebel groups 
(Farazmand & Pinkowski, 2006: 973-974).  
Khartoum did put on a good show for the international community during the IGAD process; 
they sent a great deal of political and logistical resources to Darfur in order to “help” with the 
conflict. Simultaneously, however, Khartoum was also reporting that the situation was not as 
bad as it seemed, all the while making sure the military was in place in Darfur. Nevertheless, 
the Darfur conflict only got worse and the government could no longer control what was seen 
by the international community or how they would respond. As the conflict in Darfur was 
exacerbated, the Sudan regime rapidly undermined its relationship with the international 
community and lost much of its diplomatic gains achieved at the IGAD conference. As is 
common with oppressive governments, Khartoum tried everything they could to ensure that 
the international community would not learn of the extent of the conflict in Darfur. They did 
so through establishing a Crisis Management Committee, which focused on deflecting 
international criticism of the government’s actions in Darfur (Dullaghan, 2015; International 
Crisis Group, 2004: 15).  
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The Crisis Management Committee had the responsibility of monitoring and responding to 
international reactions to issues which were taking place in Darfur. The sole purpose of the 
Committee was to ensure that the government could put an end to “the internationalisation of 
the situation” (Du Plooy, 2005: 12). It is ironic as the government created an “international 
mechanism to deal with the internal political issues created by the rebels” (Du Plooy, 2005: 
12-13). This formed part of the larger strategy to hide the real nature of the conflict from the 
rest of the world. Khartoum proved its intolerance of criticism by banning several Sudanese 
newspapers such as the Khartoum Monitor and Al-Ayam. They even went as far as to forcibly 
close the offices of the Al Jazeera Arab television network. It was clear that the government 
was attempting to “reinforce the utilisation of its own directives to the media, in order to limit 
it to the government’s version of events” (Du Plooy, 2005: 13).  
The censorship had a major impact on the independently owned press in Sudan. There were 
no longer any independent press offices or media houses which did not strictly follow the 
official prescriptions given to them by the government. These restrictions formed part of the 
massive disinformation campaign which the government had embarked on with the 
introduction of international observers to Darfur. In order to fully contain all details about 
Darfur, the government also implemented Moreso travel restrictions which ensured that relief 
and foreign aid workers were kept away from Darfur and all areas that were experiencing 
violence against the government. Any foreign workers who were able to observe the truth and 
tried to report on it to the international community were in real danger of being put in 
preventative detention by government officials (Guha-Sapir, Degomme & Phelan, 2005). It is 
reported that between 2003 and 2004, the Sudanese government stopped all international 
humanitarian aid and assistance to internally displaced people in Darfur. In addition, the 
government did not provide any aid from its own coffers to innocent civilians during the 
conflict. For four months the government was also reported to have completely restricted the 
movements of international aid workers who were already in the country. All international aid 
workers were confined to the locations they were already in (Eichstaedt, 2011: 89; Kamal El-
Din, 2007: 92-93).  
Response from the international community to the crisis in Darfur was slow and ineffective 
for the most part. This is not because the international community decided to turn a blind eye, 
but rather because of the government’s stringent position on not allowing international aid 
workers to enter the Darfur region. Nevertheless, the international community only become 
fully aware of the human rights abuses which were taking place a year after the conflict had 
started. Many commentators believe this is because President Bush and his administration 
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were too focused on the Middle East at the time. Much attention was still being drawn to the 
peace talks still taking place between the government and the SPLA (Totten & Markusen, 
2013: 190). The United States (US) did not want to take stringent actions against the 
government concerning Darfur as they believed the government would retaliate by ruining the 
peace talks with the SPLA. Nevertheless, in August 2004 the US openly condemned the 
murders and mass rapes which were occurring in Darfur; the US even went as far as to label 
the conflict as genocide. The UN also took a strong, forceful stance on the human rights 
abuses which were taking place in Darfur, for which they condemned the government. There 
was a consistent thread of reports written by the UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator 
which detailed the daily violations that civilians in Darfur were victims to. The African Union 
(AU) and the Arab League (AL), however, did not publish any statements until well after a 
peace agreement was signed (Grimm, Lemay-Herbert & Nay, 2016: 89).   
The UN Human Rights Commission, deeply concerned about civilians in Darfur, put together 
the “Chairman’s Statement”, which was agreed to by most of the Commission members. The 
statement got so much support that it was “adopted with 50 in favour, one against (US), and 
two abstentions” (Ukraine and Australia) (Du Plooy, 2005: 14). In addition to this, many 
reports were actually held back from being published until the UN and European Union (EU) 
delegations could gain access to Darfur. The most important action occurred on 30 July 2004, 
when the UN Security Council (its most power department) passed a resolution which 
demanded the end to government-sponsored Janjaweed attacks within 30 days. If the 
Sudanese government did not stop these attacks, then the Security Council announced that it 
would have to take action. When the 30 days were over, it was reported that the Sudanese 
government had failed to meet the resolution’s requirements. In response the UN sent in more 
peacekeeping forces and the wheels for a ceasefire were put into motion (UN, 2006).  
The resulting peace processes were complex and took many years to conclude or take hold. 
The main purpose of this chapter was to give an account of the conflict in Darfur and to 
assessing whether the links with water scarcity are comprehensive, hence the peace process 
itself will not be explored further. The following sections look to integrate what has been 
studied on the Darfur conflict and to apply theories from previous chapters to specific 
intricacies of the conflict. This will include analysing whether the environment, specifically 
water, was securitized in Darfur during the conflict. The type of scarcity which led to the 
conflict as well as the type of conflict the violence in Darfur could be classified as will be 
studied. The sections below will therefore attempt to integrate the case study of the Darfur 
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conflict with the theories that have already been described in this thesis. The next section of 
this chapter will address the research questions which were posed in Chapter 1.  
Environmental Securitization and Green Theories in Darfur 
The Darfur conflict is a good example of water scarcity having links to conflict as it 
highlights that water scarcity can lead to high levels of politicization and major abusers of 
power. Nevertheless, for the Khartoum government the issues around water scarcity remained 
secondary to those of retaining power control over the differing ethnic groups. As one saw in 
Chapter 2, the relationship between water scarcity and conflict is not a direct one; water 
scarcity is neither a necessity nor substantial enough to start armed conflict on its own. There 
is rather a causal relationship which involves two steps. Water scarcity interacts with the 
political, social and economic conditions that are present. This determines whether conflict 
ensues. Homer-Dixon (1991: 8) states that the most common type of conflict to ensue as a 
consequence of water scarcity is “ethnic clashes arising from population migration and 
deepened social cleavages due to environmental scarcity”. This provides a clear insight into 
the conflict in Darfur.  
Environmental scarcity is a “scarcity of renewable resources, such as cropland, forests, river 
water, and fish stocks” (Homer-Dixon, 1991: 9). The scarcity occurs because there is a surge 
in demand and/or a decline in supply which leads to unequal distribution of the resource. Such 
changes mean that increased poverty, growing social tensions, mass migrations and a 
weakening of political institutions and governance make the fabric of a society increasingly 
fragile and instable. This instability is the trigger for the violence or the intensification of a 
current conflict. All of these elements are seen in Darfur in 2003. As a result of climate 
change the North experienced major food shortages, in late 2002 and early 2003, because of 
the drought, which in turn led to mass migration to southern Darfur. In southern Darfur the 
supply of resources such as water was already incredibly low also as a result of the droughts. 
With increased demand on the resource from northern migrants, social tensions were 
exacerbated. The involvement of the government, with its manipulative ethnic-based policies, 
was almost a guarantee that violence would erupt (Friere, Lopes & Nascimento, 2008).  
Darfur experienced supply-induced scarcity, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Supply-induced 
scarcity is “caused by degradation and depletion of an environmental resource” (Homer-
Dixon & Percival, 1998: 280; Onyekuru & Marchant, 2013). One can also identify the 
ecological marginalisation and resource capture that resulted from this specific type of 
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environmental scarcity. Ecological marginalisation is present when increased “consumption 
of a resource combines with structural inequalities in distribution” (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 
1998: 280; Peterson & Pardo-Guerra, 2006: 135; Tovey, 2007: 25). During the Darfur conflict 
there were incidents which involved the weaker population (Zaghawa, Fur, Masaalit etc.) 
being denied access to water. This led their migrating to urban centres and seeking refuge in 
the IDP camps. A consequence of this was that the water sources in urban centres became 
increasingly degraded. All of this ensured that the Zaghawa, Fur and Masaalit were 
ecologically marginalised.  
More than the African communities being ecologically marginalised, they were also the 
victims of resource capture by the government and the Janjaweed. Resource capture is 
specific to cases when the “increased consumption of a resource combines with its 
degradation” (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1998: 280). This has been identified as being the 
case in Darfur. Once this occurred, powerful groups such as the Janjaweed or government 
elite ensured that the distribution of water favoured them (Peterson & Pardo-Guerra, 2006: 
135; Tovey, 2007: 25). With the dangerous combination of supply-induced scarcity, 
ecological marginalisation and resource capture, it is no wonder that so many young men in 
African communities took up arms in order to ensure their survival.  
“The root of the Darfur conflict is a struggle over controlling an environment that can no 
longer support all the people who must live in it” – this is the opinion of environmentalist, 
Wangari Maathai, a 2004 Nobel Peace Prize winner. The conflict in Darfur is often regarded 
as the first “climate change conflict”; this section aims to place the conflict in Darfur within 
an environmental securitization framework (Friere et al., 2008). As pointed out in Chapter 3, 
securitizing the environment is not always beneficial and can cause nearly all aspects of life to 
become militarized. What occurred in the Darfur conflict is that much of the process can be 
seen as a case of securitization of the environment; however, the issue of the environment was 
side-lined as the government remained exclusively focused on ethnic, economic and political 
issues as the prevalent elements of the conflict. It was the internal divisions and factional 
disagreements which took centre stage (Freire et al., 2008).  
Once again one can see the reluctance of states to regard environmental issues as being of 
equal significance to those of national security. Darfur is a case where there was a clear denial 
of environmental security; it was pushed to the back burner in order to give more attention to 
the physical manifestation of the issues. It was stated in Chapter 2 that environmental security 
can provide a more comprehensive account of new and different “typologies of vulnerability 
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as well as the potential for conflict and violence with which these vulnerabilities could be 
associated” (Trombetta, 2008: 586). The conflict in Darfur signifies a missed opportunity;  
could have been the first case where environmental security was put to use, but instead it was 
side-lined in the face of traditional security threats once again.  
The social-constructivist make-up of securitization theory ensures that with cases like Darfur 
much comes down to “the successful process of labelling an issue a security issue” 
(Trombetta, 2008). In the case of Darfur there was not the slightest attempt to label the issue 
of water scarcity as a security threat. If the Khartoum government had labelled the issue of 
water scarcity a “security” threat, then emergency action would have been taken, because it 
would have been seen as an existential threat. Exceptional measures would have been taken, 
which may have broken many rules and required a degree of authoritarianism; however, 
considering how many lives have been taken and ruined since the start of the conflict, this 
may have been a better option for all Darfurians.  
When it comes to securitization there needs to be a referent object or objects, which are 
“referred to by the securitization actor as constituting a threat, and functional actors, those 
who influence decisions in the process, but are not securitization actors” (Freire et al., 2008). 
When one studies Darfur, it becomes evident that the political elite, or those who had the 
power to securitize water or land, did not regard this as on their agenda at all. Rather they 
securitized the threat of the JEM and SLA. Balzacq (2012: 60) stated that “securitization is a 
pragmatic act, i.e. a sustained argumentative practice aimed convincing a target audience to 
accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development is 
threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to curb it”. If this is the case, then one can 
see that Khartoum initially saw that the African tribes were the threat; therefore, it 
implemented policies which marginalised those communities economically in order to ensure 
the safety of their audience, the Arab communities. This transformed as violence started. It 
was through the Janjaweed that the government violated the rules; for many months this was 
accepted by onlookers, because they believed government rhetoric that convinced them the 
JEM and SLA were the major threats. The political elite were once more seen as being 
“uncommitted to the process of securitization of environmental matters” (Freire et al., 2008).  
Regardless of a clear, identifiable threat – water scarcity – the domestic securitization actors, 
mostly the political elite, as well as functional agents with the agency to influence the 
securitization process in Darfur, have not yet done anything to start the process. Therefore, 
one can see that the environment-security nexus has gone unrecognised and ignored. 
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Unfortunately, this ensured that one of the most fundamental challenges to finding the real 
causes of the conflict in Darfur went unnoticed. As noted in Chapter 3, the Copenhagen 
School requirements for securitization include an audience which is willing to believe 
securitization actors that a threat is cause for concern and action. In Darfur and Sudan there 
was no audience that was aware of the connection between the conflict and water scarcity; 
therefore there was no one to mobilize. It was the international community that noted the link. 
The European Union recognised it when it published the Report on Climate Change and 
International Security in 2004. The Report, referring to the conflict in Darfur stated that,  
Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, 
tensions and instability. The core challenge is that climate change threatens to 
overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone (Freire et 
al., 2008).  
This quote highlights the need for “internalizing environmental threats as security issues” 
(Freire et al., 2008). Despite international awareness of the links between environmental and 
water scarcity to the conflict, domestic actors still did not see environmental scarcity as a key 
element for the security of Sudan and more specifically Darfur. The conflict in Darfur was 
increasingly influenced by the power politics of realism. There was no consideration from the 
political elite that security issues were a result, or even related, to matters of environmental 
security (Friere et al., 2008).  
The realist approach to the conflict in Darfur ensured that there was a winner and a loser. This 
might have been different if the dominant theory had been Green Theories and not realism. If 
Darfurians and the Khartoum government had an awareness of ecologism, one cannot help 
but wonder if the crisis would have occurred. Through the holistic approach to environmental 
problems which ecologism takes, issues such as water scarcity would not have been ignored 
when conflict started or in trying to find a viable solution. The relationships between the 
political, social, cultural, economic, geographical and biological would all have been assessed 
in trying to locate the source of the issues with the environment. All of these elements are 
interdependent and directly or indirectly affect the environment every day. 
Although the Darfur conflict remained predominantly realist in nature, there were elements to 
the lifestyles of Darfurians which echoed the ideals of eco-anarchism. Darfurians lived in 
their organic communities which rely on subsistence farming for survival. This was the 
consequence of lack of development, which was in fact imposed by the government. Through 
the imposition of a social hierarchy, the benefits of living in these “organic” communities 
were replaced with unnecessary divisions based on race and ethnicity. Had the divisions not 
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existed, one could surmise that Green Theory may have become the dominant theory in 
Darfur, not through a direct decision but rather through evolving naturally. Had Green Theory 
prevailed in such areas, issues and competition around the lack of water might have been 
handled better, as they were when traditional leaders took control many decades ago. This 
might have happened because the people would have been more spiritually connected to 
nature and therefore taken more peaceful measures to resolve all environmental issues.   
Green Theories would have provided people with a more holistic perspective of where they 
belong in relation to the natural world. If the Sudanese had adopted an ecologist perspective, 
then people would not have seen their own needs as being more important than the needs of 
the environment. There would have been a deep respect for the environment, which could 
have translated into less harmful measures being imposed on the environment both before and 
during the conflict. Green Theories provide an alternate perspective to that of the zero-sum 
nature of realism. The characteristics of the conflict in Darfur were certainly in the realist 
mould. The descriptive characteristics (as opposed to normative or prescriptive 
characteristics) of Green Theories, however, could have ensured that issues around water 
scarcity were converted into instances of cooperation and not conflict.  
Types of Conflict and the Darfur Crisis 
As indicated in Chapter 1, conflict is defined by the 2015 Conflict Barometer as the “clashing 
of interests” between at least two parties, whether these parties are groups of states, 
organisations or organised groups (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 
2015). The number of fatalities has proven hard to determine in the conflict in Darfur; 
however, in 2014 the UN reported that an estimated 450,000 people lost their lives in the 
conflict since 2003 (World without Genocide, 2015). This is a vast number and it has far-
reaching implications for how the conflict would be labelled and thus how the international 
community would respond to it. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 
for violence to be considered an armed conflict, there must be 25 battle-related deaths per 
year; Darfur definitely experienced this number of casualties. The Darfur conflict would also 
be considered a major conflict as the number of fatalities more than exceeded 1,000 per year 
(Edstrom & Gyllensporre, 2013: 16).  
According to the UCDP, the conflict in Darfur was classified as an intra-state conflict. Intra-
state conflicts occur when the government and non-governmental groups engage in violence 
against one another. In the case of Darfur, there were obviously the rebel groups, JEM and the 
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SLA. Although, this may seem like the obvious classification of the conflict in Darfur, it does 
overlook the fact that the conflict did spill over into Chad. For it to be considered a true intra-
state conflict, the conflict in Darfur should have remained within the borders of Sudan 
(Landman, 2013: 117; Gleditsch et al., 2016: 16). Therefore, the better classification of the 
conflict in Darfur would be an international intra-state conflict. This is a more comprehensive 
classification as it takes into account the fact that many Chadian migrants were involved in 
supporting both of the rebel groups in the conflict. It also explains how the international 
community involved themselves through the UN in what seemed like them aiding the rebels, 
although they were mere peacekeeping troops (Landman, 2013: 117 & Gleditsch et al., 2016: 
16). It is the evolution of the Darfur conflict which places it within this classification, because 
if it had not escalated in the manner that it did, then the external (international) actors would 
not have become involved.  
It is important to note that although the rebel groups had major grievances with the 
government, according to Homer-Dixon and Percival (1998: 280), there needed to more than 
just grievances to spur them into violence. These elements include: a strong group, collective 
identity and the inclination of aggrieved groups to believe that the only way to get their 
grievances heard was through violence. The JEM and SLA definitely possessed both of these 
elements. All other measures to get the government to treat them fairly or as equal to their 
Arab neighbours were unsuccessful. Both groups consisted predominantly of African 
pastoralists, which aided them in bonding and forming a collective identity. One could also 
argue that the abuse and assaults these groups experienced as a result of the Janjaweed attacks 
also helped in them forming a common identity.  
“Civil violence is a reflection of troubled relations between the state and society” (Homer-
Dixon & Percival, 1998: 280) – clearly once can see that it was the unhealthy relationship 
between the government and the African communities that gave rise to the grievances. The 
nature of the Sudanese government entailed authoritarianism and human rights abuses. This 
type of state cannot be fully representative because it continually ignored African grievances 
and actively sought to harm such communities through attacking their villages. The power 
distribution between the groups that were competing for water sources was completely unfair 
as the government afforded the Arab groups special treatment and support. This is what 
caused the violence to continue until external forces saw what was really happening in Darfur.  
Chapter 1 noted a disagreement among academics about the purported links between water 
scarcity and conflict, and how societies are able to either adapt to scarcity or turn to violence. 
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Matthew et al. (2004: 858) believe that environmental scarcity and stress resulted in a vast 
range of social reactions; however, this could be eliminated by a type of double-loop learning. 
They suggested that ecological and social systems would perform double-loop learning from 
one another and they would both be able to change as a result of such interactions with one 
another. The result of the double-loop learning would be equilibrium between scarcity and 
social tensions. Matthew et al. (2004: 859) even went on to claim that it is extremely rare that 
a society should lose its adaptive capacity and break down into protracted conflict over a 
resource. This may be true, but it seems to be difficult to accept when applying it to low-
income countries such as Sudan. The adaptive capacity of a country such as Sudan to respond 
to competition over resources is exceptionally diminished.  
This could be caused by the government’s general lack of concern for areas such as Darfur, or 
one could look as far back as colonial times. During colonialism, countries such as Sudan 
were set up to fail as the social fabric was manipulated so much that by the time independence 
came around the damage was already irreparable. Had the south and north not been split 
between Egypt and Britain, perhaps future leaders would not have used the differences 
between these two areas and ethnic bases as their opportunity to rule abusively and with 
impunity. This highlights once more that there is an ingenuity gap between countries that can 
adapt and those which cannot. Darfur is one of the many countries which cannot adapt to 
resource scarcity, because it lacks technological innovation as well as a representative, fair 
government. Many African states face the same problem; they lack the funds which are 
required when it comes to research and development to promote better management of 
environmental resources.  
This gap and the inability of low-income countries to deal with adaptive capacity precipitates 
a rhetoric which over-exaggerates water scarcity and labels all conflicts that have anything to 
do with water as “water wars”. The fearful rhetoric in today’s media around the topic of water 
scarcity can easily point to a conflict such as Darfur and label it a water war. It is the 
contention of this thesis that the Darfur conflict did not fit the requirements for it to be 
labelled a real water war. The conflict in Darfur cannot be attributed to water scarcity which 
led to violence. It was not just water scarcity which brought about the violence, as pointed out 
repeatedly throughout this thesis. It was a contributing factor, yes, but not the only or decisive 
factor. The Janjaweed did take control over water sources, yet they did not physically ruin 
these sources in order to weaken the JEM and SLA. The Janjaweed did not damage the 
sources in any way, because they knew that water was so scarce that ruining such sources 
would also be detrimental to their own survival.  
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Transboundary water sources did not become conflict hotspots either. According to Turton 
(2000: 36), the conflict in Darfur should rather be called and considered a “quasi-water war” 
or rather a conventional conflict which had water implications. Such incorrect labelling, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, has had major consequences for African economies. Newspaper 
articles labelling the conflict in Darfur as a “water war” spread an incorrect, irrational fear of 
investing in African states. Although the future of African water supplies is in jeopardy, this 
does not mean that a dialogue conducted in over-exaggerated term should further inhibit 
African states from attempting to close the ingenuity gap through external investments.  
In Chapter 1 a diagram entitled “Pathways to Conflict” indicated how most scarcity-related 
conflicts could be explained. In an attempt to illustrate how this diagram applies to Darfur, the 
original diagram will be presented first, followed by the diagram as it applies to the Darfur 
conflict. 
Figure 4.2: “Pathways to Conflict” applied to Darfur 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pathways to Conflict 
Direct Effect     
Environmental Stress  Migration from Region A  Conflict in Region B 
Indirect Effect 
Environmental stress  Conflict in Region A  Migration from Region A  Conflict 
in Region B 
 
Pathways to Conflict in Darfur 
Direct Effect     
Environmental Stress  (droughts)  Migration from North Sudan  Conflict in Darfur 
Indirect Effect 
Environmental stress (droughts)  Conflict in North  Migration from North  
Conflict in Darfur 
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These diagrams (taken from Gleditsch et al., 2007) highlight that there may have been some 
conflict amongst the Arabs of the North over access to water before they migrated to Darfur 
in search of water. This possibility, however, is not backed up by any empirical sources. 
Nevertheless, the possibility provides a more layered perspective of history of Sudan and 
what possibly came before the conflict. In order to provide more alternative perspectives on 
the conflict or what led up to it, Homer-Dixon (1991) provides another helpful framework 
which classifies the conflict, this will be discussed below.  
Homer-Dixon (1991) provided a helpful framework to account for conflicts associated with 
resource scarcity, much like in Darfur. Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Group proposed three 
scarcity-related types of conflict. It is the position of this thesis that the conflict in Darfur can 
be classified as a “group-identity conflict”. A group-identity conflict takes place when people 
are forced to migrate because of environmental disruptions such as droughts and floods. 
Tensions occur because differing ethnic groups meet under stressful conditions and this often 
causes group hostilities. Naturally, the native group will want to defend its access to resources 
such as water. Against this backdrop one can usually observe the groups attack each other’s 
identities and use violence to act out discriminatory feelings. It is also within these types of 
scarcity-related conflicts that leaders are often able to manipulate followers into fabricating 
environmental scarcity in order to justify further attacks against the other group (Homer-
Dixon, 1991: 109). This provides a different perspective on the conflict in Darfur. It is easy to 
call the government the villain within the context of the conflict in Darfur, but it might be 
amiss to believe that the rebel groups themselves did not use water scarcity issues to further 
their cause.  
Conclusion 
The conflict in Darfur had been in the making for many years. The government imposed 
biased policies across the country which favoured one group over others. This created 
tensions that had never been present before between the black African tribes and the Arab 
populations. These tensions manifested as competition over natural resources, specifically 
water. The government responded to an insurgency from both the JEM and SLA by arming, 
training and financially supporting the Janjaweed. These Arab bandits have been recognised 
as being the perpetrators of mass rapes, assaults, murders and many other crimes against 
humanity. The government used the Janjaweed to successfully spread fear and terror to all 
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communities which were believed to be supporting the insurgency; these communities were 
predominantly black African tribes such as the Zaghawa, Fur and Masaalit.  
The conflict in 2003 also highlighted how a colonial history of Sudan had a damaging effect 
on the modern state, especially in Darfur. The country was split into two, with Egypt and 
Britain controlling the respective sections; ethnic differences were easily manipulated to 
polarise the population. Successive independent governments used this polarisation in order to 
ensure their control and power over the country. This phenomenon was further exacerbated by 
the political manoeuvrings of district cadres and administrative officers who were only out to 
benefit themselves. Policies of Arabization also further worsened the lives of many non-Arab 
Darfurians.  
The Arabization of Sudan also made sure that regions such as Darfur were developmentally 
neglected, as the black population were of no concern to the government. The lack of 
development in Darfur ensured that when the droughts brought northern migrants into Darfur, 
the already scarce natural resources were exploited and never tended to. Many decades before, 
conflict over water and land had been resolved by traditional leaders, who always seemed to 
manage to find a compromise between the two parties. In 2003, however, this was not 
possible as too many variables were involved that led to competition over resources, which 
became extremely violent.  
Water had always been scarce in Darfur, but with the influx of migrants from the north and 
rainfall being variable as a result of climate change, in 2003 there was hardly enough to go 
around. Groundwater supplies were also not consistent and sometimes unreachable due to the 
geological make-up of urban areas in Darfur. Through the involvement of humanitarian 
organisations which supplied water to IDPs, thousands and thousands of lives were saved 
from dehydration during the conflict, even though the government tried its best to block such 
international efforts. Issues with access to water were also highlighted by the Janjaweed 
presence and attacks against certain tribe members if they tried to collect water. For this 
reason, millions of Darfurians decided to live in IDP camps, where they were given more than 
enough to survive.  
The international response to what was occurring in Darfur during the conflict took longer to 
emerge than expected. This was because of the restrictions of movement imposed on foreign 
aid workers in Sudan. At the time that information did leak out about the atrocities which 
were occurring, many powerful states (such as the US) were more concerned with other 
matters. Through the tireless work of organisations such as the UN, the true nature of the 
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conflict was revealed and all who turned a blind eye were heavily condemned by the rest of 
the international community. The subsequent peace talks were mired in infighting within the 
rebel groups. The government was not immune to this either, as it was also divided over how 
to proceed. With the help of the international community talks eventually proceeded without 
too much infighting.  
This chapter has taken the case of the Darfur conflict and applied the theories which were 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Through this, one can see that the environment in Darfur was 
not securitized, but rather the ethnic tensions (high politics) were the main focus of 
securitization. Securitization did not even come from the Sudanese government, but rather 
from international observers. It is clear that the Darfur conflict type was an international intra-
state conflict, which also had elements of group-identity conflict because of competition over 
scarce water resources. Different perspectives on the conflict were also provided using the 
work of Gleditsch et al. (2007) and their proposed “Pathways to Conflict”.  
This chapter highlighted and discussed the elements which were involved in the research 
question stated in Chapter 1: Is there evidence that water scarcity in particular can be 
associated with armed conflicts in diverse ethnic communities in Africa, specifically in the 
Sudanese province of Darfur? As one can see, water scarcity played a major role in the Darfur 
conflict, but it was definitely not the only element at play. Ethnic tensions which were 
manipulated by the government had been building up for a long time, and without ethnic 
tensions competition over water resources would not have led to such a bloody conflict. It was 
the mixture of ethnic tensions, lack of development, environmental degradation and unfair 
government policies which ensured that the conflict in Darfur became as vicious as it did. It 
can be argued that with an absence of just one of these elements that the entire conflict would 
have played out differently, or possibly would not have occurred in the first place.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Introduction 
African problems always seem to have their roots in colonial times. The partitioning of Africa 
has had major implications for the continent’s development and internal relationships. There 
was no consideration given to whether communities were being split up by the new borders, 
or whether completely different communities were being lumped together. This has ensured 
that modern African states remain at odds within themselves as ethnic tensions only grew. 
The colonial legacy that has remained imprinted on Africa encouraged issues such as water 
scarcity and competition over resources to influence ethnic tensions to turn violent. Although 
much can be attributed to the unfair partitioning of Africa and colonial rule, there is also the 
issue that independent African countries have seriously lacked governance skills. African 
governments, especially Sudan’s, can be seen as being run by an elite which looks out for 
themselves rather than the people. Elements such as water scarcity, ethnic tensions and bad 
governance are a toxic mixture which leads to the deaths of thousands of people.  
Darfur was a prime example of this toxic mixture and it highlights major warning signs for 
the rest of the world. Protracted armed conflicts are the result of ignoring this toxic mixture. 
Many would say that this conflict is an issue of not prioritising water scarcity and that water 
scarcity needs to be securitized early so that the military can resolve the issue swiftly. 
However, pushing water scarcity into the realm of “high politics” can have unwanted side 
effects, yet it could have saved thousands of innocent lives in Darfur. As one can see 
throughout this thesis, the Khartoum government ignored all opportunities to securitize water 
or even attempt to resolve competition over the resource. This topic is important, because 
globally a resolution about how to resolve issues around scarce resources holistically has yet 
to emerge.  
Chapter 1 asks how credible IR scholarship which has framed the purported link between 
violent conflict and water insecurity is. It is the contention of this thesis that such scholarship 
in increasingly credible, especially in countries which are considered “low income”. Darfur is 
a good example, because it contained other elements which amplified the relationship 
between water scarcity and conflict. There are many countries that possess these same 
elements and are at risk of conflict. The relationship between water scarcity and conflict may 
be indirect; however, it is substantial and should receive attention as the earth continues to 
warm up.  
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The theoretical foundation of the conflict in Darfur was realist because it possessed a “loser” 
and “winner” mentality which the government adopted. The way in which the conflict 
unfolded might have been different if Green Theories had been more dominant. The level of 
environmental degradation might have been much less had the Sudanese possessed greater 
awareness of the interconnected make-up of ecosystems and the place of people in it. People 
around the world would benefit from setting aside the dominant theories of realism and 
liberalism and consider a new perspective, maybe a greener one. As shown in Chapter 2, the 
nature of both realism and liberalism ensures that the environment comes second to questions 
of either economic gain or state power. Studying the wider effects of such dominant 
paradigms highlights the point that the current global order is flawed because it does not 
respect nor protect the environment. This is important, because it means that if not altered 
these theories could lead to an increasing amount of conflicts like Darfur.  
Chapter 1 asks questions that are important for the field of IR, because they highlight the 
point that moving forward will become impossible if cases like Darfur are not taken into 
account. This field of study still attracts great attention from experts; for instance Burgess, 
Owen and Sinha (2016) published an article in October 2016, “Human Securitization of 
Water? A Case Study of the Indus Water Basin”, which questions whether securitization of 
water will aid conflicts or would it rather disregard the other elements involved in water-
scarcity-related conflicts. This is an important question, because an estimated 4 billion people 
face water scarcity for a few months every year. If a holistic approach to resolving water 
scarcity is not found, then the fearful discourse around water and wars may become accepted 
as the norm by academics and civil society alike. It is imperative once more to study the 
relationship between water scarcity and conflict because the international community has yet 
to work out a blueprint of how to approach the relationship. One may believe that because 
water scarcity is just one element in conflicts, it does not matter whether it is securitized or 
pushed into “high politics”; however, this would neglect the fact that by removing the water 
scarcity element, conflicts may be reduced and many lives may be spared.  
Summary of Thesis 
This thesis started off by providing a blueprint for how the research problem and questions 
were going to be addressed. It did so by first highlighting what information would be included 
by giving a brief overview of the topic of climate change, conflict, environmental degradation 
and the impacts all these elements have on low-income countries such as Sudan. Chapter 1 
summarised and contextualised all the topics which were later discussed more extensively: a 
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review of what academics believe the relationship between water scarcity and conflict is, 
Green Theory and Securitization Theory, and the case study of the conflict in Darfur. Chapter 
1 highlights that the objective of this thesis is to indicate how climate change and its effects, 
such as water scarcity, have an increasingly detrimental impact on the stability of low-income 
countries. The use of Darfur as a case study highlighted the point that the international 
community needs to come up with better solutions when it comes to dealing with water 
scarcity. Simply classifying water scarcity as a security threat is not easy and there are several 
consequences; however, merely ignoring climate change and its incrementally damaging 
effects is also going to have irreversible side-effects. Dominant theoretical paradigms have led 
us to climate change and have ensured that the human population regard themselves as the 
most important component of the ecosphere. Human greed and liberal economics has ensured 
that the needs of the environment come second to meeting the needs of human consumption. 
Chapter 1 suggests that maybe Green Theory would be better at addressing environmental 
issues.  
Chapter 2 provided a review of the topic of water scarcity and conflict. It analysed academics’ 
opinions and findings on whether the relationship between water scarcity and conflict is as it 
is made out to be in the media. The relationship between these two elements involved many 
other topics which later made it clear that although water scarcity is not the cause of conflicts, 
it is a significant contributor. The chapter starts with a broad net, which at first explains the 
relationship between climate change and conflict. There is a link, as when people are forced to 
migrate because of floods and rising sea levels, recipient areas for these new migrants come 
under social, economic and environmental stress. Water scarcity and conflict is the next 
relationship which is studied. Prominent environmental specialists such as Homer-Dixon, 
Postel, McMichael and Tignino all provide different perspectives in what they believe is the 
true nature of the relationship between water scarcity and conflict. The dominant perspective 
is that, although there is not a direct relationship, water scarcity does play a role in causing 
conflict.  
Chapter 2 studied the varying perspectives of the neo-Malthusians and Cornucopians. While 
the neo-Malthusians blame population growth for environmental degradation, the 
Cornucopians believe issues like water scarcity can be overcome by technological innovation 
and that scarcity is managed through adaptation by populations. These perspectives provide 
great insight into how many people view issues such as environmental degradation. The 
chapter goes on to describe different types of scarcities and different types of conflicts. These 
all help with comprehending the conflict in Darfur and why it was classified in a certain way. 
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A section on environmental security was also provided in Chapter 2, because it highlights the 
fact that issues such as water scarcity are yet to receive the necessary attention in the 
traditional outlines of what a security threat entails.  
Much of the misconceptions in the media about the situation of drying water sources around 
the world come from the fact that cases such as the Darfur conflict are incorrectly considered 
“water wars”. For this reason, water wars are conceptualised more precisely in Chapter 2. It 
highlights that what was experienced in Darfur was a pseudo-water war, and should rather be 
considered a conflict which possessed a causal relationship with water scarcity. Implications 
of climate change will involve either conflict or cooperation. Although cooperation is the 
obvious choice, it does come with consequences which impact heavily on state sovereignty. 
The aim of Chapter 2 was to highlight that the undeniable consequences of climate change, 
yet to show fully what the security implications might be. Violence will be turned to 
increasingly if environmental issues are not properly addressed.  
Chapter 3 consists of an outline of the theoretical components which underpin this thesis. 
Theory and its utility of describing and explaining real life events, power relations and 
institutions was the sole purpose of Chapter 3. The many different strands of Green Theory 
are studied as well as Securitization Theory. Global environmental theories are relatively new 
to IR and this chapter highlights how Green Theorists have yet to construct one grand theory 
which neatly incorporates such values and norms. The section on Green Theory highlights a 
multifaceted theory which comprises of different perspectives even on the meaning of 
“environment”. This has resulted in several different strands of Green Theory. Nevertheless, 
the chapter described the dominant strands and outlined each of their beliefs, norms and 
values. The prescriptions that each strand suggest would all work toward making human 
populations more aware of the environment and their impact on it. This could have major 
implications for reversing environmental damage and halting future conflicts over resources.  
As environmental issues seem to be continually side-lined by traditional security threats, the 
next section in Chapter 3 highlighted how things could be different if resources were to be 
securitized and placed within the realm of “high politics”. This section proved to be heavily 
influenced by the intricacies of Securitization Theory. This provided a helpful framework 
when analysing the Darfur conflict and deciding whether the issue of water had been 
securitized during the conflict. Once more, as this chapter shows, environmental issues still 
seem to straddle high and low politics. IR needs to address this blurred placement of 
environmental issues as with the intensification of climate change comes the continued 
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presence of environmental security and possible conflict. Securitization is not always the 
answer as is highlighted in Chapter 3. There are many unwanted and unfair consequences 
involved if environmental resources are to be securitized in the future. These include the 
involvement of the military in aspects of the environment, not something Green Theorists 
believe will help, and the undemocratic practice of potentially invading a country because of 
such issues.  
Chapter 4 gave a detailed account of the conflict in Darfur. The 2003 conflict could be traced 
decades back to when the central government began favouring the Arab communities over the 
African communities. This favouring had physical manifestations such as lack of 
development in African regions, no funding for scarce resources, and policies which directly 
generated ethnic hatred between the Africans and the Arabs. The droughts intensified ethnic 
tensions, when large numbers of Arab herders made their way to Darfur in search of water 
and grazing land. This put immense stress on the environment and was a catalyst for the 
conflict. It is not surprising that in 2003, after years of neglect, two dominant rebel groups 
(JEM and SLA) emerged and sought to enforce change for the region of Darfur. The 
government did not stand idly by while these groups tried to form an insurgency, rather they 
enlisted the help of the Janjaweed (Arab militias), who went on to commit several crimes 
against humanity during the conflict by raiding and raping any villages suspected of 
supporting the JEM and SLA.   
Chapter 4 analysed many perspectives on the conflict, providing comprehensive background 
on the conflict, the causes of the conflict (environmental stress, ethnic tensions, unfair 
government policies etc.) and the Janjaweed. These elements provided a base of 
understanding and also allowed for theories previously discussed throughout this thesis to be 
applied to the conflict. The chapter details what drove the JEM and SLA and also analysed 
the involvement of the international community. The next section in the chapter went on to 
apply Securitization Theory and Green Theories. It took a diagram from Chapter 2 
(“Pathways to Conflict” from Gleditsch et al., 2016) and directly applied it to Darfur and the 
matter of migration for environmental resources. The different types of conflict were also 
applied to Darfur, which neatly outlined what type of conflict Darfur faced; this allowed great 
insight into the conflict and possible reasons as to why it was as violent as it was. Most of 
ideas which had been presented in Chapters 2 and 3 and applied to Darfur provided a 
different, or untold, perspective on the conflict. Through application of such ideas and 
theories, Chapter 4 could highlight that Darfur is a case where water scarcity was a factor in 
the conflict, but not the only or even a major factor.  
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Research Problem and Questions Answered 
The research problem in Chapter 1 states that it is a possibility that water scarcity has the 
ability to influence ethnic tensions which have existed at least since the partitioning of Africa 
and ponders on whether an absence of good governance combined with tensions can erupt 
into protracted violence. It is the contention of this thesis that, yes, water scarcity does have 
the ability to push ethnic tensions into armed conflict, especially when there is a lack of good 
governance. Chapter 4 and the case of Darfur make this conclusion irrefutable. Because the 
international community has yet to accept that issues such as water scarcity might be better 
placed within the realm of “high politics”, issues like this will continue to occur.  
IR scholarship as stated in Chapter 1 remains divided when it comes to issues such as ethnic 
insecurities (high politics) and environmental objectification (low politics). There is yet to be 
consensus on whether environmental issues which accompany environmental objectification 
should be securitized and therefore pushed into the realm of high politics. The consequences 
which may ensue have yet to be experienced and therefore IR scholarship cannot provide a 
judgement on the topic. 
The IR scholarship which has framed the purported link between water insecurity and violent 
conflict is increasingly credible. It is the position of this thesis that such IR scholarship is 
credible because of the evidence provided in the case study of the Darfur conflict. It is also 
the position of this thesis that there is heuristic utility in the concomitant securitization of 
water because it could save thousands of innocent lives and halt ethnic tensions from turning 
into protracted armed conflicts. This is not to say that the consequences of securitization may 
not bring worse consequences than conflict. This will be discussed further.  
Even though water scarcity has never (as yet) caused a conflict on its own does not mean that 
it should not be regarded as a major threat to peace all over the world. The case of Darfur is 
not isolated. There are dozens of countries which are considered “low-income countries”, 
which have intense ethnic tensions and lack good governance. If climate change continues at 
the current rate, then all of these countries are at great risk of becoming violent. This will 
have major implications for IR and global stability. If water were to be securitized within such 
countries, emergency help would be available, yet the consequences might have far-reaching 
implications. Many might never have to go without water, but they may later be faced with 
deteriorating democratic practices, diminished state sovereignty and authoritarian 
management of water supplies. These consequences could all lead to conflict and dehydration 
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as well. The securitization of water is still a contested idea and its effects remain to be seen, 
however, its heuristic utility may outweigh such negative consequences.  
Green Theories, although mismatched and often difficult to define, do provide an analytically 
useful alternative/addition to the conservative theories of realism and liberalism especially 
when it comes to environmental issues. Through seeing that the humans have gone wrong in 
their implicit belief that they are more important than the environment, one can see that Green 
Theories do offer an outline which might change the relationship between humans and the 
environment. If Green Theories gain traction as normative theories rather than descriptive 
ones, then environmental degradation would not be as bad as it is today. Green Theories, if 
they were to become as strong as liberalism, would ensure that people see the environment as 
of equal importance to themselves and therefore make more attempts to protect it. The world 
would take a step back from dizzying mass production and notice that using the natural 
resources for economic gain at such a rate ensures that the future will be one of dehydration, 
famine and general destruction.  
There is plenty of evidence that water scarcity is associated with armed conflicts within 
diverse ethnic communities in Africa. One can see this in the case of the Sudanese province of 
Darfur. In Darfur in 2003, the physical absence of water triggered ethnic tensions to become 
violent. It was the element of competition over extremely limited supplies of water which 
triggered a larger ethnic clash. Water became a supply which manifested the government’s 
twisted policies and ethnic prejudice. These are the elements which ensured that violence 
broke out in Sudan.  
Research Gaps and Concluding Remarks 
There are still elements that have yet to be resolved in this thesis and the wider academic field 
on the topic of water scarcity and conflict. For instance, it has been impossible to answer the 
question as to whether environmental issues would be addressed more efficiently if they were 
considered in terms of “high politics”. Not one journal, book or article can explicitly answer 
that question yet. It is a question that needs an answer an imperatively, and an appropriate 
answer could provide a much needed blueprint for dealing with climate change and scarcity-
related conflicts. Green Theorists might also be advised to form a position or framework on 
conflict and share their stance on how such eventuality might be avoided.  Conflict around 
resource scarcities are becoming more regular and more severe, and if the international 
community does not work out some method to deal better with scarcity, then the world could 
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be heading for more instability and violence. The Securitization discourse could prove to be 
completely rational and serve as an early warning sign.  
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